Matching μ-Logic

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Abstract—**Matching logic is a logic for specifying and reasoning about structure by means of patterns and pattern matching. This paper makes two contributions. First, it proposes a sound and complete proof system for matching logic in its full generality. Previously, sound and complete deduction for matching logic was known only for particular theories providing equality and membership. Second, it proposes matching μ-logic, an extension of matching logic with a least fixpoint μ-binder. It is shown that matching μ-logic captures as special instances many important logics in mathematics and computer science, including first-order logic with least fixpoints, modal μ-logic as well as dynamic logic and various temporal logics such as infinite/finite-trace linear temporal logic and computation tree logic, and notably reachability logic, the underlying logic of the K framework for programming language semantics and formal analysis. Matching μ-logic therefore serves as a unifying foundation for specifying and reasoning about fixpoints and induction, programming languages and program specification and verification.**

I. Introduction

Matching logic [1] (shortened as ML) is a first-order logic (FOL) variant for specifying and reasoning about structure by means of patterns and pattern matching. In the practice of *program verification*, ML is used to specify static properties of programs in reachability logic [2] (shortened as RL), which takes an operational semantics of a programming language as axioms and yields a program verifier that can prove any reachability properties of any programs written in that language. As a successful implementation of ML and RL, the $\mathbb{K}$ framework (http://kframework.org) has been used to define the formal semantics of various real languages such as C [3], Java [4], JavaScript [5], and to verify complex program properties [6].

A sound and complete Hilbert-style proof system $\mathcal{P}$ of ML is given in [1], whose proof of completeness is by a reduction to pure predicate logic. However, the proof system $\mathcal{P}$ is only applicable to theories where a set of special *definedness symbols* are given together with appropriate axioms, which can be used to define both equality and membership as derived constructs. This leaves the question of whether there is any proof system of ML that is applicable to *all theories*, open. Our first contribution is to answer this question by proposing a new proof system $\mathcal{H}$ of ML, and show that it is (locally) complete *without requiring definedness or any other symbols*.

Our second and main contribution was stimulated by limitations of RL itself as a logic to reason about dynamic behavior of programs. Specifically, as its name suggests, RL can only define and reason about reachability claims. In particular, it

is not capable of expressing liveness or many other interesting properties that temporal or dynamic logics can naturally express. Therefore, we propose *matching μ-logic* (shortened as MmL), which extends ML with a least fixpoint μ-binder. It turns out that MmL subsumes not only RL, but also a variety of common logics/calculi that are used to reason about fixpoints and induction, especially for program verification and model checking, including first-order logic with least fixpoints (LFP) [7], modal μ-logic [8] (as well as various temporal logics [9], [10] and dynamic logic (DL) [11]–[13]). For each of these logics/calculi, we prove a *conservative extension result*, showing that our definitions are faithful.

We organize the rest of the paper as follows. We start with a quick but comprehensive overview of ML in Section II, and then present the new proof system $\mathcal{H}$ in Section III. We present MmL in Section IV, and show how to define recursive symbols as syntactic sugar in Section V. Then we discuss how MmL subsumes all the following: first-order logic with least fixpoints (Section VI); modal μ-logic and its fragment logics (Section VIII); reachability logic (Section IX). We compare with related work and conclude the paper with a proposal of future work in Sections X and XI, respectively.

All proof details can be found in appendix.

II. Matching Logic Preliminaries

Matching logic (ML) [1] is a variant of many-sorted FOL that makes no distinction between function and predicate symbols, allowing them to uniformly build *patterns*. Patterns define both structural and logical constraints, and are interpreted in models as sets of elements (those that *match* them).

A. Matching logic syntax

Definition 1. A *matching logic signature* or simply a *signature* $\Sigma = (S, \text{Var}, \Sigma)$ is a triple with a nonempty set S of *sorts*, an S-indexed set $\text{Var} = \{\text{Var}_s\}_{s \in S}$ of countably infinitely many *sorted variables* denoted $x{:}s, y{:}s$, etc., and an $(S^* \times S)$-indexed set $\Sigma = \{\Sigma_{s_1\ldots s_n, s}\}_{s_1,\ldots,s_n, s \in S}$ of countably many *many-sorted symbols*. When $n = 0$, we write $\sigma \in \Sigma_{\lambda, s}$ and say σ is a *constant*. Matching logic Σ-*patterns* or simply (Σ-*)patterns* are defined inductively for all sorts $s, s', s_1, \ldots, s_n \in S$ as follows:

$$\varphi_s ::= x{:}s \in \text{Var}_s \mid \varphi_s \wedge \varphi_s \mid \neg\varphi_s \mid \exists x{:}s' . \varphi_s$$
$$\mid \sigma(\varphi_{s_1}, \ldots, \varphi_{s_n}) \quad \text{if } \sigma \in \Sigma_{s_1\ldots s_n, s}$$

We use $\text{PATTERN}^{\text{ML}}(\Sigma) = \{\text{PATTERN}^{\text{ML}}_s(\Sigma)\}_{s \in S}$ to denote the S-indexed set of Σ-patterns generated by the above grammar (modulo α-equivalence, see later). We feel free to drop the signature Σ and simply write $\text{PATTERN}^{\text{ML}} = \{\text{PATTERN}^{\text{ML}}_s\}_{s \in S}$.

Intuitively speaking, patterns evaluate to the sets of elements that *match* them. A variable $x{:}s$ is a pattern that is matched by exactly one element; $\varphi_1 \wedge \varphi_2$ is matched by elements matching both φ_1 and φ_2; $\neg\varphi$ is matched by elements not matching φ; $\exists x{:}s' . \varphi$ is a pattern that allows us to abstract away irrelevant parts (i.e., $x{:}s'$) of the structures, which can match patterns $\sigma(\varphi_{s_1}, \ldots, \varphi_{s_n})$. This intuition is formalized in Definition 4.

We often abbreviate $\Sigma = (S, \text{VAR}, \Sigma)$ as (S, Σ) or just Σ. When we write a pattern, we assume it is well-formed without explicitly specifying the necessary conditions. When $\sigma \in \Sigma_{\lambda, s}$ is a constant, we write σ to mean the pattern $\sigma()$. We adopt the following derived constructs as syntactic sugar:

$$\varphi_1 \vee \varphi_2 \equiv \neg(\neg\varphi_1 \wedge \neg\varphi_2) \qquad\qquad \forall x{:}s . \varphi \equiv \neg\exists x{:}s . \neg\varphi$$
$$\varphi_1 \rightarrow \varphi_2 \equiv \neg\varphi_1 \vee \varphi_2 \qquad\qquad \top_s \equiv \exists x{:}s . x{:}s$$
$$\varphi_1 \leftrightarrow \varphi_2 \equiv (\varphi_1 \rightarrow \varphi_2) \wedge (\varphi_2 \rightarrow \varphi_1) \quad \bot_s \equiv \neg\top_s$$

Intuitively, $\varphi_1 \vee \varphi_2$ is matched by elements matching φ_1 or φ_2; $\top_s$ is matched by all elements (in the sort universe s); and $\bot_s$ is matched by no elements. The formal semantics of these derived constructs is given in Proposition 5. Standard precedences are adopted to avoid parentheses. The scope of "$\forall$" and "$\exists$" goes as far as possible to the right. We drop sort s whenever possible, so we write $x, \top, \bot$ instead of $x{:}s, \top_s, \bot_s$.

Like in FOL, "$\forall$" and "$\exists$" are *binders*, and we adopt the standard notions of *free variables*, α-*renaming*, and *capture-avoiding substitution*. We let $FV(\varphi)$ denote the set of free variables in φ. When $FV(\varphi) = \emptyset$, we say φ is *closed*. We regard α-equivalent patterns φ and φ' *as the same*, and write $\varphi \equiv \varphi'$. We let $\varphi[\psi/x]$ be the result of substituting ψ for every free occurrence of x in φ, where α-renaming happens implicitly to prevent variable capture. We let $\varphi[\psi_1/x_1, \ldots, \psi_n/x_n]$ be the result of simultaneously substituting $\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_n$ for $x_1, \ldots, x_n$.

B. Matching logic semantics

ML symbols are interpreted as *relations*, and thus ML patterns evaluate to *sets of elements* (those "matching" them).

Definition 2. Given $\Sigma = (S, \Sigma)$, a *matching logic Σ-model* $M = (\{M_s\}_{s \in S}, \{\sigma_M\}_{\sigma \in \Sigma})$, or simply a (Σ)-*model*, contains

- a nonempty carrier set M_s for each sort $s \in S$;
- an interpretation $\sigma_M : M_{s_1} \times \cdots \times M_{s_n} \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(M_s)$ for each $\sigma \in \Sigma_{s_1 \ldots s_n, s}$, where $\mathcal{P}(M_s)$ is the powerset of M_s.

We overload the letter M to also mean the S-indexed set $\{M_s\}_{s \in S}$. The usual FOL models are special cases of ML models, where $|\sigma_M(a_1, \ldots, a_n)| = 1$ for all $a_1 \in M_{s_1}, \ldots, a_n \in M_{s_n}$. Partial FOL models [14] are also special cases with $|\sigma_M(a_1, \ldots, a_n)| \leq 1$, as we can capture the undefinedness of the partial function σ_M on $a_1, \ldots, a_n$ by $\sigma_M(a_1, \ldots, a_n) = \emptyset$.

We tacitly use the same letter σ_M to mean its *pointwise extension*, $\sigma_M : \mathcal{P}(M_{s_1}) \times \cdots \times \mathcal{P}(M_{s_n}) \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(M_s)$, defined as:
$$\sigma_M(A_1, \ldots, A_n) = \bigcup \{\sigma_M(a_1, \ldots, a_n) \mid a_1 \in A_1, \ldots, a_n \in A_n\}$$
for all $A_1 \subseteq M_{s_1}, \ldots, A_n \subseteq M_{s_n}$.

Proposition 3. *For all $A_i, A'_i \subseteq M_{s_i}$, $1 \leq i \leq n$, the pointwise extension σ_M has the following property of propagation:*

$\sigma_M(A_1, \ldots, A_n) = \emptyset$ *if $A_i = \emptyset$ for some $1 \leq i \leq n$,*

$\sigma_M(A_1 \cup A'_1, \ldots, A_n \cup A'_n) = \bigcup_{1 \leq i \leq n, B_i \in \{A_i, A'_i\}} \sigma_M(B_1, \ldots, B_n)$,

$\sigma(A_1, \ldots, A_n) \subseteq \sigma(A'_1, \ldots, A'_n)$ *if $A_i \subseteq A'_i$ for all $1 \leq i \leq n$.*

Definition 4. Let $\Sigma = (S, \text{VAR}, \Sigma)$ and let M be a Σ-model. Given a function $\rho : \text{VAR} \rightarrow M$, called an *$M$-valuation*, let its *extension* $\bar{\rho} : \text{PATTERN}^{\text{ML}} \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(M)$ be inductively defined as:

- $\bar{\rho}(x) = \{\rho(x)\}$, for all $x \in \text{VAR}_s$;
- $\bar{\rho}(\varphi_1 \wedge \varphi_2) = \bar{\rho}(\varphi_1) \cap \bar{\rho}(\varphi_2)$, for $\varphi_1, \varphi_2 \in \text{PATTERN}_s$;
- $\bar{\rho}(\neg\varphi) = M_s \setminus \bar{\rho}(\varphi)$, for all $\varphi \in \text{PATTERN}_s$;
- $\bar{\rho}(\exists x . \varphi) = \bigcup_{a \in M_s} \overline{\rho[a/x]}(\varphi)$, for all $x \in \text{VAR}_{s'}$;
- $\bar{\rho}(\sigma(\varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_n)) = \sigma_M(\bar{\rho}(\varphi_1), \ldots, \bar{\rho}(\varphi_n))$, for $\sigma \in \Sigma_{s_1 \ldots s_n, s}$;

where "$\setminus$" is set difference and $\rho[a/x]$ denotes the M-valuation ρ' with $\rho'(x) = a$ and $\rho'(y) = \rho(y)$ for all $y \not\equiv x$.

Proposition 5. *The following propositions hold:*

- $\bar{\rho}(\top_s) = M_s$ *and* $\bar{\rho}(\bot_s) = \emptyset$;
- $\bar{\rho}(\varphi_1 \vee \varphi_2) = \bar{\rho}(\varphi_1) \cup \bar{\rho}(\varphi_2)$;
- $\bar{\rho}(\varphi_1 \rightarrow \varphi_2) = M_s \setminus (\bar{\rho}(\varphi_1) \setminus \bar{\rho}(\varphi_2))$, *for $\varphi_1, \varphi_2 \in \text{PATTERN}_s$;*
- $\bar{\rho}(\varphi_1 \leftrightarrow \varphi_2) = M_s \setminus (\bar{\rho}(\varphi_1) \triangle \bar{\rho}(\varphi_2))$, *for $\varphi_1, \varphi_2 \in \text{PATTERN}_s$;*
- $\bar{\rho}(\forall x . \varphi) = \bigcap_{a \in M_{s'}} \overline{\rho[a/x]}(\varphi)$, *for all $x \in \text{VAR}_{s'}$;*

where "$\triangle$" is set symmetric difference.

Definition 6. We say pattern φ is *valid* in M, written $M \vDash_{\text{ML}} \varphi$, iff $\bar{\rho}(\varphi) = M$ for all $\rho : \text{VAR} \rightarrow M$. Let Γ be a set of patterns called *axioms*. We write $M \vDash_{\text{ML}} \Gamma$ iff $M \vDash_{\text{ML}} \psi$ for all $\psi \in \Gamma$. We write $\Gamma \vDash_{\text{ML}} \varphi$ and say that φ is *valid* in Γ iff $M \vDash_{\text{ML}} \varphi$ for all $M \vDash_{\text{ML}} \Gamma$. We abbreviate $\emptyset \vDash_{\text{ML}} \varphi$ as $\vDash_{\text{ML}} \varphi$. We call the pair (Σ, Γ) a *matching logic Σ-theory*, or simply a *(Σ-)theory*. We say that M is *a model of the theory* (Σ, Γ) iff $M \vDash_{\text{ML}} \Gamma$.

C. Important notations

Several mathematical instruments of practical importance, such as definedness, totality, equality, membership, set containment, functions and partial functions, and constructors, can all be defined using patterns. We give a compact summary of the definitions and notations that are needed in this paper.

Definition 7. For any (not necessarily distinct) sorts s, s', let us consider a unary symbol $\lceil \_ \rceil^{s'}_s \in \Sigma_{s, s'}$, called the *definedness symbol*, and the pattern/axiom $\lceil x{:}s \rceil^{s'}_s$, called (DEFINEDNESS). We define *totality* "$\lfloor \_ \rfloor^{s'}_s$", *equality* "$=^{s'}_s$", *membership* "$\in^{s'}_s$", and *set containment* "$\subseteq^{s'}_s$" as derived constructs:

$$\lfloor \varphi \rfloor^{s'}_s \equiv \neg\lceil \neg\varphi \rceil^{s'}_s \qquad\qquad \varphi_1 =^{s'}_s \varphi_2 \equiv \lfloor \varphi_1 \leftrightarrow \varphi_2 \rfloor^{s'}_s$$
$$x \in^{s'}_s \varphi \equiv \lceil x \wedge \varphi \rceil^{s'}_s \qquad\qquad \varphi_1 \subseteq^{s'}_s \varphi_2 \equiv \lfloor \varphi_1 \rightarrow \varphi_2 \rfloor^{s'}_s$$

and feel free to drop the (not necessarily distinct) sorts s, s'.

For all M satisfying (DEFINEDNESS), $(\lceil \_ \rceil^{s'}_s)_M(a) = M_{s'}$ for all $a \in M_s$ [1, Proposition 5.2]. Thus, for all ρ, we have $\bar{\rho}(\lceil \varphi \rceil^{s'}_s) = M_{s'}$ if $\bar{\rho}(\varphi) \neq \emptyset$, and $\bar{\rho}(\lceil \varphi \rceil^{s'}_s) = \emptyset$ otherwise; i.e., $\lceil \varphi \rceil^{s'}_s$ says, in sort universe s', if φ is defined in universe s. Definition 7 constructs have expected semantics: $\bar{\rho}(\lfloor \varphi \rfloor^{s'}_s) = M_{s'}$ if $\bar{\rho}(\varphi) = M_s$, and $\bar{\rho}(\lfloor \varphi \rfloor^{s'}_s) = \emptyset$ otherwise; $\bar{\rho}(\varphi_1 =^{s'}_s \varphi_2) = M_{s'}$ if $\bar{\rho}(\varphi_1) = \bar{\rho}(\varphi_2)$, and $\bar{\rho}(\varphi_1 =^{s'}_s \varphi_2) = \emptyset$ otherwise; etc.

Functions and *partial functions* can be defined by axioms:

(FUNCTION)	$\exists y \ . \ \sigma(x_1, \ldots, x_n) = y$
(PARTIAL FUNCTION)	$\exists y \ . \ \sigma(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \subseteq y$

(FUNCTION) requires $\sigma(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ to contain exactly one element and (PARTIAL FUNCTION) requires it to contain at most one element (recall that y evaluates to a singleton set). For brevity, we use the function notation $\sigma \colon s_1 \times \cdots \times s_n \to s$ to mean we automatically assume the (FUNCTION) axiom of σ. Similarly, partial functions are written as $\sigma \colon s_1 \times \cdots \times s_n \rightharpoonup s$.

Constructors are extensively used in building programs and data, as well as semantic structures to define and reason about languages and programs. They can be characterized in the "no junk, no confusion" spirit [15]. Let $\bar{\Sigma} = (S, \Sigma)$ be a signature and $C = \{c_i \in \Sigma_{s_i^1 \ldots s_i^{m_i}, s_i} \mid 1 \le i \le n\} \subseteq \Sigma$ be a set of symbols called *constructors*. Consider the following axioms/patterns:

(NO JUNK) for all sorts $s \in S$:

$$\bigvee_{c_i \in C \text{ with } s_i = s} \exists x_i^1 \colon s_i^1 \ldots \exists x_i^{m_i} \colon s_i^{m_i} \ . \ c_i(x_i^1, \ldots, x_i^{m_i})$$

(NO CONFUSION I) for all $i \ne j$ and $s_i = s_j$:

$$\neg(c_i(x_i^1, \ldots, x_i^{m_i}) \land c_j(x_j^1, \ldots, x_j^{m_j}))$$

(NO CONFUSION II) for all $1 \le i \le n$:

$$(c_i(x_i^1, \ldots, x_i^{m_i}) \land c_i(y_i^1, \ldots, y_i^{m_i})) \to c_i(x_i^1 \land y_i^1, \ldots, x_i^{m_i} \land y_i^{m_i})$$

Intuitively, (NO JUNK) says everything is constructed; (NO CONFUSION I) says different constructs build different things; and (NO CONFUSION II) says constructors are injective. We refer to the the last two axioms as (NO CONFUSION).

D. Defining first-order logic in matching logic

Given a FOL signature (S, Σ, Π) with *function symbols* Σ and *predicate symbols* Π, the *syntax* of FOL is given by:

$$t_s ::= x \in \text{VAR}_s \mid f(t_{s_1}, \ldots, t_{s_n}) \text{ with } f \in \Sigma_{s_1 \ldots s_n, s}$$

$$\varphi ::= \pi(t_{s_1}, \ldots, t_{s_n}) \text{ with } \pi \in \Pi_{s_1 \ldots s_n} \mid \varphi \to \varphi \mid \neg\varphi \mid \forall x \ . \ \varphi$$

To subsume the syntax, we define a ML signature $\bar{\Sigma}^{\text{FOL}} = (S^{\text{FOL}}, \Sigma^{\text{FOL}})$, where $S^{\text{FOL}} = S \cup \{Pred\}$ contains a distinguished sort *Pred* for FOL formulas and $\Sigma^{\text{FOL}} = \{f \colon s_1 \times \cdots \times s_n \to s \mid f \in \Sigma_{s_1 \ldots s_n, s}\} \cup \{\pi \in \Sigma_{s_1 \ldots s_n, Pred}^{\text{FOL}} \mid \pi \in \Pi_{s_1 \ldots s_n}\}$ contains FOL function symbols as ML functions and FOL predicate symbols as ML symbols that return *Pred*. Let Γ^{FOL} be the resulting $\bar{\Sigma}^{\text{FOL}}$-theory. Notice that we use the function notations so Γ^{FOL} contains the (FUNCTION) axioms for all $f \in \Sigma^{\text{FOL}}$.

Proposition 8. *All FOL formulas φ are $\bar{\Sigma}^{\text{FOL}}$-patterns of sort Pred, and we have $\vDash_{FOL} \varphi$ iff $\Gamma^{\text{FOL}} \vDash_{ML} \varphi$ (see [1]).*

E. Matching logic proof system $\mathcal{P}$ with definedness symbols

ML has a *conditional* sound and complete Hilbert-style proof system [1, Fig. 5], here referred to as $\mathcal{P}$. We let $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathcal{P}} \varphi$ denote its provability relation. $\mathcal{P}$ can prove all patterns φ that are valid in Γ *under the condition that* Γ contains definedness symbols and (DEFINEDNESS) axioms. In fact, $\mathcal{P}$ proof rules use equality "$=$" and membership "$\in$", both requiring definedness symbols. This means that $\mathcal{P}$ *is not applicable at all* to any theories that do not contain definedness symbols.

We wrap up this section by reviewing the soundness and completeness theorem of $\mathcal{P}$. In Section III, we propose a new ML proof system $\mathcal{H}$ that is sound and (locally) complete *without requiring the theories to contain definedness symbols.*

Theorem 9 (Soundness and completeness of $\mathcal{P}$, see [1]). *For all theories Γ containing the definedness symbols and axioms (Definition 7) and all patterns φ, we have $\Gamma \vDash_{ML} \varphi$ iff $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathcal{P}} \varphi$.*

III. A NEW PROOF SYSTEM OF MATCHING LOGIC

Our first main contribution is a new ML proof system $\mathcal{H}$ that is sound and (locally) complete *without requiring definedness symbols and axioms*, and thus extends the completeness result in [1], re-stated in Theorem 9. We first need the following:

Definition 10. A *context C* is a pattern with a distinguished placeholder variable $\square$. We write $C[\varphi]$ to mean the result of *replacing $\square$ with φ without any α-renaming*, so free variables in φ may become bound in $C[\varphi]$, *different* from capture-avoiding substitution. A *single symbol context* has the form $C_\sigma \equiv \sigma(\varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_{i-1}, \square, \varphi_{i+1}, \ldots, \varphi_n)$ where $\sigma \in \Sigma_{s_1 \ldots s_n, s}$ and $\varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_{i-1}, \varphi_{i+1}, \ldots, \varphi_n$ are patterns of appropriate sorts. A *nested symbol context* is inductively defined as follows:

- $\square$ is a nested symbol context, called the *identity context*;
- if C_σ is a single symbol context, and C is a nested symbol context, then $C_\sigma[C[\square]]$ is a nested symbol context.

Intuitively, a context C is a nested symbol context iff the path to $\square$ in C contains only symbols and no logic connectives.

The proof system $\mathcal{H}$ (Fig. 1, above the double line) has four categories of proof rules. The first consists of all propositional tautologies as axioms and (MODUS PONENS). The second completes the (complete) axiomatization of pure predicate logic (two rules); see, e.g., [16]. The third category contains four rules that capture the property of propagation (Proposition 3). The fourth category contains two technical proof rules that are needed for the completeness result of $\mathcal{H}$. Note that unlike $\mathcal{P}$, all proof rules of $\mathcal{H}$ are general rules and do not depend on any special symbols such as the definedness symbols.

Definition 11. For an axiom set Γ and a pattern φ, we write $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathcal{H}} \varphi$ iff φ can be proved by $\mathcal{H}$ with the patterns in Γ as additional axioms. We abbreviate $\emptyset \vdash_{\mathcal{H}} \varphi$ as $\vdash_{\mathcal{H}} \varphi$.

There are two interesting observations about $\mathcal{H}$. First, (FRAMING) allows us to lift local reasoning through symbol contexts, and thus supports *compositional reasoning* in ML. Second, the propagation axioms plus (FRAMING) inspire a close relationship between ML and modal logics, where the *ML symbols* and the *modal logic modalities* are dual:

Proposition 12. *Let $\sigma \in \Sigma_{s_1 \ldots s_n, s}$ and define its "dual" as $\bar{\sigma}(\varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_n) \equiv \neg\sigma(\neg\varphi_1, \ldots, \neg\varphi_n)$. Then we have:*

- *(K): $\vdash_{\mathcal{H}} \bar{\sigma}(\varphi_1 \to \varphi_1', \ldots, \varphi_n \to \varphi_n')$*
  $\to (\bar{\sigma}(\varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_n) \to \bar{\sigma}(\varphi_1', \ldots, \varphi_n'))$;
- *(N): $\vdash_{\mathcal{H}} \varphi_i$ implies $\vdash_{\mathcal{H}} \bar{\sigma}(\varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_i, \ldots, \varphi_n)$.*

These rules also appear in [17], [18] as proof rules of polyadic modal logic. When $n = 1$, we obtain the standard (K) rule and (N) rule of normal modal logic [19].

(Propositional Tautology)	φ if φ is a propositional tautology over patterns of the same sort
(Modus Ponens)	$\dfrac{\varphi_1 \quad \varphi_1 \rightarrow \varphi_2}{\varphi_2}$
($\exists$-Quantifier)	$\varphi[y/x] \rightarrow \exists x . \varphi$
($\exists$-Generalization)	$\dfrac{\varphi_1 \rightarrow \varphi_2}{(\exists x.\varphi_1) \rightarrow \varphi_2}$ if $x \notin FV(\varphi_2)$
(Propagation$_\perp$)	$C_\sigma[\perp] \rightarrow \perp$
(Propagation$_\vee$)	$C_\sigma[\varphi_1 \vee \varphi_2] \rightarrow C_\sigma[\varphi_1] \vee C_\sigma[\varphi_2]$
(Propagation$_\exists$)	$C_\sigma[\exists x.\varphi] \rightarrow \exists x.C_\sigma[\varphi]$ $\quad$ if $x \notin FV(C_\sigma[\exists x.\varphi])$
(Framing)	$\dfrac{\varphi_1 \rightarrow \varphi_2}{C_\sigma[\varphi_1] \rightarrow C_\sigma[\varphi_2]}$
(Existence)	$\exists x . x$
(Singleton Variable)	$\neg(C_1[x \wedge \varphi] \wedge C_2[x \wedge \neg\varphi])$
	where C_1 and C_2 are nested symbol contexts.
(Set Variable Substitution)	$\dfrac{\varphi}{\varphi[\psi/X]}$
(Pre-Fixpoint)	$\varphi[\mu X . \varphi/X] \rightarrow \mu X . \varphi$
(Knaster-Tarski)	$\dfrac{\varphi[\psi/X] \rightarrow \psi}{\mu X . \varphi \rightarrow \psi}$

The upper block above is $\mathcal{H}$, the lower block together form $\mathcal{H}_\mu$.

Fig. 1. Sound and complete proof system $\mathcal{H}$ of matching logic (above the double line) and the proof system $\mathcal{H}_\mu$ of matching μ-logic

We present three important properties about $\mathcal{H}$. All proof details can be found in appendix. The first property is the soundness theorem of $\mathcal{H}$.

Theorem 13 (Soundness of $\mathcal{H}$). $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathcal{H}} \varphi$ *implies* $\Gamma \vDash_{ML} \varphi$.

The second property is a version of *deduction theorem* of $\mathcal{H}$ which requires definedness symbols and axioms.

Theorem 14 (Deduction theorem). *For all axiom sets Γ containing (Definedness) axioms (see Definition 7) and patterns ψ, φ with ψ closed, we have $\Gamma \cup \{\psi\} \vdash_{\mathcal{H}} \varphi$ iff $\Gamma \cup \vdash_{\mathcal{H}} \lfloor \psi \rfloor \rightarrow \varphi$.*

The proof is standard, by induction on the proof length of $\Gamma \cup \{\psi\} \vdash_{\mathcal{H}} \varphi$. Here, we give it an intuitive semantic explanation. Suppose $\Gamma \cup \{\psi\} \vDash_{ML} \varphi$. Then for all models $M \vDash_{ML} \Gamma$, if ψ holds then φ also holds (we ignore valuations as ψ is closed). This means $M \vDash_{ML} \lfloor \psi \rfloor \rightarrow \varphi$, as $\lfloor \psi \rfloor$ evaluates to $\emptyset$ iff ψ does not hold in M. Note that $M \vDash_{ML} \psi \rightarrow \varphi$ is too strong as a conclusion, for it requires the evaluation of ψ is always contained in φ, even in models where ψ does not hold.

The third property is that we can prove all proof rules of $\mathcal{P}$ using $\mathcal{H}$ with (Definedness) as axioms. This immediately gives us the following (global) completeness result of $\mathcal{H}$:

Theorem 15. *For all axiom sets Γ containing (Definedness) axioms and all patterns φ, we have $\Gamma \vDash_{ML} \varphi$ implies $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathcal{H}} \varphi$.*

Finally, we state our main completeness result for $\mathcal{H}$:

Theorem 16 (Local completeness of $\mathcal{H}$). $\vDash_{ML} \varphi$ *implies* $\vdash_{\mathcal{H}} \varphi$.

Here, "local" means the theory is empty (i.e., no additional axioms); in comparison, Theorem 15 holds for non-empty theories. The proof of Theorem 16 is rather complex (see Appendix D). We drew inspiration from [20], where a similar result is proved for *hybrid modal logic*, using a mixture of modal and first-order techniques: the ideas of *canonical models* from modal logic and *witnessed sets* from first-order logic. Theorem 16 can be seen as a nontrivial generalization. Specifically, we extend hybrid modal logic with $\forall$-binder [20] in two directions. First, we consider multiple sorts, each coming with its own universe of worlds and logical infrastructure; the approach in [20] has only one sort, that of "formulas". Second, we allow arbitrarily many modalities of arbitrary arities (see Proposition 12); the approach in [20] only considers the usual, unary "necessity" modality "□" (and its dual "◇"). Polyadic, non-hybrid (i.e., without $\forall$-binder) variants of modal logic are known (see, e.g., [17]), but at our knowledge our work in this paper is the first to combine polyadic modalities and FOL quantifiers.

The full global completeness of $\mathcal{H}$ is left as future work. See Section X-B for more discussion.

IV. From Matching Logic to Matching μ-Logic

We extend ML with the least fixpoint μ-binder. We call the extended logic *matching μ-logic* (MmL), and study its syntax, semantics, and proof system. Many definitions, notations, and properties of ML that are introduced in Section II and III also work for MmL, so we only focus on parts where they differ.

A. Matching μ-logic syntax

Definition 17. A *matching μ-logic signature* $\Sigma = (S, \text{Var}, \Sigma)$ or simply a *signature* is the same as a matching logic signature *except that* $\text{Var} = \text{EVar} \cup \text{SVar}$ is now a disjoint union of two S-indexed sets of variables: the *element variables* denoted as $x{:}s$, $y{:}s$, etc. in EVar, and the *set variables* denoted as $X{:}s, Y{:}s$, etc in SVar. *Matching μ-logic Σ-patterns*, or simply *(Σ)-patterns*, are defined inductively for all sorts $s, s' \in S$ as:

$$\varphi_s ::= x{:}s \in \text{EVar}_s \mid X{:}s \in \text{SVar}_s \mid \cdots$$
$$\mid \mu X{:}s . \varphi_s \quad \text{if } \varphi_s \text{ is positive in } X{:}s,$$

where the "…" part is the same as in ML. Note that we only quantify over element variables, not set variables. We say φ_s is *positive* in $X{:}s$ if every free occurrence of $X{:}s$ is under an even number of negations. We let $\textsc{Pattern}(\Sigma) = \{\textsc{Pattern}_s\}_{s \in S}$ denote the set of all matching μ-logic Σ-patterns and feel free to drop the signature Σ.

From now on, we tacitly assume we are talking about MmL unless we explicitly say otherwise. Intuitively, element variables are like ML variables in that they evaluate to *elements*, while set variables evaluate to *sets*. The least fixpoint pattern $\mu X{:}s \,.\, \varphi_s$ gives *the least solution* (under set containment) of the equation $X{:}s = \varphi_s$ of set variable $X{:}s$ (this should be taken as merely intuition at this stage, because we may not have equality in the theories). The condition of positive occurrence guarantees the existence of such a least solution. The notion of free variables, α-renaming, and capture-avoiding substitution are extended to set variables and the μ-binder. The dual version of the least fixpoint μ-binder is the *greatest fixpoint ν-binder*, defined as $\nu X{:}s \,.\, \varphi_s \equiv \neg \mu X{:}s \,.\, \neg\varphi_s[\neg X{:}s/X{:}s]$, given that φ_s is positive in $X{:}s$, (which implies that $\neg\varphi_s[\neg X{:}s/X{:}s]$ is also positive in $X{:}s$, justifying the definition).

B. Matching μ-logic semantics

We first review a variant of the Knaster-Tarski theorem [21]:

Theorem 18 (Knaster-Tarski). *Let M be a nonempty set and $\mathcal{F}\colon \mathcal{P}(M) \to \mathcal{P}(M)$ be a monotone function, i.e., $\mathcal{F}(A) \subseteq \mathcal{F}(B)$ for all subsets $A \subseteq B$ of M. Then $\mathcal{F}$ has a unique least fixpoint $\mu\mathcal{F}$ and a unique greatest fixpoint $\nu\mathcal{F}$, given as:*

$$\mu\mathcal{F} = \bigcap \{A \in \mathcal{P}(M) \mid \mathcal{F}(A) \subseteq A\},$$
$$\nu\mathcal{F} = \bigcup \{A \in \mathcal{P}(M) \mid A \subseteq \mathcal{F}(A)\}.$$

We call A a pre-fixpoint of $\mathcal{F}$ whenever $\mathcal{F}(A) \subseteq A$, and a post-fixpoint of $\mathcal{F}$ whenever $A \subseteq \mathcal{F}(A)$.

MmL models are exactly ML models where sorts are associated with their carrier sets and symbols are interpreted as relations. Valuations are extended such that element variables are mapped to elements and set variables are mapped to subsets. Patterns are evaluated in the same way for the ML constructs, but extended with the evaluation of least fixpoint patterns $\mu X{:}s \,.\, \varphi$ as the *true least fixpoints* in models. Formally:

Definition 19. Let $\Sigma = (S, \textsc{Var}, \Sigma)$ be a signature with $\textsc{Var} = \textsc{EVar} \cup \textsc{SVar}$, and $M = (\{M_s\}_{s \in S}, \{\sigma_M\}_{\sigma \in \Sigma})$ be a Σ-model. A *valuation* $\rho\colon \textsc{Var} \to (M \cup \mathcal{P}(M))$ is a function such that $\rho(x) \in M_s$ for all $x \in \textsc{EVar}_s$ and $\rho(X) \in \mathcal{P}(M_s)$ for all $X \in \textsc{SVar}_s$. Its *extension* $\bar\rho\colon \textsc{Pattern} \to \mathcal{P}(M)$ is defined as in Definition 4, extended with:

- $\bar\rho(x) = \{\rho(x)\}$ for all $x \in \textsc{EVar}_s$;
- $\bar\rho(X) = \rho(X)$ for all $X \in \textsc{SVar}_s$;
- $\bar\rho(\mu X \,.\, \varphi) = \mu\mathcal{F}^\rho_{\varphi,X}$ for all $X \in \textsc{SVar}_s$, where $\mathcal{F}^\rho_{\varphi,X}(A) = \overline{\rho[A/X]}(\varphi)$ for all $A \subseteq M_s$.

Here $\rho[A/X]$ is the ρ' with $\rho'(X) = A$ and $\rho'(Y) = \rho(Y)$ for all $Y \not\equiv X$. Note $\mathcal{F}^\rho_{\varphi,X}$ is monotone, since φ is positive in X. The notions $M \vDash \varphi$, $M \vDash \Gamma$, and $\Gamma \vDash \varphi$ are defined as expected.

Proposition 20. *For all axiom sets Γ of matching logic patterns (without μ) and all matching logic patterns φ (without μ), we have $\Gamma \vDash_{ML} \varphi$ if and only if $\Gamma \vDash \varphi$.*

C. Example: capturing precisely term algebras

Many approaches to specifying formal semantics of programming languages are applications of *initial algebra semantics* [22]. In this subsection, we show how *term algebras*, a special case of initial algebras, can be *precisely captured* using MmL patterns as axioms. For simplicity, we discuss only *monosorted term algebras*, but the result can be extended to the many-sorted settings without any major technical difficulties using the techniques introduced in Section V.

Definition 21. Let $\Sigma = (\{Term\}, \Sigma)$ be a signature with one sort *Term* and at least one constant. Σ-*terms* are defined as:

$$t ::= c \in \Sigma_{\lambda, Term} \mid c(t_1, \ldots, t_n) \text{ for } c \in \Sigma_{Term\ldots Term, Term}$$

The Σ-*term algebra* $T^\Sigma = (\{T^\Sigma_{Term}\}, \{c_{T^\Sigma}\}_{c \in \Sigma})$ consists of:

- a carrier set T^Σ_{Term} of all Σ-terms;
- a function $c_{T^\Sigma}\colon T^\Sigma_{Term} \times \cdots \times T^\Sigma_{Term} \to T^\Sigma_{Term}$ for all $c \in \Sigma_{Term\ldots Term, Term}$ defined as $c_{T^\Sigma}(t_1, \ldots, t_n) = c(t_1, \ldots, t_n)$.

Proposition 22. *Let $\Sigma = (\{Term\}, \Sigma)$ be a signature with one sort Term and at least one constant. Define a Σ-theory Γ^{term}_Σ with (Function) and (No Confusion) axioms (see Section II-C) for all symbols in Σ, plus the following axiom:*

$$(\textsc{Inductive Domain}) \quad \mu D \,.\, \bigvee_{c \in \Sigma} c(D, \ldots, D)$$

Then for all Σ-models $M \vDash \Gamma^{term}_\Sigma$, M is isomorphic to T^Σ. In addition, for all extended signatures $\Sigma^+ \supseteq \Sigma$ and Σ^+-models $M \vDash \Gamma^{term}_\Sigma$, we have $M\big|_\Sigma$ is isomorphic to T^Σ, where $M\big|_\Sigma$ is the reduct model of M over the sub-signature Σ.

(Inductive Domain) forces that for all models M, the carrier set M_{Term} must be the *the smallest set* that is closed under all symbols in Σ, while (Function) and (No Confusion) force all symbols in Σ to be interpreted as injective functions, and different symbols construct different terms.

Proposition 22 immediately tells us that MmL cannot have a proof system that is both sound and complete for all theories, because one can capture precisely the model $(\mathbb{N}, +, \times)$ of natural numbers with addition and multiplication with a finite number of MmL axioms, and the model $(\mathbb{N}, +, \times)$, by Gödel's first incompleteness theorem [23], is not axiomatizable.

Proposition 23. *Let $\Sigma = (\{Nat\}, \{0 \in \Sigma_{\lambda, Nat}, succ \in \Sigma_{Nat, Nat}\})$ and the Σ-theory Γ^{term}_Σ be defined as in Proposition 22, where the (Inductive Domain) takes the following form:*

$$(\textsc{Inductive Domain}) \quad \mu D \,.\, 0 \vee succ(D)$$

Let the signature $\Sigma^\mathbb{N}$ extend Σ with two functions:

$$plus\colon Nat \times Nat \to Nat \qquad mult\colon Nat \times Nat \to Nat$$

and the $\Sigma^\mathbb{N}$-theory $\Gamma^\mathbb{N}$ extend Γ^{term}_Σ with the standard axioms:

$$plus(0, y) = y \qquad plus(succ(x), y) = succ(plus(x, y))$$
$$mult(0, y) = 0 \qquad mult(succ(x), y) = plus(y, mult(x, y))$$

Then, $\Gamma^\mathbb{N}$ captures precisely $(\mathbb{N}, +, \times)$, meaning that for all models $M \vDash \Gamma^\mathbb{N}$, M is isomorphic to $(\mathbb{N}, +, \times)$.

We finish this subsection by comparing Proposition 22 with the nontrivial result that the term algebra T^Σ has a *complete axiomatization* in FOL where the only predicate symbol is equality [24]. We refer to this complete FOL axiomatization as $\Gamma_{\mathsf{FOL}}(T^\Sigma)$. This means that for all FOL formulas φ, $\Gamma_{\mathsf{FOL}}(T^\Sigma) \vDash_{\mathsf{FOL}} \varphi$ iff $T^\Sigma \vDash_{\mathsf{FOL}} \varphi$. This result is *weaker* than Proposition 22, because by Löwenheim-Skolem theorem [25], the FOL theory $\Gamma_{\mathsf{FOL}}(T^\Sigma)$ has models of arbitrarily large cardinalities (if Σ contains non-constant constructors), meaning that there are models $M \vDash_{\mathsf{FOL}} \Gamma_{\mathsf{FOL}}(T^\Sigma)$ with *strictly more elements* than T^Σ, and thus cannot be isomorphic to T^Σ. It is just the case that the FOL models of $\Gamma_{\mathsf{FOL}}(T^\Sigma)$ satisfy exactly the same FOL formulas as T^Σ. Proposition 22, on the other hand, shows that the MmL theory $\Gamma_\Sigma^{\mathrm{term}}$ captures T^Σ *up to isomorphism*. Many automatic reasoning approaches [26], [27] for algebraic datatypes and co-datatypes exploit this complete axiomatization $\Gamma_{\mathsf{FOL}}(T^\Sigma)$. These approaches can be generalized to MmL settings and provide (semi-)decision procedures for the corresponding MmL theories. We leave this as future work.

D. Matching μ-logic proof system

Proposition 23 implies that MmL cannot have a sound and complete proof system. The best we can do then is to aim for a proof system that is *good enough in practice*. We take the ML proof system $\mathcal{H}$ and extend it with three additional proof rules (see Fig. 1). Rules (Pre-Fixpoint) and (Knaster-Tarski) are standard proof rules about least fixpoints as in modal μ-logic [8]; sometimes (Knaster-Tarski) is referred to as *Park induction* [28]–[30]. Rule (Set Variable Substitution) allows us to prove from $\vdash \varphi$ any substitution $\vdash \varphi[\psi/X]$ for $X \in \mathrm{SVar}$. That X is a set variable is crucial. In general, we *cannot* prove from $\vdash \varphi$ that $\vdash \varphi[\psi/x]$ for $x \in \mathrm{EVar}$, because it does not hold semantically. As shown in [1], it only holds when ψ is *functional*, that is, when ψ evaluates to a singleton set. Indeed, suppose that ψ is not functional, say it is the pattern $0 \vee succ(0)$ over the signature of natural numbers in Proposition 23, which evaluates to a set of two elements. Then we can pick φ to be the tautology $\exists y . x = y$, and then $\varphi[\psi/x]$ becomes $\exists y . \psi = y$, which states that ψ evaluates to a singleton set (the valuation of y), which is a contradiction.

We let $\mathcal{H}_\mu$ denote the extended proof system in Fig. 1, and from here on we write $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$ instead of $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathcal{H}_\mu} \varphi$.

Theorem 24 (Soundness of $\mathcal{H}_\mu$). $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$ *implies* $\Gamma \vDash \varphi$.

E. Instance: Peano arithmetic

We illustrate the power of (Pre-Fixpoint) and (Knaster-Tarski) by showing that they derive the (Induction) schema in the FOL axiomatization of Peano arithmetic [31], [32]:

(Induction) $\quad \varphi(0) \wedge \forall x . (\varphi(x) \to \varphi(succ(x))) \to \forall x . \varphi(x)$

where $\varphi(x)$ is a FOL formula with a distinguished variable x.

We encode the FOL syntax of Peano arithmetic following the technique in Section II-D, that is, we define a signature $\Sigma^{\mathsf{Peano}} = (\{Nat, Pred\}, \Sigma^{\mathbb{N}})$ where $\Sigma^{\mathbb{N}}$ is defined in Proposition 23 that contains the functions $0, succ, plus, mult$, and let Γ^{Peano} contain the same equation axioms as $\Gamma^{\mathbb{N}}$. The Σ^{Peano}-patterns of sort *Pred* are those built from equalities between

two patterns of sort *Nat*, as well as connectives and quantifiers.

Proposition 25. *Under the above notations, we have:*

$\Gamma^{\mathsf{Peano}} \vdash \varphi(0) \wedge \forall x . (\varphi(x) \to \varphi(succ(x))) \to \forall x . \varphi(x).$

V. Defining Recursive Symbols as Syntactic Sugar

Intuitively, the least fixpoint pattern $\mu X . \varphi$ specifies *a recursive set* that satisfies the equation $X = \varphi$, where φ may contain recursive occurrences of X. For example, the pattern $\mu X . 3 \vee plus(X, X)$ specifies the set of all nonzero multiples of 3, which intuitively defines a *recursive constant*:

$$m3 \in \Sigma_{\lambda, Nat} \qquad m3 =_{\mathrm{lfp}} 3 \vee plus(m3, m3).$$

Here, "$=_{\mathrm{lfp}}$" is merely a notation, meaning that we want $m3$ to be *the least set* that satisfies the equation. Note that the total set of all natural numbers is a trivial solution.

The challenge is how to generalize the above and define *recursive non-constant symbols*. For example, suppose we want to define a unary symbol $collatz \in \Sigma_{Nat, Nat}$ as follows:

$collatz(n) =_{\mathrm{lfp}}$

$\quad n \vee (even(n) \wedge collatz(n/2)) \vee (odd(n) \wedge collatz(3n+1))$

with the intuition that $collatz(n)$ gives the set of all numbers in the Collatz sequence[1] starting from n. However, the μ-binder in MmL can only be applied on *set variables*, not on *symbols*, so the following attempt is syntactically wrong:

$collatz(n) = \mu \sigma(n) . \qquad$ // μ can only bind a set variable

$\quad n \vee (even(n) \wedge \sigma(n/2)) \vee (odd(n) \wedge \sigma(3n+1))$

One possible solution could be to *extend* MmL with the above syntax and allow the μ-binder to quantify *symbol variables*, not only *set variables*. The semantics and proof system could be extended accordingly. This is exactly how *first-order logic with least fixpoints* extends FOL [7]. But do we really have to? After all, our proof rules (Pre-Fixpoint) and (Knaster-Tarski) in Fig. 1 are nothing but a logical incarnation of the Knaster-Tarski theorem, which has been repeatedly demonstrated to serve as a solid if not the main foundation for recursion. Therefore, we conjecture that the $\mathcal{H}$ proof system in Fig. 1 is sufficient in practice, and thus would rather resist extending MmL. That is, we conjecture that it should be possible to *define* one's desired approach to recursion/induction/fixpoints using ordinary MmL *theories*; as an analogy, in Section II-C we showed how we can define definedness, totality, equality, membership, set containment, functions, partial functions, constructors, etc. (see [1] for more) as theories, without a need to extend ML.

In particular, we can solve the above recursive symbol challenge by using the *principle of currying-uncurrying* to "mimic" the unary symbol $collatz \in \Sigma_{Nat, Nat}$ with a set variable $collatz : Nat \otimes Nat$, where $Nat \otimes Nat$ is the *product sort* (defined later; the intuition is that $Nat \otimes Nat$ has the product set $\mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N}$ as its carrier set), and thus reducing the challenge of defining a least relation in $[\mathbb{N} \to \mathcal{P}(\mathbb{N})]$ to defining a least subset of $\mathcal{P}(\mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N})$, which can be done with the MmL μ-binder.

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[1] A Collatz sequence starting from $n \geq 1$ is obtained by repeating the following procedure: if n is even then return $n/2$; otherwise, return $3n + 1$.

A. Principle of currying-uncurrying and product sorts

The principle of currying-uncurrying [33], [34] is used in various settings (e.g., simply-typed lambda calculus [35]) as a means to reduce the study of multi-argument functions to the simpler single-argument functions. We here present the principle in its adapted form that fits best with our needs.

Proposition 26. *Let* $M_{s_1}, \ldots, M_{s_n}, M_s$ *be nonempty sets. The* principle of currying-uncurring *means the isomorphism*

$$\mathcal{P}(M_{s_1} \times \cdots \times M_{s_n} \times M_s) \xrightleftharpoons[uncurry]{curry} [M_{s_1} \times \cdots \times M_{s_n} \to \mathcal{P}(M_s)]$$

defined for all $a_1 \in M_{s_1}, \ldots, a_n \in M_{s_n}, b \in M_s, \alpha \subseteq M_{s_1} \times \cdots \times M_{s_n} \times M_s$, *and* $f : M_{s_1} \times \cdots \times M_{s_n} \to \mathcal{P}(M_s)$ *as:*

$$curry(\alpha)(a_1, \ldots, a_n) = \{b \in M_s \mid (a_1, \ldots, a_n, b) \in \alpha\}$$
$$uncurry(f) = \{(a_1, \ldots, a_n, b) \mid b \in f(a_1, \ldots, a_n)\}.$$

The tuple set $uncurry(f)$ *is also called the* graph of f.

In other words, we can mimic an n-ary symbol $\sigma \in \Sigma_{s_1 \ldots s_n, s}$ with a set variable of the *product sort* $s_1 \otimes \cdots \otimes s_n \otimes s$, whose (intended) carrier set is exactly the product set $M_{s_1} \times \ldots M_{s_n} \times M_s$. This inspires the following definition.

Definition 27. Let s, s' be two sorts, not necessarily distinct. The *product sort* $s \otimes s'$ is a sort that is different from s and s'. *Pairing* $\langle \_, \_ \rangle_{s,s'} : s \times s' \to s \otimes s'$ is a function and *projection* $\_(\_)_{s,s'} : s \otimes s' \times s \rightharpoonup s'$ is a partial function, and we drop sorts s, s' for simplicity. Define three axioms:

(Injectivity) $\langle k_1, v_1 \rangle = \langle k_2, v_2 \rangle \to (k_1 = k_2) \wedge (v_1 = v_2)$

(Key-Value) $\langle k_1, v \rangle (k_2) = (k_1 = k_2) \wedge v$

(Product) $\exists k \exists v . \langle k, v \rangle$

that force the carrier set of $s \otimes t$ to be the product of the ones of s and t and pairing/projection to be interpreted as expected. Note that we assume definedness symbols/axioms because we have used the function and partial function notations as well as equality in the axioms.

The product of multiple sorts and the associated pairing/projection operations can be defined as derived constructs as follows. Given (not necessarily distinct) sorts $s_1, \ldots, s_n, s$ and patterns $\varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_n, \varphi, \psi$ of appropriate sorts, we define:

$$s_1 \otimes \cdots \otimes s_n \otimes s \equiv s_1 \otimes (s_2 \otimes (\cdots \otimes (s_n \otimes s) \ldots))$$
$$\langle \varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_n, \varphi \rangle \equiv \langle \varphi_1, \langle \ldots, \langle \varphi_n, \varphi \rangle \ldots \rangle \rangle$$
$$\psi(\varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_n) \equiv \psi(\varphi_1) \ldots (\varphi_n).$$

Note that we tacitly use the same syntax $\_(\_, \ldots, \_)$ for both symbol applications and projections to blur their distinction. In particular, if $\sigma : s_1 \otimes \cdots \otimes s_n \otimes s$ is a set variable of the product sort, then $\sigma(\varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_n)$ is a well-formed pattern of sort s iff $\varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_n$ have the appropriate sorts $s_1, \ldots, s_n$.

B. Defining recursive symbols in matching μ-logic

Definition 28. Let $\overline{\Sigma} = (S, \Sigma)$ be a signature and $\sigma \in \Sigma_{s_1 \ldots s_n, s}$, containing the product sorts and pairing/projection symbols. We use the notation $\sigma(x_1, \ldots, x_n) =_{\text{lfp}} \varphi$ to mean the axiom:

$$\sigma(x_1, \ldots, x_n) =$$
$$(\mu \sigma : s_1 \otimes \cdots \otimes s_n \otimes s . \exists x_1 \ldots \exists x_n . \langle x_1, \ldots, x_n, \varphi \rangle)(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$$

where $\exists x_1 \ldots \exists x_n . \langle x_1, \ldots, x_n, \varphi \rangle$ captures the *graph of* φ *as a function w.r.t.* $x_1, \ldots, x_n$. Note that in the axiom, all occurrences of $\sigma \in \Sigma_{s_1 \ldots s_n, s}$ in φ are tacitly regarded as the set variable $\sigma : s_1 \otimes \cdots \otimes s_n \otimes s$, which are then bound by μ-binder. A symbol $\sigma \in \Sigma_{s_1 \ldots s_n, s}$ obeying this axiom is called *recursive*.

Recursive symbols can be used to define various (co)inductive data structures and relations. In Section VI, we will see how first-order logic with least fixpoints (LFP) can be captured as notations using recursive symbols. In Section VII, we will show that recursive definitions in separation logic, such as lists and trees, can also be defined as recursive symbols. However, Definition 28 is not ideally convenient when it comes to *reasoning* about recursive symbols because it is complex and contains many details about the product sorts. Instead, we want to reason about recursive symbols in a similar way to how we reason about the basic least fixpoint patterns $\mu X . \varphi$, using a generalized form of (Pre-Fixpoint) and (Knaster-Tarski). This is achieved by the following theorem.

Theorem 29. *Let* $\sigma \in \Sigma_{s_1 \ldots s_n, s}$ *be a recursive symbol defined as* $\sigma(x_1, \ldots, x_n) =_{\text{lfp}} \varphi$, Γ *be a theory,* ψ *be a pattern, and*

$$\Gamma \vdash (\exists z_1 \ldots \exists z_n . z_1 \in \varphi_1 \wedge \cdots \wedge z_n \in \varphi_n \wedge \psi[z_1/x_1, \ldots, z_n/x_n])$$
$$\to \psi[\varphi_1/x_1, \ldots, \varphi_n/x_n] \qquad \text{for all } \varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_n \qquad (\dagger)$$

Then the following hold:
- *Pre-Fixpoint:* $\Gamma \vdash \varphi \to \sigma(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$;
- *Knaster-Tarski:* $\Gamma \vdash \varphi[\psi/\sigma] \to \psi$ *implies* $\Gamma \vdash \sigma(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \to \psi$, *where* $\varphi[\psi/\sigma]$ *is the result of substituting all patterns of the form* $\sigma(\varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_n)$ *in* φ *with* $\psi[\varphi_1/x_1, \ldots, \varphi_n/x_n]$.

Condition $(\dagger)$ is a logic incarnation of the property of propagation (Proposition 3) of ψ as a function w.r.t. $x_1, \ldots, x_n$, which requires, intuitively, that ψ "behaves like a symbol".

VI. Instance: First-Order Logic with Least Fixpoints

First-order logic with least fixpoints (LFP) [7] extends the syntax of first-order logic formulas with:

$$\varphi ::= [\text{lfp}_{R, x_1, \ldots, x_n} \varphi](t_1, \ldots, t_n)$$

where R is a *predicate variable* and φ is a formula that is positive in R. Intuitively, "$[\text{lfp}_{R, x_1, \ldots, x_n} \varphi]$" behaves as the least fixpoint predicate of the operation that maps R to φ. Due to its complexity and our limited space, we skip the formal definition of the semantics and simply denote the validity relation in LFP as $\vDash_{\text{LFP}} \varphi$. A comprehensive study on LFP can be found in [36]. As an example, the following LFP formula holds iff x is a nonzero multiple of 3:

$$[\text{lfp}_{R,z} z = 3 \vee \exists z_1 \exists z_2 . R(z_1) \wedge R(z_2) \wedge z = plus(z_1, z_2)](x)$$

Given the notations of recursive symbols defined in Section V, it is straightforward to subsume LFP by extending the theory Γ^{FOL} defined in Section II-D with product sorts and pairing/projection symbols, and the syntactic sugar:

$$[\text{lfp}_{R, x_1, \ldots, x_n} \varphi](t_1, \ldots, t_n) \equiv$$
$$(\mu R : s_1 \otimes \ldots \otimes s_n \otimes Pred . \exists x_1 \ldots \exists x_n . \langle x_1, \ldots, x_n, \varphi \rangle)(t_1, \ldots, t_n)$$

for all predicate variables R with argument sorts $s_1, \ldots, s_n$. A minor difference here is that we add one additional axiom, $\forall x{:}Pred\,\forall y{:}Pred \,.\, x = y$, to constrain that the carrier set of sort $Pred$ is a singleton set so that all MmL models can be regarded as FOL/LFP models. This fact is used to prove the "only if" part in the next theorem.[2] We denote the resulting theory Γ^{LFP}.

Theorem 30. *If φ is an LFP formula, then $\vDash_{\mathsf{LFP}} \varphi$ iff $\Gamma^{\mathsf{LFP}} \vDash \varphi$.*

VII. Instance: Separation Logic with Recursive Definitions

Separation logic [37] (shortened as SL) is a logic specifically crafted for reasoning about heap structures. Separation logic with recursive definitions (shortened as SLRD) extends SL with *recursive predicates* that give the ability of describing precisely unbounded heap structures. Both SL and SLRD have many variants; the formalization that we consider here is adapted from [38]. For simplicity, we do not consider mutual recursive definitions in this paper. We leave it as future work.

The most characteristic construct in SL is *separating conjunction*, denoted $\varphi_1 * \varphi_2$, which specifies a conjunctive heap of two disjoint heaps. In addition, SL has the model of heaps (i.e., finite maps) *hard-wired* in its semantics, which makes it a logic specifically crafted for heap reasoning.

On the contrary, ML/MmL offer general facilities to define any structures and constraints via symbols and patterns. In addition, MmL uses the μ-binder and recursive symbols (see Section V) to capture the recursive predicates in SLRD. As shown in [1], SL can be precisely captured in ML by *fixing the model* of finite maps. In the following, we show that SLRD can be precisely captured in MmL in exactly the same manner.

A. Separation logic with recursive predicates: syntax and semantics

The *syntax* of SLRD is parametric in a set VAR of variables and a finite set $\text{RPRED} = \{p_1, \ldots, p_k\}$ of *recursive predicates*, where we denote the *arity* of p_i is a_i for $1 \le i \le k$. Let *nil* be a distinguished constant that is different from all variables. SLRD *terms* and *formulas* are given by the following grammar:

$$\text{terms } t ::= x \in \text{VAR} \mid nil$$

$$\text{formulas } \varphi ::= \text{(FOL syntax)} \mid emp \mid t_1 \mapsto t_2$$
$$\mid \varphi_1 * \varphi_2 \mid \varphi_1 \mathbin{-\!\!*} \varphi_2 \text{ "magic wand"}$$
$$\mid p_i(t_1, \ldots, t_{a_i}) \text{ for } p_i \in \text{RPRED}$$

A *recursive definition set* $D = \{\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_k\}$ specifies recursive definitions of each recursive predicates as follows:

$$p_1(x_1, \ldots, x_{a_1}) =_{\text{lfp}} \psi_1, \; \ldots, \; p_k(x_1, \ldots, x_{a_k}) =_{\text{lfp}} \psi_k,$$

where we require that $FV(\psi_i) \subseteq \{x_1, \ldots, x_{a_i}\}$, ψ_i does not contain other recursive predicates other than p_i, and that p_i is positive in ψ_i.

SLRD formulas are interpreted over a typical RAM model that consists of a *store* $s\colon \text{VAR} \to \mathbb{N}$ and a *heap* $h\colon \mathbb{N}^+ \rightharpoonup_{\text{fin}} \mathbb{N}$, where $\mathbb{N}^+$ denotes the set of positive natural numbers. We extend the store s over all terms by letting $s(nil) = 0$. We use $\text{dom}(h)$ to denote the *domain* of h. When $\text{dom}(h_1) \cap \text{dom}(h_2) = \emptyset$, we say that h_1 and h_2 are *disjoint* and let $h_1 * h_2$ denote the heap h' such that $\text{dom}(h') = \text{dom}(h_1) \cup \text{dom}(h_2)$, $h'|_{\text{dom}(h_1)} = h_1$, and $h'|_{\text{dom}(h_2)} = h_2$.

Given a recursive definition set D, a store s, and a heap h, SLRD *semantics* $s, h \vDash_D \varphi$ is defined inductively as follows:

- $s, h \vDash_D \varphi$ iff $s \vDash_{\mathsf{FOL}} \varphi$, for FOL formula φ;
- $s, h \vDash_D emp$ iff $\text{dom}(h) = \emptyset$;
- $s, h \vDash_D t_1 \mapsto t_2$ iff $s(t_1) \ne 0$, $\text{dom}(h) = \{s(t_1)\}$, and $h(s(t_1)) = s(t_2)$;
- $s, h \vDash_D \varphi_1 * \varphi_2$ iff there exist h_1, h_2 such that $s, h_1 \vDash_D \varphi_1$, $s, h_2 \vDash_D \varphi_2$, and $h = h_1 * h_2$;
- $s, h \vDash_D \varphi_1 \mathbin{-\!\!*} \varphi_2$ iff for all h' such that h, h' are disjoint and $s, h' \vDash_D \varphi_1$, we have $s, h * h' \vDash_D \varphi_2$;
- $s, h \vDash_D p_i(t_1, \ldots, t_{a_i})$ iff $(s(t_1), \ldots, s(t_{a_i}), h) \in \llbracket p_i \rrbracket^D$;

where the semantics $\llbracket p_i \rrbracket^D$ of the recursive predicate p_i under D is defined later. We say φ is *valid*, denoted $\vDash_{\mathsf{SLRD}} \varphi$, iff $s, h \vDash_D \varphi$ for all s and h.

For notational simplicity, we let $\mathbb{H} = [\mathbb{N}^+ \rightharpoonup_{\text{fin}} \mathbb{N}]$ denote the set of heaps. For $1 \le i \le k$, we define $\mathbb{P}_i = \mathcal{P}(\mathbb{N}^{a_i} \times \mathbb{H})$ and $\mathbb{P} = \mathbb{P}_1 \times \cdots \times \mathbb{P}_k$. We define the function $\mathcal{F}\colon \mathbb{P} \to \mathbb{P}$ as follows:

$$\begin{pmatrix} P_1 \\ \vdots \\ P_k \end{pmatrix} \overset{\mathcal{F}}{\mapsto} \begin{pmatrix} \{(s(x_1), \ldots, s(x_{a_1}), h) \mid s, h \vDash_P \psi_1\} \\ \vdots \\ \{(s(x_1), \ldots, s(x_{a_k}), h) \mid s, h \vDash_P \psi_k\} \end{pmatrix}$$

where $P_i \subseteq \mathbb{P}_i$ for $1 \le i \le k$ and the relation $\vDash_P$ is defined the same as $\vDash_D$ except that $\llbracket p_i \rrbracket^P = P_i$. We finally define the semantics of all recursive predicates $\llbracket p_1 \rrbracket^D \times \cdots \times \llbracket p_k \rrbracket^D = \mu\mathcal{F}$.

As an example, the following recursive predicate *list* captures all singly linked lists:

$$list(x) =_{\text{lfp}} (x = nil) \wedge emp \vee \exists y\,.\,(x \ne nil) \wedge x \mapsto y * list(y)$$

B. Defining separation logic with recursive definitions in matching μ-logic

To subsume the syntax of SLRD, we define an MmL signature $\Sigma^{\mathsf{SLRD}} = (\{Nat, Heap\}, \Sigma^{\mathsf{SLRD}})$ that contains two sorts *Nat* for natural numbers and *Heap* for heaps. The symbol set Σ^{SLRD} contains the distinguished constant $nil \in \Sigma_{\lambda, Nat}$ and the following recursive predicates and heap constructors:

$p_i \in \Sigma^{\mathsf{SLRD}}_{Nat \ldots Nat, Heap}$	// recursive predicate
$emp\colon \to Heap$	// empty heap
$\_ \mapsto \_\colon Nat \times Nat \rightharpoonup Heap$	// singleton heap
$\_ * \_\colon Heap \times Heap \rightharpoonup Heap$	// separating conjunction

Note that p_i is a symbol, *emp* is a function, and $\_ \mapsto \_$ and $\_ * \_$ are partial functions. The magic wand $\varphi_1 \mathbin{-\!\!*} \varphi_2$ can be defined as a derived construct as follows (also see [1]):

$$\varphi_1 \mathbin{-\!\!*} \varphi_2 \equiv \exists h\,.\,h \wedge \lfloor h * \varphi_1 \to \varphi_2 \rfloor$$

Intuitively, the pattern $\varphi_1 \mathbin{-\!\!*} \varphi_2$ is matched by all heaps h such that $h * \varphi_1$ is contained in φ_2; that is, for all heaps h_1 that matches φ_1, we have that $h * h_1$ matches φ_2. This intuition matches the semantics of $\varphi_1 \mathbin{-\!\!*} \varphi_2$ in SLRD.

To subsume the semantics of SLRD, we define the following Σ^{SLRD}-theory Γ^{SLRD} that contains the basic axioms about the heap constructors and the definitions of recursive predicates:

(Empty Heap)	$emp * h = h * emp = h$
(Associativity)	$(h_1 * h_2) * h_3 = h_1 * (h_2 * h_3)$
(Commutativity)	$h_1 * h_2 = h_2 * h_1$
(Nil)	$(nil \mapsto y) = \bot_{Heap}$
(Collision)	$(x \mapsto y) * (x \mapsto z) = \bot_{Heap}$
(Recursive Predicates)	$p_i(x_1, \ldots, x_{a_i}) =_{\mathrm{lfp}} \psi_i$

As said in the beginning of this section, SL/SLRD have the model of heaps *hard-wired* in the semantics. To capture precisely SL/SLRD semantics, we define the Σ^{SLRD}-model $Map = (\{Map_{Nat}, Map_{Heap}\}, \{\sigma_{Map}\}_{\sigma \in \Sigma^{\mathsf{SLRD}}})$, called the *canonical model of finite maps*, where $Map_{Nat} = \mathbb{N}$, $Map_{Heap} = \mathbb{H}$, and all symbols in Σ^{SLRD} are interpreted in the intended way: *nil* is interpreted as 0; *emp* is interpreted as the empty heap; $\_ \mapsto \_$ is interpreted as the corresponding singleton heap except when the first argument is zero in which case it is undefined (note that $\_ \mapsto \_$ was declared as a partial function); $\_ * \_$ is interpreted as the union of two disjoint heaps or, if they are not disjoint, undefined; and p_i is interpreted as the recursive relation $[\![p_i]\!]^D$. *Map* satisfies all axioms above.

Theorem 31. *For all SLRD formulas φ, we have $\vDash_{SLRD} \varphi$ iff $Map \vDash \varphi$.*

VIII. Instances: Modal μ-Calculus and Temporal Logics

We have seen how MmL symbols and patterns can be used to specify both structure and constraints, such as terms (Section IV-C) and FOL (Section II-D), as well as various induction, recursion and least fixpoints schemas (Sections IV-E and V) over these. These suffice to express and prove program assertions, including complex state abstractions (see also how separation logic falls as a fragment of ML in [1]), in contexts where MmL is chosen as a static state assertion formalism in program verification frameworks based on Hoare logic [39], dynamic logic [11], or reachability logic [2]. However, as explained in Section I, our ultimate goal is to support not only static state assertions, but any program properties, including ones that are usually specified using Hoare, dynamic, or reachability logics. We start the discussion in this section by showing how MmL symbols and patterns can also be used to specify *dynamic transition relations*, which are often captured by modalities in modal μ-logic and dynamic logic; in Section IX we then discuss how MmL also subsumes reachability logic, which subsumes Hoare logic [6].

A. Modal μ-logic syntax, semantics, and proof system

The *syntax* of modal μ-logic [8] is parametric in a countably infinite set PVar of propositional variables. Modal μ-logic *formulas* are given by the grammar[3]:

$$\varphi ::= p \in \mathrm{PVar} \mid \varphi \wedge \varphi \mid \neg\varphi \mid \circ\varphi \mid \mu X . \varphi \text{ if } \varphi \text{ is positive in } X$$

where $p, X \in \mathrm{PVar}$ are propositional variables. As a convention, p is used for free variables while X is used for bound ones. Derived constructs are defined as usual, e.g., $\bullet\varphi \equiv \neg\circ\neg\varphi$. Modal μ-logic semantics is given using *transition systems* $\mathbb{S} = (S, R)$, with S a nonempty set of *states* and $R \subseteq S \times S$ a *transition relation*, and valuations $V \colon \mathrm{PVar} \to \mathcal{P}(S)$, as follows:

- $[\![p]\!]^{\mathbb{S}}_V = V(p)$;
- $[\![\varphi_1 \wedge \varphi_2]\!]^{\mathbb{S}}_V = [\![\varphi_1]\!]^{\mathbb{S}}_V \cap [\![\varphi_2]\!]^{\mathbb{S}}_V$;
- $[\![\neg\varphi]\!]^{\mathbb{S}}_V = S \setminus [\![\varphi]\!]^{\mathbb{S}}_V$;
- $[\![\circ\varphi]\!]^{\mathbb{S}}_V = \{s \in S \mid s \mathrel{R} t \text{ implies } t \in [\![\varphi]\!]^{\mathbb{S}}_V \text{ for all } t \in S\}$;
- $[\![\mu X . \varphi]\!]^{\mathbb{S}}_V = \bigcap\{A \subseteq S \mid [\![\varphi]\!]^{\mathbb{S}}_{V[A/X]} \subseteq A\}$;

A modal μ-logic formula φ is *valid*, denoted $\vDash_\mu \varphi$, if for all transition systems $\mathbb{S}$ and all valuations V, we have $[\![\varphi]\!]^{\mathbb{S}}_V = S$. A proof system of modal μ-logic is firstly given in [8] and then proved to be complete in [40]. It extends the proof system of propositional logic with the following proof rules:

(K)	$\circ(\varphi_1 \to \varphi_2) \to (\circ\varphi_1 \to \circ\varphi_2)$	(N) $\dfrac{\varphi}{\circ\varphi}$
(μ_1)	$\varphi[\mu X . \varphi / X] \to \mu X . \varphi$	(μ_2) $\dfrac{\varphi[\psi/X] \to \psi}{\mu X . \varphi \to \psi}$

We denote the corresponding provability relation as $\vdash_\mu \varphi$. Notice that (K) and (N) are provable in MmL (Proposition 12), and (μ_1) and (μ_2) are our (Pre-Fixpoint) and (Knaster-Tarski). This means that we can easily mimic all modal μ-logic proofs in MmL (i.e. "(2) $\Rightarrow$ (3)" in Theorem 32).

B. Defining modal μ-logic in matching μ-logic

To subsume the syntax of modal μ-logic, we define a signature (of *transition systems*) $\Sigma^{\mathsf{TS}} = (\{State\}, \{\bullet \in \Sigma^{\mathsf{TS}}_{State, State}\})$ where symbol "$\bullet$" is called *one-path next*. We regard propositional variables in PVar as MmL set variables. We write $\bullet\varphi$ instead of $\bullet(\varphi)$, and define $\circ\varphi \equiv \neg\bullet\neg\varphi$. Then all modal μ-logic formulas φ are MmL Σ^{TS}-patterns of sort *State*. Finally, note that no axioms are needed; let Γ^μ be the empty Σ^{TS}-theory.

An important observation is that the Σ^{TS}-models are *exactly* the transition systems, where $\bullet \in \Sigma^{\mathsf{TS}}_{State, State}$ is interpreted as the transition relation R. Specifically, for any transition system $\mathbb{S} = (S, R)$, we can regard $\mathbb{S}$ as a Σ^{TS}-model where S is the carrier set of *State* and $\bullet_{\mathbb{S}}(t) = \{s \in S \mid s \mathrel{R} t\}$ contains all R-*predecessors* of t. This might seem counter-intuitive at first glance: why "one-path next" is interpreted as the predecessors instead of the successors of R? See the following illustration:

$$\cdots \quad s \xrightarrow{R} s' \xrightarrow{R} s'' \quad \cdots \qquad // \text{ states}$$
$$\bullet\bullet\varphi \qquad \bullet\varphi \qquad \varphi \qquad // \text{ patterns}$$

In other words, $\bullet\varphi$ is matched by states that *have at least one next state* that satisfies φ, conforming to the intuition. Another

[3]The modal μ-logic literature often uses $\Box\varphi$ and $\Diamond\varphi$ instead of $\circ\varphi$ and $\bullet\varphi$. We here use the latter to avoid confusion with the "always" $\Box\varphi$ and "eventually" $\Diamond\varphi$ in LTL and CTL.

interesting observation is about $\bullet\varphi$ and its dual, $\circ\varphi \equiv \neg\bullet\neg\varphi$, called *all-path next*. The difference is that $\circ\varphi$ is matched by s if *for all* states t such that $s\,R\,t$, we have t matches φ. In particular, if s has no successor, then s matches $\circ\varphi$ for any φ. This is formally summarized in Proposition 33.

We now feel free to take any transition system $\mathbb{S}$ as an MmL Σ^{TS}-model. The following *conservative extension theorem* shows that our definition of modal μ-logic in MmL is *faithful*, both syntactically and semantically. What is insightful about the theorem is its *proof*, which can be applied to other logics discussed in this paper to obtain similar results.

Theorem 32. *The following properties are equivalent for all modal μ-logic formulas φ: (1) $\vDash_\mu \varphi$; (2) $\vdash_\mu \varphi$; (3) $\Gamma^\mu \vdash \varphi$; (4) $\Gamma^\mu \vDash \varphi$; (5) $M \vDash \varphi$ for all Σ^{TS}-models M such that $M \vDash \Gamma^\mu$; (6) $\mathbb{S} \vDash_\mu \varphi$ for all transition systems $\mathbb{S}$.*

Proof sketch: We only need to prove "(2) $\Rightarrow$ (3)" and "(5) $\Rightarrow$ (6)", as the rest are already proved/known. "(1) $\Rightarrow$ (2)" follows by the completeness of modal μ-logic, which is nontrivial but known [40]. "(2) $\Rightarrow$ (3)" follows by proving all modal μ-logic proof rules as theorems in MmL (Proposition 12). "(3) $\Rightarrow$ (4)" follows by the soundness of MmL (Theorem 24). "(4) $\Rightarrow$ (5)" follows by Definition 19. "(5) $\Rightarrow$ (6)" follows by proving its contrapositive statement, "$\nvDash_\mu \varphi$ implies $\Gamma^\mu \nvDash \varphi$", by taking a transition system $\mathbb{S} = (S, R)$ and a valuation V such that $\llbracket\varphi\rrbracket_V^{\mathbb{S}} \neq S$, and showing that if we regard $\mathbb{S}$ as a Σ^{TS}-model and V as an $\mathbb{S}$-valuation in MmL, then $\mathbb{S} \vDash \Gamma^\mu$ and $\overline{V}(\varphi) \neq S$, which means that $\Gamma^\mu \nvDash \varphi$. Finally, "(6) $\Rightarrow$ (1)" follows by definition. ∎

Therefore, modal μ-logic can be regarded as an empty theory in a vanilla MmL without quantifiers, over a signature containing only one sort and only one symbol, which is unary. It is worth mentioning that variants of modal μ-logic with more modal modalities have been proposed (see [41] for a survey). At our knowledge, however, all such variants consider only unary modal modalities and they are only required to obey the usual (K) and (N) proof rules of modal logic. In contrast, MmL allows polyadic symbols while still obeying the desired (K) and (N) rules (see Proposition 12), allows arbitrary further constraining axioms in MmL theories, and also quantification over element variables and many-sorted universes.

C. Studying transition systems in MmL

The above suggests that MmL may offer a unifying playground to specify and reason about transition systems, by means of Σ^{TS}-theories/models. We can define various temporal/dynamic operations and modalities as *derived constructs* from the basic "one-path next" symbol "$\bullet$" and the μ-binder, without the need to extend the syntax and semantics of the logic. We can constrain the models/transition systems of interest using *additional axioms*, without the need to modify/extend the proof system of the logic. In what follows, we show that by defining proper constructs as syntactic sugar and adding proper axioms, we can capture *faithfully* LTL (both finite- and infinite-trace), CTL, dynamic logic (DL), and reachability logic (RL).

Let us add more temporal modalities as derived constructs (we have seen "all-path next" $\circ\varphi$ in Section VIII-B):

$$\text{"eventually" } \lozenge\varphi \equiv \mu X \,.\, \varphi \vee \bullet X$$
$$\text{"always" } \square\varphi \equiv \nu X \,.\, \varphi \wedge \circ X$$
$$\text{"(strong) until" } \varphi_1 \, U \, \varphi_2 \equiv \mu X \,.\, \varphi_2 \vee (\varphi_1 \wedge \bullet X)$$
$$\text{"well-founded" } \mathsf{WF} \equiv \mu X \,.\, \circ X \quad // \text{ no infinite paths}$$

Proposition 33. *Let $\mathbb{S} = (S, R)$ be a transition system regarded as a Σ^{TS}-model, and let ρ be any valuation and $s \in S$. Then:*

- $s \in \bar\rho(\bullet\varphi)$ *if there exists $t \in S$ such that $s\,R\,t$, $t \in \bar\rho(\varphi)$; in particular, $s \in \bar\rho(\bullet\top)$ if s has an R-successor;*
- $s \in \bar\rho(\circ\varphi)$ *if for all $t \in S$ such that $s\,R\,t$, $t \in \bar\rho(\varphi)$; in particular, $s \in \bar\rho(\circ\bot)$ if s has no R-successor;*
- $s \in \bar\rho(\lozenge\varphi)$ *if there exists $t \in S$ such that $s\,R^*\,t$, $t \in \bar\rho(\varphi)$;*
- $s \in \bar\rho(\square\varphi)$ *if for all $t \in S$ such that $s\,R^*\,t$, $t \in \bar\rho(\varphi)$;*
- $s \in \bar\rho(\varphi_1 \, U \, \varphi_2)$ *if there exists $n \geq 0$ and $t_1, \ldots, t_n \in S$ such that $s\,R\,t_1\,R\cdots R\,t_n$, $t_n \in \bar\rho(\varphi_2)$, and $s, t_1, \ldots, t_{n-1} \in \bar\rho(\varphi_1)$;*
- $s \in \bar\rho(\mathsf{WF})$ *if s is R-well-founded, meaning that there is no infinite sequence $t_1, t_2, \cdots \in S$ with $s\,R\,t_1\,R\,t_2\,R\ldots$;*

where $R^* = \bigcup_{i \geq 0} R^i$ is the reflexive transitive closure of R.

D. Instances: temporal logics

Since MmL can define modal μ-logic (as an empty theory over a unary symbol), it is not surprising that it can also define various temporal logics such as LTL and CTL as theories whose axioms constrain the underlying transition relations. What is interesting, in our view, is that the resulting theories are simple, intuitive, and faithfully capture both the syntax (provability) and the semantics of these temporal logics.

1) Instance: infinite-trace LTL: The LTL syntax, namely

$$\varphi ::= p \in \mathrm{PVAR} \mid \varphi \wedge \varphi \mid \neg\varphi \mid \circ\varphi \mid \varphi \, U \, \varphi$$

is already subsumed in MmL with the derived constructs we give in Section VIII-C. Other common LTL modalities such as "always $\square\varphi$" are defined from the "until U" modality in the usual way. Infinite-trace LTL takes as models transition systems whose transition relations are *linear* and *infinite into the future*. We assume readers are familiar with the semantics and proof system of infinite-trace LTL (see [10], e.g.) and skip their formal definitions. We use "$\vDash_{\mathsf{infLTL}}$" and "$\vdash_{\mathsf{infLTL}}$" to denote infinite-trace LTL validity and provability, respectively.

To capture the characteristics of both "*infinite future*" and "*linear future*", we add the following two patterns as axioms:

$$(\text{INF}) \quad \bullet\top \qquad\qquad (\text{LIN}) \quad \bullet X \rightarrow \circ X$$

and denote the resulting Σ^{TS}-theory as Γ^{infLTL}. Note that by (SET VARIABLE SUBSTITUTION), we can prove from axiom (LIN) that $\bullet\varphi \rightarrow \circ\varphi$ for all patterns φ. Intuitively, (INF) forces all states s to have at least one successor, and thus all traces can be extended to an infinite trace, and (LIN) forces all states s to have only a *linear future*. The following theorem shows that our definition of infinite-trace LTL is faithful both syntactically and semantically, proved exactly as Theorem 32.

Theorem 34. *The following properties are equivalent for all infinite-trace LTL formulas φ: (1) $\vdash_{\mathsf{infLTL}} \varphi$; (2) $\vDash_{\mathsf{infLTL}} \varphi$; (3) $\Gamma^{\mathsf{infLTL}} \vdash \varphi$; (4) $\Gamma^{\mathsf{infLTL}} \vDash \varphi$.*

Therefore, infinite-trace LTL can be regarded as a theory containing two axioms, (INF) and (LIN), over the same signature as the theory corresponding to modal μ-logic.

2) Instance: finite-trace LTL: Finite execution traces play an important role in program verification and monitoring. Finite-trace LTL considers models that are *linear* but have only *finite future*. The following *syntax* of finite-trace LTL:

$$\varphi ::= p \in \mathrm{PVAR} \mid \varphi \wedge \varphi \mid \neg\varphi \mid \circ\varphi \mid \varphi\, U_w\, \varphi$$

differs from infinite-trace LTL in that the "until U_w" is *weak until*, meaning that $\varphi_1\, U_w\, \varphi_2$ does not force that φ_2 holds eventually. Again, we assume readers are familiar with the semantics and proof system of finite-trace LTL (if not, see [10]) and use "$\vDash_{\mathsf{finLTL}}$" and "$\vdash_{\mathsf{finLTL}}$" to denote its validity and provability, respectively.

To subsume the above syntax, we define in MmL:

"weak until" $\varphi_1\, U_w\, \varphi_2 \equiv \mu X . \varphi_2 \vee (\varphi_1 \wedge \circ X)$.

To capture the characteristics of both *finite future* and *linear future*, we add the following two patterns as axioms:

$$(\text{FIN}) \quad \mathsf{WF} \equiv \mu X . \circ X \qquad\qquad (\text{LIN}) \quad \bullet X \to \circ X$$

and call the resulting Σ^{TS}-theory Γ^{finLTL}. Intuitively, (FIN) forces all states to be well-founded, meaning that there is no infinite execution trace in the underlying transition systems.

Theorem 35. *The following properties are equivalent for all finite-trace LTL formula φ: (1) $\vdash_{\mathsf{finLTL}} \varphi$; (2) $\vDash_{\mathsf{finLTL}} \varphi$; (3) $\Gamma^{\mathsf{finLTL}} \vdash \varphi$; (4) $\Gamma^{\mathsf{finLTL}} \vDash \varphi$.*

Therefore, finite-trace LTL can be regarded as a theory containing two axioms, (FIN) and (LIN), over the same signature as the theory corresponding to modal μ-logic.

3) Instance: CTL: CTL models are transition systems that are *infinite into the future* and allow states to have a *branching future* (rather than linear). The following syntax of CTL:

$$\varphi ::= p \in \mathrm{PVAR} \mid \varphi \wedge \varphi \mid \neg\varphi \mid \mathsf{AX}\varphi \mid \mathsf{EX}\varphi \mid \varphi\, \mathsf{AU}\, \varphi \mid \varphi\, \mathsf{EU}\, \varphi$$

is extended with the following derived constructs:

$$\mathsf{EF}\varphi \equiv true\, \mathsf{EU}\, \varphi \qquad\qquad \mathsf{AG}\varphi \equiv \neg\mathsf{EF}\neg\varphi$$
$$\mathsf{AF}\varphi \equiv true\, \mathsf{AU}\, \varphi \qquad\qquad \mathsf{EG}\varphi \equiv \neg\mathsf{AF}\neg\varphi$$

The names of the CTL modalities suggest their meaning: the first letter means either "on all paths" (A) or "on one path" (E), and the second letter means "next" (X), "until" (U), "always" (G), or "eventually" (F). For example, "AX" is "all-path next", "EU" is "one-path until", etc. We refer readers to [42] for CTL definitions, semantics and proof system. Here we denote its validity and provability as "$\vDash_{\mathsf{CTL}}$" and "$\vdash_{\mathsf{CTL}}$", respectively.

To define CTL as an MmL theory, we add only the axiom (INF) for infinite future and use the following syntactic sugar:

$$\mathsf{AX}\varphi \equiv \circ\varphi \qquad\qquad \varphi_1\, \mathsf{AU}\, \varphi_2 \equiv \mu X . \varphi_2 \vee (\varphi_1 \wedge \circ X)$$
$$\mathsf{EX}\varphi \equiv \bullet\varphi \qquad\qquad \varphi_1\, \mathsf{EU}\, \varphi_2 \equiv \mu X . \varphi_2 \vee (\varphi_1 \wedge \bullet X)$$

The resulting Σ^{TS}-theory is denoted as Γ^{CTL}.

Theorem 36. *For all CTL formulas φ, the following are equivalent: (1) $\vdash_{\mathsf{CTL}} \varphi$; (2) $\vDash_{\mathsf{CTL}} \varphi$; (3) $\Gamma^{\mathsf{CTL}} \vdash \varphi$; (4) $\Gamma^{\mathsf{CTL}} \vDash \varphi$.*

Therefore, CTL can be regarded as a theory over the same signature as the theory corresponding to modal μ-logic, but

containing one axiom, (INF). It may be insightful to look at all three temporal logics discussed in this section through the lenses of MmL, as theories over a unary symbol signature: modal μ-logic is the empty and thus the least constrained theory; CTL comes immediately next with only one axiom, (INF), to enforce infinite traces; infinite-trace LTL further constrains with the linearity axiom (LIN); finally, finite-trace LTL replaces (INF) with (FIN). We believe that MmL can serve as a convenient and uniform framework to define and study temporal logics. For example, finite-trace CTL can be trivially obtained as the theory containing only the axiom (FIN), LTL with both finite and infinite traces is the theory containing only the axiom (LIN), and CTL with unrestricted (finite or infinite branch) models is the empty theory (i.e., modal μ-logic).

E. Instance: dynamic logic

Dynamic logic (DL) [11]–[13], [43] is a common logic used for program reasoning. The DL syntax is parametric in a set PVAR of *propositional variables* and a set APGM of *atomic programs*, each belonging to a different formula syntactic category:

$$\varphi ::= p \in \mathrm{PVAR} \mid \varphi \to \varphi \mid false \mid [\alpha]\varphi$$
$$\alpha ::= a \in \mathrm{APGM} \mid \alpha\,;\alpha \mid \alpha \cup \alpha \mid \alpha^* \mid \varphi?$$

The first line defines *propositional formulas*. The second line defines *program formulas*, which represent programs built from atomic ones with the primitive regular expression constructs. Define $\langle\alpha\rangle\varphi \equiv \neg[\alpha](\neg\varphi)$. Intuitively, $[\alpha]\varphi$ holds if all executions of α lead to φ, while $\langle\alpha\rangle\varphi$ holds if there is one execution of α that leads to φ. Common program constructs such as if-then-else, while-do, etc., can be defined as derived constructs using the four primitive ones; see [11]–[13]. We let "$\vDash_{\mathsf{DL}}$" and "$\vdash_{\mathsf{DL}}$" denote the validity and provability of DL.

It is known that DL can be embedded in the variant of modal μ-logic with multiple modalities (see, e.g., [41]). The idea is to define a modality $[a]$ for every atomic program $a \in \mathrm{APGM}$, and then to define the four program constructs as least/greatest fixpoints. We can easily adopt the same approach and associate an empty MmL theory to DL, over a signature containing as many unary symbols as atomic programs. However, MmL allows us to propose a better embedding, unrestricted by the limitations of modal μ-logic. Indeed, the embedding in [41] suffers from at least two limitations that we can avoid with MmL. First, sometimes transitions are not just labeled with discrete programs, such as in *hybrid systems* [44] and *cyber-physical systems* [45] where the labels are *continuous values* such as elapsing time. We cannot introduce for every time $t \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$ a modality $[t]$, as only countably many modalities are allowed. Instead, we may want to axiomatize the domains of such possibly continuous values and treat them as any other data. Second, we may want to quantify over such values, be they discrete or continuous, and we would not be able to do so (even in MmL) if they are encoded as modalities/symbols.

Let us instead define a signature (of *labeled transition systems*) $\Sigma^{\mathsf{LTS}} = (\{State, Pgm\}, \Sigma^{\mathsf{LTS}}_{\lambda, Pgm} \cup \{\bullet \in \Sigma^{\mathsf{LTS}}_{Pgm\, State, State}\})$ where the "one-path next $\bullet$" is a *binary symbol* taking an ad-

ditional *Pgm* argument, and for all atomic programs $a \in$ APGM we add a constant symbol $a \in \Sigma_{\lambda,Pgm}^{\mathsf{LTS}}$. Just as all Σ^{TS}-models are exactly transition systems (Section VIII-B), we have that all Σ^{LTS}-models are exactly labeled transition systems. We define compound programs as derived constructs as follows:

$\langle\alpha\rangle\varphi \equiv \bullet(\alpha,\varphi)$ $\qquad$ $[\alpha]\varphi \equiv \neg\langle\alpha\rangle\neg\varphi$

(SEQ) $[\alpha;\beta]\varphi \equiv [\alpha][\beta]\varphi$ $\quad$ (CHOICE) $[\alpha\cup\beta]\varphi \equiv [\alpha]\varphi \wedge [\beta]\varphi$

(TEST) $[\psi?]\varphi \equiv (\psi \to \varphi)$ $\quad$ (ITER) $[\alpha^*]\varphi \equiv \nu X.(\varphi \wedge [\alpha]X)$

Like for the embedding of modal μ-logic (Section VIII-B), no axioms are needed. Let Γ^{DL} denote the empty Σ^{LTS}-theory.

Theorem 37. *For all DL formulas φ, the following are equivalent: (1) $\vdash_{\mathsf{DL}} \varphi$; (2) $\vDash_{\mathsf{DL}} \varphi$; (3) $\Gamma^{\mathsf{DL}} \vdash \varphi$; (4) $\Gamma^{\mathsf{DL}} \vDash \varphi$.*

We point out that the iterative operator $[\alpha^*]\varphi$ is axiomatized with *two* axioms in the proof system of DL (see, e.g., [13]):

$\quad$ (DL-ITER$_1$) $\qquad$ $\varphi \wedge [\alpha][\alpha^*]\varphi \leftrightarrow [\alpha^*]\varphi$

$\quad$ (DL-ITER$_2$) $\qquad$ $\varphi \wedge [\alpha^*](\varphi \to [\alpha]\varphi) \to [\alpha^*]\varphi$

while we just regard it as syntactic sugar, via (ITER). One may argue that (ITER) desugars to the ν-binder, though, which obeys the proof rules (PRE-FIXPOINT) and (KNASTER-TARSKI) that essentially have the same appearance as (DL-ITER$_1$) and (DL-ITER$_2$). We agree. And that is exactly why we think that we should have *one uniform and fixed logic*, such as MmL, where general fixpoint axioms are given to specify and reason about *any fixpoint properties* of *any domains* and to develop general-purpose automatic tools and provers. When it comes to specific domains and special-purpose logics, we can define them as theories/notations in MmL, as what we have done in this section for modal μ-logic and all its fragment logics. Often, these special-purpose logics are simpler than MmL and more computationally efficient. In particular, modal μ-logic and all its fragment logics shown in this section are not only *complete* but also *decidable* [19], while MmL does not have any complete proof system and thus its validity is not semi-decidable. Therefore, the existing decision procedures and completeness results of these special-purpose logics give decision procedures and (global) completeness results (such as Theorem 32) for the corresponding MmL theories.

IX. INSTANCE: REACHABILITY LOGIC

Reachability logic (RL) [2] is an approach to program verification using operational semantics. Different from other approaches such as Hoare-style verification, RL has a *language-independent* proof system that offers sound and relatively complete deduction for all programming languages. RL is the logic underlying the $\mathbb{K}$ framework [46], which has been used to define the formal semantics of various real languages such as C [3], Java [4], and JavaScript [5], yielding program verifiers for all these languages at no additional cost [6].

In spite of its generality w.r.t. languages, reachability logic is unfortunately limited to specifying and deriving only reachability properties. This limitation was one of the factors that motivated the development of MmL. Fig. 8 shows a few RL proof rules; notice that unlike Hoare logic proof rules, RL

$$(\text{AXIOM}) \quad \frac{\varphi_1 \Rightarrow \varphi_2 \in A}{A \vdash_C \varphi_1 \Rightarrow \varphi_2}$$

$$(\text{TRANSITIVITY}) \quad \frac{A \vdash_C \varphi_1 \Rightarrow \varphi_2 \quad A \cup C \vdash \varphi_2 \Rightarrow \varphi_3}{A \vdash_C \varphi_1 \Rightarrow \varphi_3}$$

$$(\text{CONSEQUENCE}) \quad \frac{M^{\mathsf{cfg}} \vDash \varphi_1 \to \varphi_1' \quad A \vdash_C \varphi_1' \Rightarrow \varphi_2' \quad M^{\mathsf{cfg}} \vDash \varphi_2' \to \varphi_2}{A \vdash_C \varphi_1 \Rightarrow \varphi_2}$$

$$(\text{CIRCULARITY}) \quad \frac{A \vdash_{C \cup \{\varphi_1 \Rightarrow \varphi_2\}} \varphi_1 \Rightarrow \varphi_2}{A \vdash_C \varphi_1 \Rightarrow \varphi_2}$$

Fig. 2. Some selected proof rules in the proof system of reachability logic

proof rules are not specific to any particular programming language. The programming language is given through its operational semantics as a set of axiom rules, to be used via the (AXIOM) proof rule. The characteristic feature of RL is its (CIRCULARITY) rule, which supports reasoning about circular behavior and recursive program constructs. In this subsection, we show how RL is faithfully defined in MmL and all its proof rules, including (CIRCULARITY), can be proved in MmL.

A. RL syntax, semantics, and proof system

RL is parametric in a model of ML (without μ) called the *configuration model*. Specifically, fix a signature (of *static program configurations*) Σ^{cfg} which may have various sorts and symbols, among which there is a distinguished sort *Cfg*. Fix a Σ^{cfg}-model M^{cfg} called the *configuration model*, where M_{Cfg}^{cfg} is the set of all configurations. RL formulas are called *reachability rules*, or simply *rules*, and have the form $\varphi_1 \Rightarrow \varphi_2$ where φ_1, φ_2 are ML (without μ) Σ^{cfg}-patterns. A *reachability system S* is a finite set of rules, which yields a transition system $\mathbb{S} = (M_{Cfg}^{\mathsf{cfg}}, R)$ where $s \, R \, t$ iff there exist a rule $\varphi_1 \Rightarrow \varphi_2 \in S$ and an M^{cfg}-valuation ρ such that $s \in \bar{\rho}(\varphi_1)$ and $t \in \bar{\rho}(\varphi_2)$. A rule $\psi_1 \Rightarrow \psi_2$ is *S-valid*, denoted $S \vDash_{\mathsf{RL}} \psi_1 \Rightarrow \psi_2$, iff for all M_{Cfg}^{cfg}-valuations ρ and configurations $s \in \bar{\rho}(\psi_1)$, either there is an infinite trace $s \, R \, t_1 \, R \, t_2 \, R \dots$ in $\mathbb{S}$ or there is a configuration t such that $s \, R^* \, r$ and $t \in \bar{\rho}(\psi_2)$. Therefore, validity in RL is defined in the spirit of *partial correctness*.

The sound and relatively complete proof system of RL derives *reachability logic sequents* of the form $A \vdash_C \varphi_1 \Rightarrow \varphi_2$ where A (called *axioms*) and C (called *circularities*) are finite sets of rules. Initially we start with $A = S$ and $C = \emptyset$. As the proof proceeds, more rules can be added to C via (CIRCULARITY) and then moved to A via (TRANSITIVITY), which can then be used via (AXIOM). We write $S \vdash_{\mathsf{RL}} \psi_1 \Rightarrow \psi_2$ to mean that $S \vdash_\emptyset \psi_1 \Rightarrow \psi_2$. Notice (CONSEQUENCE) consults the configuration model M^{cfg} for validity, so the completeness result is *relative to M^{cfg}*. We recall the following result [2]:

Theorem 38. *For all reachability systems S satisfying some reasonable technical assumptions (see [2]) and all rules $\psi_1 \Rightarrow \psi_2$, we have $S \vDash_{\mathsf{RL}} \psi_1 \Rightarrow \psi_2$ iff $S \vdash_{\mathsf{RL}} \psi_1 \Rightarrow \psi_2$.*

B. Defining reachability logic in matching μ-logic

We define the extended signature $\Sigma^{\mathsf{RL}} = \Sigma^{\mathsf{cfg}} \cup \{\bullet \in \Sigma_{Cfg,Cfg}\}$ where "$\bullet$" is a unary symbol called *one-path next*. To capture

the semantics of reachability rules $\varphi_1 \Rightarrow \varphi_2$, we define:

"weak eventually" $\diamondsuit_w \varphi \equiv \nu X . \varphi \vee \bullet X$ // equal to $\neg \mathsf{WF} \vee \diamondsuit \varphi$

"reaching star" $\varphi_1 \Rightarrow^* \varphi_2 \equiv \varphi_1 \rightarrow \diamondsuit_w \varphi_2$

"reaching plus" $\varphi_1 \Rightarrow^+ \varphi_2 \equiv \varphi_1 \rightarrow \bullet \diamondsuit_w \varphi_2$

Notice that the "weak eventually" $\diamondsuit_w \varphi$ is defined similarly to the "eventually" $\diamondsuit \varphi \equiv \mu X . \varphi \vee \bullet X$, but instead of using least fixpoint μ-binder, we define it as a greatest fixpoint. One can prove that $\diamondsuit_w \varphi = \neg \mathsf{WF} \vee \diamondsuit \varphi$, that is, a configuration γ satisfies $\diamondsuit_w \varphi$ if either it satisfies $\diamondsuit \varphi$, or it is not well-founded, meaning that there exists an infinite execution path from γ. Also notice that "reaching plus" $\varphi_1 \Rightarrow^+ \varphi_2$ is a stronger version of "reaching star", requiring that $\diamondsuit_w \varphi_2$ should hold *after at least one step*. This *progressive condition* is crucial to the soundness of RL reasoning: as shown in (Transitivity), circularities are flushed into the axiom set only *after one reachability step is established*. This leads us to the following translation from RL sequents to MmL patterns.

Definition 39. Given a rule $\varphi_1 \Rightarrow \varphi_2$, define the MmL pattern $\boxdot(\varphi_1 \Rightarrow \varphi_2) \equiv \Box(\varphi_1 \Rightarrow^+ \varphi_2)$ and extend it to a rule set A as follows: $\boxdot A \equiv \bigwedge_{\varphi_1 \Rightarrow \varphi_2 \in A} \boxdot(\varphi_1 \Rightarrow \varphi_2)$. Define the translation RL2MmL from RL sequents to MmL patterns as follows:

$$\text{RL2MmL}(A \vdash_C \varphi_1 \Rightarrow \varphi_2) = (\forall \boxdot A) \wedge (\forall \circ \boxdot C) \rightarrow (\varphi_1 \Rightarrow^\star \varphi_2)$$

where $\star = *$ if C is empty and $\star = +$ if C is nonempty. We use $\forall \varphi$ as a shorthand for $\forall \vec{x} . \varphi$ where $\vec{x} = FV(\varphi)$. Recall that the "$\circ$" in $\forall \circ \boxdot C$ is "all-path next".

Hence, the translation of $A \vdash_C \varphi_1 \Rightarrow \varphi_2$ depends on whether C is empty or not. When C is nonempty, the RL sequent is *stronger* in that it requires *at least one step* being made in $\varphi_1 \Rightarrow \varphi_2$. Axioms (those in A) are also *stronger* than circularities (those in C) in that axioms *always* hold, while circularities only hold *after at least one step* because of the leading all-path next "$\circ$"; and since the "next" is an "all-path" one, it does not matter which step is actually made, as circularities hold on *all* next states.

Theorem 40. *Let $\Gamma^{\mathsf{RL}} = \{\varphi \in \text{Pattern}^{ML}_{Cfg} \mid M^{\mathsf{cfg}} \vDash \varphi\}$ be the set of all ML patterns (without μ) of sort Cfg that hold in M^{cfg}. For all RL systems S and rules $\varphi_1 \Rightarrow \varphi_2$ satisfying the same technical assumptions in [2], the following are equivalent: (1) $S \vdash_{\mathsf{RL}} \varphi_1 \Rightarrow \varphi_2$; (2) $S \vDash_{\mathsf{RL}} \varphi_1 \Rightarrow \varphi_2$; (3) $\Gamma^{\mathsf{RL}} \vdash \text{RL2MmL}(S \vdash_\emptyset \varphi_1 \Rightarrow \varphi_2)$; (4) $\Gamma^{\mathsf{RL}} \vDash \text{RL2MmL}(S \vdash_\emptyset \varphi_1 \Rightarrow \varphi_2)$.*

Therefore, provided that an oracle for validity of ML patterns (without μ) in M^{cfg} is available, the MmL proof system is capable of deriving any reachability property that can be derived with the RL proof system. This result makes MmL an even more fundamental logic foundation for the $\mathbb{K}$ framework and thus for programming language specification and verification than RL, because it can express significantly more properties than partial correctness reachability.

X. Future and Related Work

We discuss future work, open problems, and related work.

A. Relation to modal logics

Due to the duality between MmL symbols and modal logic modalities (Section III, Proposition 12), ML can be regarded as a nontrivial extension of modal logics. There are various directions to extend the basic propositional modal logic in the literature [19]. One is the *hybrid extension*, where first-order quantifiers "$\forall$" and "$\exists$" are added to the logic, as well as *state variables/names* that allow us to specify one particular state. Another is the *polyadic extension*, where modalities can take not just one argument, but any number of arguments, and there can be multiple modalities. MmL can be seen as a combination of both extensions, further extended with multiple sort universes. The local completeness of $\mathcal{H}$ (Theorem 16) also extends the completeness results of its fragment logics, including hybrid modal logic [20] and many-sorted polyadic modal logic [18].

B. Stronger completeness results of $\mathcal{H}$

There are various notions of completeness for modal logics (see, e.g., [47, Appendix B.6]). We recall three of them, adapted to the context of ML and its proof system $\mathcal{H}$, from the strongest to the weakest:

- Global completeness: $\Gamma \vDash_{\mathsf{ML}} \varphi$ implies $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathcal{H}} \varphi$;
- Strong local completeness: $\Gamma \vDash^{\mathsf{loc}}_{\mathsf{ML}} \varphi$ implies $\Gamma \vdash^{\mathsf{loc}}_{\mathcal{H}} \varphi$;
- Weak local completeness: $\vDash_{\mathsf{ML}} \varphi$ implies $\vdash_{\mathcal{H}} \varphi$;

where $\Gamma \vDash^{\mathsf{loc}}_{\mathsf{ML}} \varphi$, called *local semantic entailment*, means that $\bigcap_{\psi \in \Gamma} \bar{\rho}(\psi) \subseteq \bar{\rho}(\varphi)$ for all models M and valuations ρ; $\Gamma \vdash^{\mathsf{loc}}_{\mathcal{H}} \varphi$, called *local provability*, means that there exists a finite subset $\Gamma_0 \subseteq_{\mathsf{fin}} \Gamma$ such that $\vdash_{\mathcal{H}} \wedge \Gamma_0 \rightarrow \varphi$, where $\wedge \Gamma_0$ is the conjunction of all patterns in Γ_0. Theorem 16 is a weak local completeness result for $\mathcal{H}$, but the way we actually prove it is by proving the strong local completeness theorem and then let $\Gamma = \emptyset$ (see Theorem 83). What is unknown and left as future work is global completeness. Theorem 15 shows that global completeness holds for ML when Γ contains definedness symbols and axioms. We conjecture global completeness holds in general.

C. Decidability of matching μ-logic without FOL quantifiers

Modal μ-logic is known for its high expressiveness as well as its *decidability*, given that it can capture the true least/greatest fixpoints in models, As a result, modal μ-logic stands out from other fixpoint logics, such as LFP. As seen in Section VIII, modal μ-logic can be seen as the syntactic fragment of MmL without FOL quantifiers (i.e., $\exists$-binder) or element variables that contains only one sort and one unary symbol. A natural question is whether the decidability result stil holds if we consider the MmL fragment without FOL quantifiers or element variables but containing multiple sorts and symbols of arbitrary arities. We conjecture it holds.

D. Alternative semantics of matching μ-logic

MmL cannot have a sound and complete proof system because we can precisely define $(\mathbb{N}, +, \times)$ (see Proposition 23). On the other hand, the proof system $\mathcal{H}_\mu$ turned out to be strong enough to prove all the proof rules of all the proof systems

of all the logics discussed in this paper. Therefore, a natural question is whether we can find alternative models for MmL that make $\mathcal{H}_\mu$ complete. A promising direction towards such an alternative semantics is to consider the so-called *Henkin semantics* or *general semantics*, where the least fixpoint pattern $\mu X . \varphi$ does not evaluate to the true least fixpoint in models, but to *the least fixpoint that is definable in the logic*.

XI. Conclusion

We made two main contributions in this paper. Firstly, we proposed a new sound and complete proof system $\mathcal{H}$ for matching logic (ML). Secondly, we extended ML with the least fixpoint μ-binder and proposed matching μ-logic (MmL). We showed the expressiveness of MmL by defining a variety of common logics about induction/fixpoints/verification in MmL. We hope that MmL may serve as a promising unifying foundation for specifying and reasoning about induction, fixpoints, as well as model checking and program verification.

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APPENDIX A
MATCHING LOGIC PROOF SYSTEM $\mathcal{P}$

The proof system $\mathcal{P}$ of ML in [1] is shown in Fig. 3.

APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 13

We prove the soundness theorem of $\mathcal{H}$ (Theorem 13). We only discuss ML (without μ) in this section, so we drop all unnecessary annotations. Specifically, we abbreviate "$\vDash_{\mathsf{ML}}$" as "$\vDash$" and "$\vdash_{\mathcal{H}}$" as "$\vdash$".

Lemma 41 (ML substitution lemma). *For all models M and M-valuations ρ, we have $\bar{\rho}(\varphi[y/x]) = \overline{\rho[\rho(y)/x]}(\varphi)$.*

Proof: The proof is standard as in FOL. We conduct structural induction on φ. If $\varphi \equiv z \not\equiv x$, we have $\bar{\rho}(z[y/x]) = \bar{\rho}(z) = \{\rho(z)\}$ and $\overline{\rho[\rho(y)/x]}(z) = \{\rho(z)\}$. If $\varphi \equiv x$, we have $\bar{\rho}(x[y/x]) = \bar{\rho}(y) = \{\rho(y)\}$ and $\overline{\rho[\rho(y)/x]}(x) = \{\rho(y)\}$. If $\varphi \equiv \varphi_1 \wedge \varphi_2$, we have $\bar{\rho}((\varphi_1 \wedge \varphi_2)[y/x]) = \bar{\rho}(\varphi_1[y/x] \wedge \varphi_2[y/x]) = \bar{\rho}(\varphi_1[y/x]) \cap \bar{\rho}(\varphi_2[y/x]) = \overline{\rho[\rho(y)/x]}(\varphi_1) \cap \overline{\rho[\rho(y)/x]}(\varphi_2) = \overline{\rho[\rho(y)/x]}(\varphi_1 \wedge \varphi_2)$. If $\varphi \equiv \neg\varphi_1$, we have $\bar{\rho}((\neg\varphi_1)[y/x]) = \bar{\rho}(\neg(\varphi_1[y/x])) = M \setminus \bar{\rho}(\varphi_1[y/x]) = M \setminus \overline{\rho[\rho(y)/x]}(\varphi_1) = \overline{\rho[\rho(y)/x]}(\neg\varphi_1)$.

If $\varphi \equiv \exists z . \varphi_1$, by α-renaming, we can safely assume that z is distinct from both x and y without loss of generality. Then we have

$$
\begin{aligned}
\bar{\rho}((\exists z . \varphi_1)[y/x]) &= \bar{\rho}(\exists z . (\varphi_1[y/x])) \\
&= \bigcup_a \overline{\rho[a/z]}(\varphi_1[y/x]) \\
&= \bigcup_a \overline{\rho[a/z][\rho[a/z](y)/x]}(\varphi_1) \\
&= \bigcup_a \overline{\rho[a/z][\rho(y)/x]}(\varphi_1) \\
&= \bigcup_a \overline{\rho[\rho(y)/x][a/z]}(\varphi_1) \\
&= \overline{\rho[\rho(y)/x]}(\exists z . \varphi_1).
\end{aligned}
$$

If $\varphi \equiv \sigma(\varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_n)$, we have

$$
\begin{aligned}
\bar{\rho}(\sigma(\varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_n)[y/x]) &= \bar{\rho}(\sigma(\varphi_1[y/x], \ldots, \varphi_n[y/x])) \\
&= \sigma_M(\bar{\rho}(\varphi_1[y/x]), \ldots, \bar{\rho}(\varphi_n[y/x])) \\
&= \sigma_M(\overline{\rho[\rho(y)/x]}(\varphi_1), \ldots, \overline{\rho[\rho(y)/x]}(\varphi_n)) \\
&= \overline{\rho[\rho(y)/x]}(\sigma(\varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_n)).
\end{aligned}
$$

Therefore, the conclusion holds by structural induction. ∎

Lemma 42. *Let C be be a nest symbol context. Then for all models M and M-valuations ρ, we have*

1) $\bar{\rho}(C[\bot]) = \emptyset$;
2) $\bar{\rho}(C[\varphi_1 \vee \varphi_2]) = \bar{\rho}(\varphi_1) \cup \bar{\rho}(\varphi_2)$;
3) $\bar{\rho}(C[\exists x . \varphi]) = \bigcup_a \overline{\rho[a/x]}(C[\varphi])$ *if $x \notin FV(C[\exists x . \varphi])$;*
4) $\bar{\rho}(\varphi_1) \subseteq \bar{\rho}(\varphi_2)$ *implies $\bar{\rho}(C[\varphi_1]) \subseteq \bar{\rho}(C[\varphi_2])$;*
5) $\bar{\rho}(C[x \wedge \varphi]) \cap \bar{\rho}(C[x \wedge \neg\varphi]) = \emptyset$.

Proof: We conduct structural induction on C. The base case is when $C[\Box] \equiv \Box$ is the identity context. In this case, all propositions trivially hold.

(Propositional Tautology)	φ, if φ is a proposition tautology over patterns of the same sort
(Modus Ponens)	$\dfrac{\varphi_1 \quad \varphi_1 \rightarrow \varphi_2}{\varphi_2}$
(Functional Substitution)	$(\forall x.\varphi) \wedge (\exists y.\varphi' = y) \rightarrow \varphi[\varphi'/x]$ if $y \notin FV(\varphi')$
($\forall$)	$\forall x.(\varphi_1 \rightarrow \varphi_2) \rightarrow (\varphi_1 \rightarrow \forall x.\varphi_2)$ if $x \notin FV(\varphi_1)$
(Universal Generalization)	$\dfrac{\varphi}{\forall x . \varphi}$
(Equality Introduction)	$\varphi = \varphi$
(Equality Elimination)	$(\varphi_1 = \varphi_2) \wedge \psi[\varphi_1/x] \rightarrow \psi[\varphi_2/x]$
(Membership Introduction)	$\dfrac{\varphi}{\forall x . (x \in \varphi)}$ if $x \notin FV(\varphi)$
(Membership Elimination)	$\dfrac{\forall x . (x \in \varphi)}{\varphi}$ if $x \notin FV(\varphi)$
(Membership Variable)	$(x \in y) = (x = y)$
(Membership$_\neg$)	$(x \in \neg\varphi) = \neg(x \in \varphi)$
(Membership$_\wedge$)	$(x \in \varphi_1 \wedge \varphi_2) = (x \in \varphi_1) \wedge (x \in \varphi_2)$
(Membership$_\exists$)	$(x \in \exists y.\varphi) = \exists y.(x \in \varphi)$, where x and y distinct.
(Membership Symbol)	$x \in C_\sigma[\varphi] = \exists y.(y \in \varphi) \wedge (x \in C_\sigma[y])$ if $y \notin FV(C_\sigma[\varphi])$

Fig. 3. Sound and complete matching logic proof system $\mathcal{P}$ with definedness symbols [1]

The inductive case is when $C[\Box] \equiv C_\sigma[C_1[\Box]]$ where C_σ is a single symbol context and C_1 is a nested symbol context. By inductive hypothesis, all propositions hold for C_1. Let us assume that $C_\sigma[\Box] \equiv \sigma(\psi_1, \ldots, \psi_{i-1}, \Box, \psi_{i+1}, \ldots, \psi_n)$. For notational simplicity, we define

$$\sigma_M^i(A) = \sigma_M(\bar{\rho}(\psi_1), \ldots, \bar{\rho}(\psi_{i-1}), A, \bar{\rho}(\psi_{i+1}), \ldots, \bar{\rho}(\psi_n)))$$

for $A \subseteq M$. Then, $\bar{\rho}(C_\sigma[\varphi]) = \sigma_M^i(\bar{\rho}(\varphi))$ for all φ.

We now prove propositions (1)-(5) using the inductive hypothesis and the property of propagation (Proposition 3).

(1). We have $\bar{\rho}(C_\sigma[C_1[\bot]]) = \sigma_M^i(\bar{\rho}(C_1[\bot])) = \sigma_M^i(\emptyset) = \emptyset$.

(2). We have $\bar{\rho}(C_\sigma[C_1[\varphi_1 \vee \varphi_2]]) = \sigma_M^i(\bar{\rho}(C_1[\varphi_1 \vee \varphi_2])) = \sigma_M^i(\bar{\rho}(C_1[\varphi_1]) \cup \bar{\rho}(C_1[\varphi_2])) = \sigma_M^i(\bar{\rho}(C_1[\varphi_1])) \cup \sigma_M^i(\bar{\rho}(C_1[\varphi_1])) = \bar{\rho}(C_\sigma[C_1[\varphi_1]]) \cup \bar{\rho}(C_\sigma[C_1[\varphi_2]])$.

(3). We have $\bar{\rho}(C_\sigma[C_1[\exists x . \varphi]]) = \sigma_M^i(\bar{\rho}(C_1[\exists x . \varphi])) = \sigma_M^i(\bigcup_a \overline{\rho[a/x]}(C_1[\varphi]))$. Since $x \notin FV(C_\sigma[C_1[\exists x . \varphi]])$, we have $\sigma_M^i(\bigcup_a \overline{\rho[a/x]}(C_1[\varphi])) = \bigcup_a \sigma_M^i(\overline{\rho[a/x]}(C_1[\varphi])) = \bigcup_a \overline{\rho[a/x]}(C_\sigma[C_1[\varphi]])$.

(4). We need to prove that $\bar{\rho}(C_\sigma[C_1[\varphi_1]]) \subseteq \bar{\rho}(C_\sigma[C_1[\varphi_2]])$, that is, $\sigma_M^i(\bar{\rho}(C_1[\varphi_1])) \subseteq \sigma_M^i(\bar{\rho}(C_1[\varphi_2]))$. By the property of propagation (Proposition 3), it suffices to show that $\bar{\rho}(C_1[\varphi_1]) \subseteq \bar{\rho}(C_1[\varphi_2])$, which holds, by the inductive hypothesis and the assumption $\bar{\rho}(\varphi_1) \subseteq \bar{\rho}(\varphi_2)$.

(5). This can be proved from proposition (1). If $\rho(x) \in \bar{\rho}(\varphi)$, we have $\bar{\rho}(x \wedge \varphi) = \emptyset$, and thus $\bar{\rho}(C[x \wedge \varphi]) = \emptyset$. Otherwise, we have $\bar{\rho}(x \wedge \neg\varphi) = \emptyset$, and thus $\bar{\rho}(C[x \wedge \neg\varphi]) = \emptyset$.

Therefore, all propositions hold by structural induction. ∎

Lemma 43. *For all models M, the following propositions hold*

1) $M \vDash \varphi$ *for propositional tautology φ over patterns of the same sort;*
2) $M \vDash \varphi_1$ *and* $M \vDash \varphi_1 \rightarrow \varphi_2$ *imply* $M \vDash \varphi_2$;
3) $M \vDash \varphi[y/x] \rightarrow \exists x . \varphi$;
4) $M \vDash \varphi_1 \rightarrow \varphi_2$ *implies* $M \vDash (\exists x . \varphi_1) \rightarrow \varphi_2$ *if* $x \notin FV(\varphi_2)$;

5) $M \vDash C_\sigma[\bot] \rightarrow \bot$;
6) $M \vDash C_\sigma[\varphi_1 \vee \varphi_2] \rightarrow C_\sigma[\varphi_1] \vee C_\sigma[\varphi_2]$;
7) $M \vDash C_\sigma[\exists x.\varphi] \rightarrow \exists x.C_\sigma[\varphi]$ *if* $x \notin FV(C_\sigma[\exists x.\varphi])$;
8) $M \vDash \varphi_1 \rightarrow \varphi_2$ *implies* $M \vDash C_\sigma[\varphi_1] \rightarrow C_\sigma[\varphi_2]$
9) $M \vDash \exists x . x$
10) $M \vDash \neg(C_1[x \wedge \varphi] \wedge C_2[x \wedge \neg\varphi])$

where $\varphi, \varphi_1, \varphi_2, \varphi_3$ are patterns, x and y are variables, σ is a symbol, C_σ is a single symbol context, and C_1 and C_2 are nested symbol contexts.

Proof: Propositions (1) and (2) are proved in [1, Proposition 2.8]. Note that $M \vDash \varphi_1 \rightarrow \varphi_2$ iff $\bar{\rho}(\varphi_1) \subseteq \bar{\rho}(\varphi_2)$ for all ρ (see [1, Proposition 2.6]). We will use this property to prove propositions (3)-(8). In the following, let ρ be any valuation.

(3). By ML Substitution Lemma (Lemma 41), $\bar{\rho}(\varphi[y/x]) = \overline{\rho[\rho(y)/x]}(\varphi) \subseteq \bigcup_a \overline{\rho[a/x]}(\varphi) = \bar{\rho}(\exists x . \varphi)$.

(4). We need to prove that $\bar{\rho}(\exists x . \varphi_1) \subseteq \bar{\rho}(\varphi_2)$, that is, $\bigcup_a \overline{\rho[a/x]}(\varphi_1) \subseteq \bar{\rho}(\varphi_2)$. It suffices to prove that $\overline{\rho[a/x]}(\varphi_1) \subseteq \bar{\rho}(\varphi_2)$ for all $a \in M$. Note that $x \notin FV(\varphi_1)$, so the evaluation of φ_1 is independent from the evaluation of x (see [1, Proposition 2.6]). Therefore, $\overline{\rho[a/x]}(\varphi_1) = \bar{\rho}(\varphi_1)$. Finally, we have $\bar{\rho}(\varphi_1) \subseteq \bar{\rho}(\varphi_2)$ by assumption.

(5)-(8),(10). All these propositions are a direct consequence of Lemma 42.

(9). We have $\bar{\rho}(\exists x . x) = \bigcup_a \overline{\rho[a/x]}(x) = \bigcup_a \{a\} = M$. ∎

Now, we restate Theorem 13 and prove it. Recall that within this section we abbreviate $\Gamma \vdash_\mathcal{H} \varphi$ as $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$ and abbreviate $\Gamma \vDash_{ML} \varphi$ as $\Gamma \vDash \varphi$.

Theorem 13 (Soundness of $\mathcal{H}$). $\Gamma \vdash_\mathcal{H} \varphi$ *implies* $\Gamma \vDash_{ML} \varphi$.

Proof: The proof is standard as in FOL. We conduct induction on the length of the formal proof $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$ of the Hilbert-style proof system $\mathcal{H}$. The base case is when the proof length is 1. This means that φ is either an axiom of $\mathcal{H}$ or

$\varphi \in \Gamma$. If φ is an axiom, then we have $\Gamma \vDash \varphi$ by Lemma 43. If $\varphi \in \Gamma$, then we have $\Gamma \vDash \varphi$ by Definition 6.

Now we consider the inductive case. Suppose the proof length is $n + 1$ for some $n \geq 1$, as illustrated in the following:

$$\varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_n, \varphi_{n+1} \quad \text{where } \varphi_{n+1} \equiv \varphi.$$

If φ_{n+1} is an axiom of $\mathcal{H}$ or $\varphi_{n+1} \in \Gamma$, then we have $\Gamma \vDash \varphi_{n+1}$, for the same reason as in the base case. If φ_{n+1} is by an application of one of (Modus Ponens), ($\exists$-Generalization), or (Framing), then we have $\Gamma \vDash \varphi$ by Lemma 43 as well as the inductive hypothesis, which states that $\Gamma \vDash \varphi_i$ for all $1 \leq i \leq n$. ∎

Appendix C
Properties of Proof System $\mathcal{H}$ of Matching Logic

We present and prove some important properties of the proof system $\mathcal{H}$ of ML. In particular, we prove Proposition 12 and Theorem 14.

We only discuss ML (without μ) in this section, so we drop all unnecessary annotations. Specifically, we abbreviate "$\vDash_{\mathsf{ML}}$" as "$\vDash$" and "$\vdash_{\mathcal{H}}$" as "$\vdash$". We call a *nested symbol context* (see Definition 10) also as just a *symbol context*.

We assume readers are familiar with FOL and its formal proofs. Note that the proof system $\mathcal{H}$ of ML consists of the complete axiomatization of FOL. This leads us to the following proposition.

Proposition 44. *FOL reasoning is sound for ML.*

Proof: The proof rules (Tautology), (Modus Ponens), ($\exists$-Quantifier), and ($\exists$-Generalization) form a complete axiomatization of FOL (without function symbols). Therefore, any FOL reasoning is a combination of these rules, which are sound for ML as shown in Theorem 13. ∎

Proposition 45. *Frame reasoning is sound for ML. Specifically,*

1) *If $\Gamma \vdash \varphi_i \rightarrow \varphi_i'$ for $1 \leq i \leq n$, then we have $\Gamma \vdash \sigma(\varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_n) \rightarrow \sigma(\varphi_1', \ldots, \varphi_n')$;*
2) *If $\Gamma \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \varphi'$, then we have $\Gamma \vdash C[\varphi] \rightarrow C[\varphi_i']$, where C is a symbol context.*

Proof: We first prove (1). It suffices to prove all the following propositions:

$$\Gamma \vdash \sigma(\varphi_1, \varphi_2, \ldots, \varphi_{n-1}, \varphi_n) \rightarrow \sigma(\varphi_1', \varphi_2, \ldots, \varphi_{n-1}, \varphi_n)$$
$$\Gamma \vdash \sigma(\varphi_1', \varphi_2, \ldots, \varphi_{n-1}, \varphi_n) \rightarrow \sigma(\varphi_1', \varphi_2', \ldots, \varphi_{n-1}, \varphi_n)$$
$$\cdots$$
$$\Gamma \vdash \sigma(\varphi_1', \varphi_2', \ldots, \varphi_{n-1}', \varphi_n) \rightarrow \sigma(\varphi_1', \varphi_2', \ldots, \varphi_{n-1}', \varphi_n')$$

These propositions can be directly proved by (Framing).

We then prove (2) by a structural induction on C. If $C[\square] \equiv \square$ is the identity context, the conclusion trivial holds. If $C[\square] \equiv C_\sigma[C_1[\square]]$ where C_1 is a symbol context, we have

$\Gamma \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \varphi'$	// assumption
$\Gamma \vdash C_1[\varphi] \rightarrow C_1[\varphi']$	// inductive hypothesis
$\Gamma \vdash C_\sigma[C_1[\varphi]] \rightarrow C_\sigma[C_1[\varphi']]$	// (Framing)

Therefore, both conclusions hold. ∎

Proposition 46. *For all symbol contexts C and patterns $\varphi_1, \varphi_2, \varphi$, the following propositions hold:*

1) *$\Gamma \vdash C[\bot] \leftrightarrow \bot$;*
2) *$\Gamma \vdash C[\varphi_1 \vee \varphi_2] \leftrightarrow C[\varphi_1] \vee C[\varphi_2]$;*
3) *$\Gamma \vdash C[\exists x. \varphi] \leftrightarrow \exists x. C[\varphi]$, if $x \notin FV(C[\exists x. \varphi])$;*
4) *$\Gamma \vdash C[\varphi_1 \vee \varphi_2]$ iff $\Gamma \vdash C[\varphi_1] \vee C[\varphi_2]$;*
5) *$\Gamma \vdash C[\exists x. \varphi]$ iff $\Gamma \vdash \exists x. C[\varphi]$, if $x \notin FV(C[\exists x. \varphi])$.*

Proof: We conduct structural induction on C. If $C[\square] \equiv \square$, all propositions trivially hold, so we consider the inductive case when $C[\square] \equiv C_\sigma[C_1[\square]]$ where C_σ is a single symbol context and C_1 is a symbol context.

(1,"$\rightarrow$"). By inductive hypothesis, we have $\Gamma \vdash C_1[\bot] \rightarrow \bot$. By (Framing), we have $\Gamma \vdash C_\sigma[C_1[\bot]] \rightarrow C_\sigma[\bot]$, i.e., $\Gamma \vdash C[\bot] \rightarrow C_\sigma[\bot]$. Finally, we have $\Gamma \vdash C_\sigma[\bot] \rightarrow \bot$ by (Propagation$_\bot$).

(1,"$\leftarrow$"). Trivial, by FOL reasoning.

(2,"$\rightarrow$"). Similar to (1,"$\rightarrow$") except that we use (Propagation$_\vee$) in the last step.

(2,"$\leftarrow$"). It suffices to prove $\Gamma \vdash C[\varphi_i] \rightarrow C[\varphi_1 \vee \varphi_2]$ for $i \in \{1, 2\}$. This can be proved by frame reasoning (Proposition 45) on $\Gamma \vdash \varphi_i \rightarrow \varphi_1 \vee \varphi_2$.

(3,"$\rightarrow$"). Similar to (1,"$\rightarrow$") except that we use (Propagation$_\exists$) in the last step.

(3,"$\leftarrow$"). It suffices to prove $\Gamma \vdash (\exists x. C[\varphi]) \rightarrow C[\exists x. \varphi]$. By ($\exists$-Generalization), it suffices to prove $\Gamma \vdash C[\varphi] \rightarrow C[\exists x. \varphi]$, which can be proved by frame reasoning (Proposition 45) on $\Gamma \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \exists x. \varphi$.

Finally, both (4) and (5) are direct consequences of (1)-(3). ∎

Proposition 47. *For any context C (not just symbol context), we have $\Gamma \vdash \varphi_1 \leftrightarrow \varphi_2$ implies $\Gamma \vdash C[\varphi_1] \leftrightarrow C[\varphi_2]$.*

Proof: We conduct structural induction on C. Recall that a context is simply a pattern with a distinguished placeholder variable $\square$ (see Definition 10). The base case is when C is the identity context. In this case, the conclusion trivially holds. In the following, we consider the inductive cases.

When C takes one of the forms: $\neg C'$, $\psi \wedge C'$, $C' \wedge \psi$, or $\exists x. C$ where C' is a context and ψ is a pattern *without* the placeholder variable $\square$, the conclusion holds by simple FOL reasoning. When C has the form $C_\sigma[C']$, the conclusion holds by Proposition 45. ∎

Proposition 47 allows us to replace *in-place* φ_1 by φ_2 under any context, if $\Gamma \vdash \varphi_1 \leftrightarrow \varphi_2$.

Lemma 48. *For symbol contexts C, we have $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$ implies $\Gamma \vdash \neg C[\neg \varphi]$.*

Proof:

1	φ	hypothesis
2	$\neg\varphi \rightarrow \bot$	by 1, FOL reasoning
3	$C[\neg\varphi] \rightarrow C[\bot]$	by 2, (Framing)
4	$C[\bot] \rightarrow \bot$	by (Propagation)
5	$C[\neg\varphi] \rightarrow \bot$	by 3 and 4, FOL reasoning
6	$\neg C[\neg\varphi]$	by 5, FOL reasoning

Now, we restate Proposition 12 and prove it. Recall that we abbreviate "$\vdash_{\mathcal{H}}$" as "$\vdash$" within this section.

Proposition 12. *Let $\sigma \in \Sigma_{s_1 \ldots s_n, s}$ and define its "dual" as $\bar{\sigma}(\varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_n) \equiv \neg\sigma(\neg\varphi_1, \ldots, \neg\varphi_n)$. Then we have:*

- *(K): $\vdash_{\mathcal{H}} \bar{\sigma}(\varphi_1 \to \varphi_1', \ldots, \varphi_n \to \varphi_n')$*
  $\to (\bar{\sigma}(\varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_n) \to \bar{\sigma}(\varphi_1', \ldots, \varphi_n'))$;
- *(N): $\vdash_{\mathcal{H}} \varphi_i$ implies $\vdash_{\mathcal{H}} \bar{\sigma}(\varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_i, \ldots, \varphi_n)$.*

These rules also appear in [17], [18] as proof rules of polyadic modal logic. When $n = 1$, we obtain the standard (K) rule and (N) rule of normal modal logic [19].

Proof: Define $C_\sigma[\Box] = \sigma(\varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_{i-1}, \Box, \varphi_{i+1}, \ldots, \varphi_n)$ for some $1 \le i \le n$.

(K). By FOL reasoning, we just need to prove the case of one argument, that is, to prove $\vdash \neg C_\sigma[\neg(\varphi \to \varphi')] \to (\neg C_\sigma[\neg\varphi] \to \neg C_\sigma[\neg\varphi'])$. By FOL reasoning, it suffices to prove $\vdash C_\sigma[\varphi \wedge \varphi'] \vee C_\sigma[\neg\varphi] \vee \neg C_\sigma[\neg\varphi']$. By Proposition 46, it suffices to prove $\vdash C_\sigma[(\varphi \wedge \varphi') \vee \neg\varphi] \vee \neg C_\sigma[\neg\varphi']$, i.e., $\vdash C_\sigma[\varphi' \vee \neg\varphi] \vee \neg C_\sigma[\neg\varphi']$. By Proposition 46, it suffices to prove $\vdash C_\sigma[\varphi'] \vee C_\sigma[\neg\varphi] \vee \neg C_\sigma[\neg\varphi']$, which holds by FOL reasoning.

(N). It is a direct consequence of Lemma 48, where we let $C \equiv C_\sigma$. ∎

Lemma 49. $\Gamma \vdash \varphi_1 \leftrightarrow \varphi_2$ *implies* $\Gamma \vdash \varphi_1 = \varphi_2$.

Proof:

1	$\varphi_1 \leftrightarrow \varphi_2$	hypothesis
2	$\neg\lceil\neg(\varphi_1 \leftrightarrow \varphi_2)\rceil$	by 1, Lemma 48
3	$\varphi_1 = \varphi_2$	by 2, definition of equality

∎

Lemma 50. *(Equality Introduction) can be proved in $\mathcal{H}$.*

Proof:

1	$\varphi \leftrightarrow \varphi$	propositional tautology
2	$\varphi = \varphi$	by 1, Lemma 49

∎

Lemma 51. *(Membership Introduction) can be proved in $\mathcal{H}$.*

Proof:

1	φ	hypothesis
2	$\varphi \to (x \to \varphi)$	(Proposition₁)
3	$x \to \varphi$	by 1 and 2, (Modus Ponens)
4	$x \to x$	propositional tautology
5	$x \to x \wedge \varphi$	by 3 and 4, FOL reasoning
6	$\lceil x \rceil \to \lceil x \wedge \varphi \rceil$	by 5, (Framing)
7	$\lceil x \rceil$	definedness axiom
8	$\lceil x \wedge \varphi \rceil$	by 6 and 7, (Modus Ponens)
9	$x \in \varphi$	by 8, definition of membership
10	$\forall x.(x \in \varphi)$	by 9, (Universal Generalization)

∎

Lemma 52. *(Membership Elimination) can be proved in $\mathcal{H}$.*

Proof:

1	$\forall x.(x \in \varphi)$	hypothesis
2	$(\forall x.(x \in \varphi))$ $\to x \in \varphi$	(Variable Substitution)
3	$x \in \varphi$	by 1 and 2, (Modus Ponens)
4	$\lceil x \wedge \varphi \rceil$	by 3, definition of membership
5	$\neg(\lceil x \wedge \varphi \rceil$ $\wedge(x \wedge \neg\varphi))$	(Singleton Variable)
6	$\lceil x \wedge \varphi \rceil$ $\to (x \to \varphi)$	by 5, FOL reasoning
7	$x \to \varphi$	by 4 and 6, (Modus Ponens)
8	$\forall x.(x \to \varphi)$	by 7, (Universal Generalization)
9	$(\exists x.x) \to \varphi$	by 8, FOL reasoning
10	$\exists x.x$	(Existence)
11	φ	by 10 and 9, (Modus Ponens)

∎

Lemma 53. *(Membership Variable) can be proved in $\mathcal{H}$.*

Proof: By Lemma 49, we just need to prove both $\vdash (x \in y) \to (x = y)$ and $\vdash (x = y) \to (x \in y)$. We first prove $\vdash (x = y) \to (x \in y)$.

1	$\lceil x \rceil$	definedness axiom
2	$\lceil x \rceil \vee \lceil y \rceil$	by 1, FOL reasoning
3	$\lceil x \vee y \rceil$	by 2, Proposition 46
4	$\lceil \neg(x \leftrightarrow y) \vee (x \wedge y) \rceil$	by 3, FOL reasoning
5	$\lceil \neg(x \leftrightarrow y) \rceil \vee \lceil x \wedge y \rceil$	by 4, Proposition 46
6	$\neg\lceil \neg(x \leftrightarrow y) \rceil \to \lceil x \wedge y \rceil$	by 5, FOL reasoning
7	$(x = y) \to (x \in y)$	by 6, definition

We then prove $\vdash (x \in y) \to (x = y)$.

1	$\neg(\lceil x \wedge y \rceil \wedge \lceil x \wedge \neg y \rceil)$	by (Singleton Variable)
2	$\neg(\lceil x \wedge y \rceil \wedge \lceil \neg x \wedge y \rceil)$	by (Singleton Variable)
3	$\lceil x \wedge y \rceil \to \neg\lceil x \wedge \neg y \rceil$	by 1, FOL reasoning
4	$\lceil x \wedge y \rceil \to \neg\lceil \neg x \wedge y \rceil$	by 2, FOL reasoning
5	$\lceil x \wedge y \rceil$ $\to \neg\lceil x \wedge \neg y \rceil \wedge \neg\lceil \neg x \wedge y \rceil$	by 3, 4, FOL reasoning
6	$\lceil x \wedge y \rceil$ $\to \neg(\lceil x \wedge \neg y \rceil \vee \lceil \neg x \wedge y \rceil)$	by 5, FOL reasoning
7	$\lceil x \wedge y \rceil$ $\to \neg\lceil (x \wedge \neg y) \vee (\neg x \wedge y) \rceil$	by 6, Proposition 46
8	$\lceil x \wedge y \rceil \to \neg\lceil \neg(x \leftrightarrow y) \rceil$	by 7, FOL reasoning
9	$(x \in y) \to (x = y)$	by 8, definition

∎

Lemma 54. *(Membership¬) can be proved in $\mathcal{H}$.*

Proof: We first prove $\vdash (x \in \neg\varphi) \to \neg(x \in \varphi)$.

1	$\neg(\lceil x \wedge \varphi \rceil \wedge \lceil x \wedge \neg\varphi \rceil)$	by (Singleton Variable)
2	$\lceil x \wedge \neg\varphi \rceil \to \neg\lceil x \wedge \varphi \rceil$	by 1, FOL reasoning
3	$(x \in \neg\varphi) \to \neg(x \in \varphi)$	by 2, definition

We then prove $\vdash \neg(x \in \varphi) \to (x \in \neg\varphi)$.

1	$\lceil x \rceil$	definedness axiom
2	$\lceil (x \wedge \varphi) \vee (x \wedge \neg\varphi) \rceil$	by 1, FOL reasoning
3	$\lceil x \wedge \varphi \rceil \vee \lceil x \wedge \neg\varphi \rceil$	by 2, Proposition 46
4	$\neg\lceil x \wedge \varphi \rceil \rightarrow \lceil x \wedge \neg\varphi \rceil$	by 3, FOL reasoning
5	$\neg(x \in \varphi) \rightarrow (x \in \neg\varphi)$	by 4, definition

$\blacksquare$

Lemma 55. $\vdash (x \in (\varphi_1 \vee \varphi_2)) \leftrightarrow (x \in \varphi_1) \vee (x \in \varphi_2)$.

Proof: Use (PROPAGATION$_\vee$) and FOL reasoning. $\blacksquare$

Lemma 56. (MEMBERSHIP$_\wedge$) *can be proved in* $\mathcal{H}$.

Proof: Use Lemma 54 and 55, and the fact that $\vdash \varphi_1 \wedge \varphi_2 \leftrightarrow \neg(\neg\varphi_1 \vee \neg\varphi_2)$. $\blacksquare$

Lemma 57. (MEMBERSHIP$_\exists$) *can be proved in* $\mathcal{H}$.

Proof: Use (PROPAGATION$_\exists$) and FOL reasoning. $\blacksquare$

The following is a useful lemma about definedness symbols.

Lemma 58. $\vdash C[\varphi] \rightarrow \lceil \varphi \rceil$ *for any symbol context* C.

Proof: Let x be a fresh variable in the following proof.

1	$\lceil x \rceil$	definedness axiom
2	$\lceil x \rceil \vee \lceil \varphi \rceil$	by 1, FOL reasoning
3	$\lceil x \vee \varphi \rceil$	by 2, Proposition 46
4	$\lceil x \wedge \neg\varphi \vee \varphi \rceil$	by 3, FOL reasoning
5	$\lceil x \wedge \neg\varphi \rceil \vee \lceil \varphi \rceil$	by 4, Proposition 46
6	$C[x \wedge \varphi] \rightarrow \neg\lceil x \wedge \neg\varphi \rceil$	by (SINGLETON VARIABLE)
7	$\neg\lceil x \wedge \neg\varphi \rceil \rightarrow \lceil \varphi \rceil$	by 5, FOL reasoning
8	$C[x \wedge \varphi] \rightarrow \lceil \varphi \rceil$	by 6 and 7, FOL reasoning
9	$\forall x.(C[x \wedge \varphi] \rightarrow \lceil \varphi \rceil)$	by 8, FOL reasoning
10	$(\exists x.C[x \wedge \varphi]) \rightarrow \lceil \varphi \rceil$	by 9, FOL reasoning
11	$\varphi \rightarrow (\exists x.x) \wedge \varphi$	by (EXISTENCE)
12	$\varphi \rightarrow \exists x.(x \wedge \varphi)$	by 11, FOL reasoning
13	$C[\varphi] \rightarrow C[\exists x.(x \wedge \varphi)]$	by 12, (FRAMING)
14	$C[\exists x.(x \wedge \varphi)] \rightarrow \lceil \varphi \rceil$	by 10, Proposition 46
15	$C[\varphi] \rightarrow \lceil \varphi \rceil$	by 13, 14, FOL reasoning

$\blacksquare$

Corollary 59. $\vdash C_\sigma[\varphi] \rightarrow \lceil \varphi \rceil$ *and* $\vdash \lfloor \varphi \rfloor \rightarrow \neg C_\sigma[\neg\varphi]$ *for all symbols* σ. *In particular,* $\vdash \varphi \rightarrow \lceil \varphi \rceil$ *and* $\vdash \lfloor \varphi \rfloor \rightarrow \varphi$.

We are now ready to prove the deduction theorem (Theorem 14).

Proof of Theorem 14: Carry out induction on the length of the proof $\Gamma \cup \{\psi\} \vdash \varphi$.

(Base Case). Suppose the length is one, then either φ is an axiom in $\mathcal{H}$ or $\varphi \in \Gamma \cup \{\psi\}$. In either case, it is obvious that $\Gamma \vdash \lfloor \psi \rfloor \rightarrow \varphi$ (noticing Corollary 59 for the case φ is ψ).

(Induction Step). Suppose the proof $\Gamma \cup \{\psi\} \vdash \varphi$ has $n + 1$ steps:

$$\varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_n, \varphi.$$

If φ is an axiom in $\mathcal{H}$ or $\varphi \in \Gamma \cup \{\psi\}$, then $\Gamma \vdash \lfloor \psi \rfloor \rightarrow \varphi$ for the same reason as (Base Case). If the last step is (MODUS PONENS) on φ_i and φ_j for some $1 \leq i, j \leq n$ such that φ_j has the form $\varphi_i \rightarrow \varphi$, by induction hypothesis, $\Gamma \vdash \lfloor \psi \rfloor \rightarrow \varphi_i$ and $\Gamma \vdash \lfloor \psi \rfloor \rightarrow (\varphi_i \rightarrow \varphi)$. By FOL reasoning, $\Gamma \vdash \lfloor \psi \rfloor \rightarrow \varphi$. If

the last step is (UNIVERSAL GENERALIZATION) on φ_i for some $1 \leq i \leq n$, then φ must have the form $\forall x.\varphi_i$ where x does not occur free in ψ. By induction hypothesis, $\Gamma \vdash \lfloor \psi \rfloor \rightarrow \varphi_i$. By FOL reasoning, $\Gamma \vdash \lfloor \psi \rfloor \rightarrow \forall x.\varphi_i$.

If the last step is (FRAMING) on φ_i for some $1 \leq i \leq n$, then φ_i must have the form $\varphi_i' \rightarrow \varphi_i''$, and φ must have the form $C_\sigma[\varphi_i'] \rightarrow C_\sigma[\varphi_i'']$ for some symbol σ. By induction hypothesis, $\Gamma \vdash \lfloor \psi \rfloor \rightarrow (\varphi_i' \rightarrow \varphi_i'')$. We now prove $\Gamma \vdash \lfloor \psi \rfloor \rightarrow (C_\sigma[\varphi_i'] \rightarrow C_\sigma[\varphi_i''])$.

1	$\lfloor \psi \rfloor \rightarrow (\varphi_i' \rightarrow \varphi_i'')$	hypothesis
2	$\varphi_i' \rightarrow \varphi_i'' \vee \lceil \neg\psi \rceil$	by 1, FOL reasoning
3	$C_\sigma[\lceil \neg\psi \rceil] \rightarrow \lceil \neg\psi \rceil$	Corollary 59
4	$C_\sigma[\varphi_i'] \rightarrow C_\sigma[\varphi_i'' \vee \lceil \neg\psi \rceil]$	by 2, (FRAMING)
5	$C_\sigma[\varphi_i'] \rightarrow C_\sigma[\varphi_i''] \vee C_\sigma[\lceil \neg\psi \rceil]$	by 4, Proposition 46
6	$C_\sigma[\varphi_i''] \vee C_\sigma[\lceil \neg\psi \rceil] \rightarrow C_\sigma[\varphi_i''] \vee \lceil \neg\psi \rceil$	by 3, FOL reasoning
7	$C_\sigma[\varphi_i'] \rightarrow C_\sigma[\varphi_i''] \vee \lceil \neg\psi \rceil$	by 5, 6, FOL reasoning
8	$\lfloor \psi \rfloor \rightarrow (C_\sigma[\varphi_i'] \rightarrow C_\sigma[\varphi_i''])$	by 7, FOL reasoning

$\blacksquare$

Lemma 60. (EQUALITY ELIMINATION) *can be proved in* $\mathcal{H}$.

Proof: Recall the definition of equality $(\varphi_1 = \varphi_2) \equiv \lfloor \varphi_1 \leftrightarrow \varphi_2 \rfloor$. Theorem 14 together with Proposition 47 give us a nice way to deal with equality premises. To prove $\vdash (\varphi_1 = \varphi_2) \rightarrow (\psi[\varphi_1/x] \rightarrow \psi[\varphi_2/x])$, we apply Theorem 14 and prove $\{\varphi_1 \leftrightarrow \varphi_2\} \vdash \psi[\varphi_1/x] \rightarrow \psi[\varphi_2/x]$, which is proved by Proposition 47. Note that the (formal) proof given in Proposition 47 does not use (UNIVERSAL GENERALIZATION) at all, so the conditions of Theorem 14 are satisfied. $\blacksquare$

Lemma 61. (FUNCTIONAL SUBSTITUTION) *can be proved in* $\mathcal{H}$.

Proof: Let z be a fresh variable that does not occur free in φ and φ', and is distinct from x. Notice the side condition that y does not occur free in φ'.

1	$\varphi' = z \leftrightarrow z = \varphi'$	definition
2	$z = \varphi' \rightarrow (\varphi[z/x] \rightarrow \varphi[\varphi'/x])$	Lemma 60
3	$(\forall x.\varphi) \rightarrow \varphi[z/x]$	by axiom
4	$\varphi' = z \rightarrow ((\forall x.\varphi) \rightarrow \varphi[z/x])$	FOL reasoning
5	$\varphi' = z \rightarrow (\varphi[z/x] \rightarrow \varphi[\varphi'/x])$	FOL reasoning
6	$\varphi' = z \rightarrow ((\forall x.\varphi) \rightarrow \varphi[\varphi'/x])$	FOL reasoning
7	$\forall z.(\varphi' = z \rightarrow ((\forall x.\varphi) \rightarrow \varphi[\varphi'/x]))$	by 6
8	$(\exists z.\varphi' = z) \rightarrow ((\forall x.\varphi) \rightarrow \varphi[\varphi'/x])$	FOL reasoning
9	$(\forall x.\varphi) \wedge (\exists z.\varphi' = z) \rightarrow \varphi[\varphi'/x]$	FOL reasoning
10	$(\forall x.\varphi) \wedge (\exists y.\varphi' = y) \rightarrow \varphi[\varphi'/x]$	FOL reasoning

$\blacksquare$

Lemma 62. $\vdash C_\sigma[\varphi_1 \wedge (x \in \varphi_2)] = C_\sigma[\varphi_1] \wedge (x \in \varphi_2)$.

Proof: We first prove $\vdash C_\sigma[\varphi_1 \wedge (x \in \varphi_2)] \rightarrow C_\sigma[\varphi_1] \wedge (x \in \varphi_2)$. By FOL reasoning, it suffices to show both $\vdash C_\sigma[\varphi_1 \wedge (x \in \varphi_2)] \rightarrow C_\sigma[\varphi_1]$ and $\vdash C_\sigma[\varphi_1 \wedge (x \in \varphi_2)] \rightarrow (x \in \varphi_2)$. The first follows immediately by (FRAMING) and FOL reasoning. The second can be proved as:

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
1 & \lceil x \rceil \\
2 & \lceil (x \wedge \neg\varphi_2) \vee (x \wedge \varphi_2) \rceil \\
3 & \lceil x \wedge \neg\varphi_2 \rceil \vee \lceil x \wedge \varphi_2 \rceil \\
4 & \neg\lceil x \wedge \neg\varphi_2 \rceil \to \lceil x \wedge \varphi_2 \rceil \\
5 & C_\sigma[\lceil x \wedge \varphi_2 \rceil] \to \neg\lceil x \wedge \neg\varphi_2 \rceil \\
6 & C_\sigma[\lceil x \wedge \varphi_2 \rceil] \to \lceil x \wedge \varphi_2 \rceil \\
7 & C_\sigma[\varphi_1 \wedge \lceil x \wedge \varphi_2 \rceil] \to C_\sigma[\lceil x \wedge \varphi_2 \rceil] \\
8 & C_\sigma[\varphi_1 \wedge \lceil x \wedge \varphi_2 \rceil] \to \lceil x \wedge \varphi_2 \rceil \\
9 & C_\sigma[\varphi_1 \wedge (x \in \varphi_2)] \to (x \in \varphi_2)
\end{array}
$$

∎

Lemma 63. $\vdash \exists y.((x = y) \wedge \varphi) = \varphi[x/y]$ *where x, y distinct.*

Proof: The proof is by induction on the structural of φ and Lemma 62. ∎

Lemma 64. $\vdash \varphi = \exists y.(\lceil y \wedge \varphi \rceil \wedge y)$ *if* $y \notin FV(\varphi)$.

Proof: We first prove $\vdash \exists y.(\lceil y \wedge \varphi \rceil \wedge y) \to \varphi$.

$$
\begin{array}{lll}
1 & \neg(\lceil y \wedge \varphi \rceil \wedge (y \wedge \neg\varphi)) & \text{(\textsc{Singleton Variable})} \\
2 & \lceil y \wedge \varphi \rceil \wedge y \to \varphi & \text{by 1, FOL reasoning} \\
3 & \forall y.(\lceil y \wedge \varphi \rceil \wedge y \to \varphi) & \text{by 2, axiom} \\
4 & \exists y.(\lceil y \wedge \varphi \rceil \wedge y) \to \varphi & \text{by 3, FOL reasoning}
\end{array}
$$

We then prove $\vdash \varphi \to \exists y.(\lceil y \wedge \varphi \rceil \wedge y)$. Let x be a fresh variable distinct from y.

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
1 & x \in \varphi \to x \in \varphi \\
2 & x \in \varphi \to \lceil x \wedge \varphi \rceil \\
3 & x \in \varphi \to \lceil x \wedge \lceil x \wedge \varphi \rceil \rceil \\
4 & x \in \varphi \to x \in \lceil x \wedge \varphi \rceil \\
5 & x \in \varphi \to \exists y.(x = y \wedge x \in \lceil y \wedge \varphi \rceil) \\
6 & x \in \varphi \to \exists y.(x \in y \wedge x \in \lceil y \wedge \varphi \rceil) \\
7 & x \in \varphi \to \exists y.(x \in (y \wedge \lceil y \wedge \varphi \rceil)) \\
8 & x \in \varphi \to x \in \exists y.(y \wedge \lceil y \wedge \varphi \rceil) \\
9 & x \in (\varphi \to \exists y.(y \wedge \lceil y \wedge \varphi \rceil)) \\
10 & \forall x.(x \in (\varphi \to \exists y.(y \wedge \lceil y \wedge \varphi \rceil))) \\
11 & \varphi \to \exists y.(y \wedge \lceil y \wedge \varphi \rceil)
\end{array}
$$

∎

Lemma 65. *(\textsc{Membership Symbol}) is provable in $\mathcal{H}$.*

Proof: We first prove $\vdash x \in C_\sigma[\varphi] \to \exists y.(y \in \varphi \wedge x \in C_\sigma[y])$. Let $\Psi \equiv \exists y.(y \in \varphi \wedge x \in C_\sigma[y])$.

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
1 & \exists y.(y \in \varphi \wedge x \in C_\sigma[y]) \to \Psi \\
2 & \exists y.(\lceil y \wedge \varphi \rceil \wedge x \in C_\sigma[y]) \to \Psi \\
3 & \exists y.(\lceil x \wedge \lceil y \wedge \varphi \rceil \rceil \wedge x \in C_\sigma[y]) \to \Psi \\
4 & \exists y.(x \in \lceil y \wedge \varphi \rceil \wedge x \in C_\sigma[y]) \to \Psi \\
5 & \exists y.(x \in (\lceil y \wedge \varphi \rceil \wedge C_\sigma[y])) \to \Psi \\
6 & x \in \exists y.(\lceil y \wedge \varphi \rceil \wedge C_\sigma[y]) \to \Psi \\
7 & x \in \exists y.C_\sigma[\lceil y \wedge \varphi \rceil \wedge y] \to \Psi \\
8 & x \in C_\sigma[\exists y.\lceil y \wedge \varphi \rceil \wedge y] \to \Psi \\
9 & x \in C_\sigma[\varphi] \to \Psi
\end{array}
$$

We then prove $\vdash \exists y.(y \in \varphi \wedge x \in C[y]) \to x \in C[\varphi]$. In fact, we just need to apply the same derivation as above on $\vdash \Psi \to \exists y.(y \in \varphi \wedge x \in C[y])$.

∎

We are now ready to prove Theorem 15.

Proof of Theorem 15: By the completeness of $\mathcal{P}$ (Theorem 9), we have $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathcal{P}} \varphi$. We have shown that all proof rules in $\mathcal{P}$ are provable in $\mathcal{H}$ with (\textsc{Definedness}) axioms, so $\Gamma \vdash_{\mathcal{H}} \varphi$. ∎

Appendix D
Proof of Theorem 16

We prove the completeness theorem of $\mathcal{H}$ (Theorem 16). We only discuss ML (without μ) in this section, so we drop all unnecessary annotations. Specifically, we abbreviate "$\vDash_{\mathsf{ML}}$" as "$\vDash$"; "$\vdash_{\mathcal{H}}$" as "$\vdash$"; "\textsc{Pattern}$^{\mathsf{ML}}$" as "\textsc{Pattern}", etc.

For simplicity of some technical proofs, we assume that $\{\wedge, \neg, \exists\}$ is our set of primitives, instead of $\{\to, \neg, \forall\}$. This is justified by Proposition 47.

Our proof technique was mainly inspired by [20].

Lemma 66 (Substitution Lemma). $\bar{\rho}(\varphi[y/x]) = \overline{\rho[\rho(y)/x]}(\varphi)$.

Proof: Carry out induction on the structure of φ. The only nontrivial case is when $\varphi \equiv \exists z.\psi$. Without loss of generality, let us assume z is distinct from x and y. If not, apply α-renaming to make them different. Then

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \bar{\rho}((\exists z.\psi)[y/x]) \\
\equiv\ & \bar{\rho}(\exists z.(\psi[y/x])) \\
\equiv\ & \bigcup\{\overline{\rho_1}(\psi[y/x]) \mid \rho_1 \overset{z}{\sim} \rho\} \\
\equiv\ & \bigcup\{\overline{\rho_1'}(\psi) \mid \rho_1 \overset{z}{\sim} \rho \text{ and } \rho_1' = \rho_1[\rho_1(y)/x]\} \\
\equiv\ & \bigcup\{\overline{\rho_1'}(\psi) \mid \rho_1 \overset{z}{\sim} \rho \text{ and } \rho_1' = \rho_1[\rho(y)/x]\} \\
\equiv\ & \bigcup\{\overline{\rho_1'}(\psi) \mid \rho_1 \overset{z}{\sim} \rho[\rho(y)/x]\} \\
\equiv\ & \bigcup\{\overline{\rho_1'}(\psi) \mid \rho_1 \overset{z}{\sim} \rho'\} \\
\equiv\ & \overline{\rho'}(\exists z.\psi)
\end{aligned}
$$

∎

Definition 67 (Local Provability). Let s be a sort, $H_s \subseteq$ \textsc{Pattern}$_s$ be a pattern set, and φ_s be a pattern of sort s. We write $H_s \Vdash_s \varphi_s$, if there exists a finite subset $\Delta_s \subseteq_{\mathrm{fin}} H_s$ such that $\emptyset \vdash \bigwedge \Delta_s \to \varphi_s$, where $\bigwedge \Delta_s$ is the conjunction of all patterns in Δ_s. When Δ_s is the empty set, $\bigwedge \Delta_s$ is $\top_s$. Let $H = \{H_s\}_{s \in S}$ be a family set of patterns. We write $H \Vdash_s \varphi_s$ if $H_s \Vdash_s \varphi_s$. We drop sort subscripts when there is no confusion.

Definition 68 (Consistent Sets). Let Γ_s be a pattern set of sort s. We say Γ_s is *consistent*, if $\Gamma_s \nVdash \bot_s$. Γ_s is a maximal consistent set (MCS) if any strict extension of it is inconsistent. By abuse of language, we say $\Gamma = \{\Gamma_s\}_{s \in S}$ is consistent if every Γ_s is consistent, and Γ is an MCS if every Γ_s is an MCS.

Like the local provability relation, consistency is also a local property. Whether a pattern set Γ_s is consistent or whether it is an MCS depends only on itself and has nothing to do with the pattern sets of other sorts. A useful intuition about consistent sets is that they provide consistent "views" of patterns. Recall that patterns in matching logic match elements in domain. Intuitively speaking, a pattern set Γ_s is inconsistent if it contains patterns that cannot match common elements in any models and valuations. In other words, if Γ_s is consistent, then there exist a model M and a valuation ρ, and an element

a in the model, such that all patterns in Γ_s match a, i.e., $a \in \bar{\rho}(\varphi)$ for all pattern $\varphi \in \Gamma_s$. If Γ_s is in addition an MCS, adding any pattern $\psi \notin \Gamma_s$ will lead to inconsistency, and thus $a \notin \bar{\rho}(\psi_s)$. Therefore, we can think of the MCS Γ_s representing that particular element a, with all patterns in Γ_s matching it while patterns outside Γ_s not. This useful intuition motivates the definition of canonical models that consist MCSs as elements (see Definition 72), and the Truth Lemma that says "Matching = Membership in MCSs", connecting syntax and semantics, (see Lemma 81). They play an important role in proving the completeness result, including both local and global completeness theorems. The rest of the section is all about making this intuition work.

Before we move on, we emphasize that consistency is a *local property* and is defined via the *local provability relation* "$\Vdash$" given in Definition 67. In particular, a pattern set Γ is consistent *does not imply* that $\Gamma \nvdash \bot$. As an example, consider $\Gamma = \{\neg x\}$ where x is a variable. We will argue that Γ is consistent, but $\Gamma \vdash \bot$. For the consistency, assume that Γ is inconsistent, meaning that $\emptyset \vdash \neg x \to \bot$. By soundness of $\mathcal{H}$ (Theorem 13), we have $\emptyset \vDash \neg x \to \bot$, which is *not true*, because (for the sake of contradiction) we can construct a model M whose carrier set contains two elements, say $\{0, 1\}$, and a valuation ρ such that $\rho(x) = 0$, and that $\bar{\rho}(\neg x \to \bot) = \{0\} \neq \{0, 1\}$. This contradiction shows that Γ must be consistent. On the other hand, we can show that $\Gamma \vdash \bot$, because by (Universal Generalization) we can prove $\Gamma \vdash \forall x . \neg x$, and by FOL reasoning we can prove $\Gamma \vdash \neg \exists x . x$, which contradicts with the axiom (Existence) $\exists x . x$.

In conclusion, consistency is a local property, and one cannot apply proof rules in $\mathcal{H}$ on patterns in a consistent set Γ, and assume the derived patterns can be safely added to Γ without breaking the consistency. In Lemma 71, we will see how we can carefully extend a consistent set Γ to a *maximal consistent set* while remain its consistency.

Proposition 69 (MCS Properties)**.** *Given an MCS Γ and patterns $\varphi, \varphi_1, \varphi_2$ of the same sort s. The following propositions hold.*

1) $\varphi \in \Gamma$ *if and only if* $\Gamma \Vdash \varphi$*; In particular, if* $\vdash \varphi$ *then* $\varphi \in \Gamma$*;*
2) $\neg\varphi \in \Gamma$ *if and only if* $\varphi \notin \Gamma$*;*
3) $\varphi_1 \wedge \varphi_2 \in \Gamma$ *if and only if* $\varphi_1 \in \Gamma$ *and* $\varphi_2 \in \Gamma$*; In general, for any finite pattern set* Δ*,* $\bigwedge \Delta \in \Gamma$ *if and only if* $\Delta \subseteq \Gamma$*;*
4) $\varphi_1 \vee \varphi_2 \in \Gamma$ *if and only if* $\varphi_1 \in \Gamma$ *or* $\varphi_2 \in \Gamma$*; In general, for any finite pattern set* Δ*,* $\bigvee \Delta \in \Gamma$ *if and only if* $\Delta \cap \Gamma \neq \emptyset$*; As a convention, when* $\Delta = \emptyset$*,* $\bigvee \Delta$ *is* $\bot$*;*
5) $\varphi_1, \varphi_1 \to \varphi_2 \in \Gamma$ *implies* $\varphi_2 \in \Gamma$*; In particular, if* $\vdash \varphi_1 \to \varphi_2$*, then* $\varphi_1 \in \Gamma$ *implies* $\varphi_2 \in \Gamma$*.*

Proof: Standard propositional reasoning. ∎

Definition 70 (Witnessed MCSs)**.** Let Γ be an MCS of sort s. Γ is a witnessed MCS, if for any pattern $\exists x.\varphi \in \Gamma$, there is a variable y such that $(\exists x.\varphi) \to \varphi[y/x] \in \Gamma$. By abuse of language, we say the family set $\Gamma = \{\Gamma_s\}_{s \in S}$ is a witnessed MCS if every Γ_s is a witnessed MCS.

In the following, we show any consistent set Γ can be extended to a witnessed MCS Γ^+. The extension, however, requires an extension of the set of variables. To see why such an extension is needed, consider the following example. Let $\Sigma = (S, \text{Var}, \Sigma)$ be a signature, $s \in S$ be a sort, and $\Gamma = \{\neg x \mid x \in \text{Var}_s\}$ be a pattern set containing all variable negations. We leave it for the readers to show that Γ is consistent. Here, we claim the consistent set Γ cannot be extended to a witnessed MCS Γ^+ in the signature Σ. The proof is by contradiction. Assume Γ^+ exists. By Proposition 69 and (Existence), $\exists x.x \in \Gamma^+$. Because Γ^+ is a witnessed MCS, there is a variable y such that $(\exists x.x) \to y \in \Gamma^+$, and by Proposition 69, $y \in \Gamma^+$. On the other hand, $\neg y \in \Gamma \subseteq \Gamma^+$. This contradicts the consistency of Γ^+.

Lemma 71 (Extension Lemma)**.** *Let $\Sigma = (S, \text{Var}, \Sigma)$ be a signature and Γ be a consistent set of sort $s \in S$. Extend the variable set Var to Var^+ with countably infinitely many new variables, and denoted the extended signature as $\Sigma^+ = (\text{Var}^+, S, \Sigma)$. There exists a pattern set Γ^+ in the extended signature Σ^+ such that $\Gamma \subseteq \Gamma^+$ and Γ^+ is a witnessed MCS.*

Proof: We use Pattern_s and Pattern_s^+ denote the set of all patterns of sort s in the original and extended signatures, respectively. Enumerate all patterns $\varphi_1, \varphi_2, \cdots \in \text{Pattern}_s^+$. For every sort s, enumerate all variables $\varkappa_1{:}s, \varkappa_2{:}s, \ldots$ in $\text{Var}_s^+ \setminus \text{Var}_s$. We will construct a non-decreasing sequence of pattern sets $\Gamma_0 \subseteq \Gamma_1 \subseteq \Gamma_2 \cdots \subseteq \text{Pattern}_s^+$, with $\Gamma_0 = \Gamma$. Notice that Γ_0 contains variables only in Var. Eventually, we will let $\Gamma^+ = \bigcup_{i \geq 0} \Gamma_i$ and prove it has the intended properties.

For every $n \geq 1$, we define Γ_n as follows. If $\Gamma_{n-1} \cup \{\varphi_n\}$ is inconsistent, then $\Gamma_n = \Gamma_{n-1}$. Otherwise,

if φ_n is not of the form $\exists x{:}s'.\psi$:

$\quad \Gamma_n = \Gamma_{n-1} \cup \{\varphi_n\}$

if $\varphi_n \equiv \exists x{:}s'.\psi$ and $\varkappa_i{:}s'$ is the first variable in $\text{Var}_{s'}^+ \setminus \text{Var}_{s'}$ that does not occur free in Γ_{n-1} and ψ:

$\quad \Gamma_n = \Gamma_{n-1} \cup \{\varphi_n\} \cup \{\psi[\varkappa_i{:}s'/x{:}s']\}$

Notice that in the second case, we can always pick a variable $\varkappa_i{:}s'$ that satisfies the conditions because by construction, $\Gamma_{n-1} \cup \{\varphi_n\}$ uses at most finitely many variables in $\text{Var}^+ \setminus \text{Var}$.

We show that Γ_n is consistent for every $n \geq 0$ by induction. The base case is to show Γ_0 is consistent in the extended signature. Assume it is not. Then there exists a finite subset $\Delta_0 \subseteq_{\text{fin}} \Gamma_0$ such that $\vdash \bigwedge \Delta_0 \to \bot$. The proof of $\bigwedge \Delta_0 \to \bot$ is a finite sequence of patterns in Pattern^+. We can replace every occurrence of the variable $\mathsf{y} \in \text{Var}^+ \setminus \text{Var}$ (y can have any sort) with a variable $y \in \text{Var}$ that has the same sort as y and does not occur (no matter bound or free) in the proof. By induction on the length of the proof, the resulting sequence is also a proof of $\bigwedge \Delta_0 \to \bot$, and it consists of only patterns in Pattern. This contradicts the consistency of Γ_0 as a subset of Pattern_s, and this contradiction finishes our proof of the base case.

Now assume Γ_{n-1} is consistent for $n \geq 1$. We will show Γ_n is also consistent. If $\Gamma_{n-1} \cup \{\varphi_n\}$ is inconsistent or φ_n

does not have the form $\exists x{:}s'.\psi$, Γ_n is consistent by construction. Assume $\Gamma_{n-1} \cup \{\varphi_n\}$ is consistent, $\varphi_n \equiv \exists x{:}s'.\psi$, but $\Gamma_n = \Gamma_{n-1} \cup \{\varphi_n\} \cup \{\psi[\varkappa_i{:}s'/x{:}s']\}$ is not consistent. Then there exists a finite subset $\Delta \subseteq_{\text{fin}} \Gamma_{n-1} \cup \{\varphi_n\}$ such that $\vdash \bigwedge \Delta \rightarrow \neg\psi[\varkappa_i{:}s'/x{:}s']$. By (Universal Generalization), $\vdash \forall \varkappa_i{:}s'.(\bigwedge \Delta \rightarrow \neg\psi[\varkappa_i{:}s'/x{:}s'])$. Notice that $\varkappa_i{:}s' \notin FV(\bigwedge \Delta)$ by construction, so by FOL reasoning $\vdash \bigwedge \Delta \rightarrow \neg\exists \varkappa_i{:}s'.(\psi[\varkappa_i{:}s'/x{:}s'])$. Since $\varkappa_i{:}s' \notin FV(\psi)$, by α-renaming, $\exists \varkappa_i{:}s'.(\psi[\varkappa_i{:}s'/x{:}s']) \equiv \exists x{:}s'.\psi \equiv \varphi_n$, and thus $\vdash \bigwedge \Delta \rightarrow \neg\varphi_n$. This contradicts the assumption that $\Gamma_{n-1} \cup \{\varphi_n\}$ is consistent.

Since Γ_n is consistent for any $n \geq 0$, $\Gamma^+ = \bigcup_n \Gamma_n$ is also consistent. This is because the derivation that shows inconsistency would use only finitely many patterns in Γ^+. In addition, we know Γ^+ is maximal and witnessed by construction. ∎

We will prove that for every witnessed MCS $\Gamma = \{\Gamma_s\}_{s \in S}$, there exists a model M and a valuation ρ such that for every $\varphi \in \Gamma_s$, $\bar{\rho}(\varphi) \neq \emptyset$. The next definition defines the canonical model which contains all witnessed MCSs as its elements. We will construct our intended model M as a submodel of the canonical model.

Definition 72 (Canonical Model). Given a signature $\Sigma = (S, \Sigma)$. The canonical model $W = (\{W_s\}_{s \in S}, \_W)$ consists of
- a carrier set $W_s = \{\Gamma \mid \Gamma \text{ is a witnessed MCS of sort } s\}$ for every sort $s \in S$;
- an interpretation $\sigma_W : W_{s_1} \times \cdots \times W_{s_n} \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(W_s)$ for every symbol $\sigma \in \Sigma_{s_1 \ldots s_n, s}$, defined as $\Gamma \in \sigma_W(\Gamma_1, \ldots, \Gamma_n)$ if and only if for any $\varphi_i \in \Gamma_i$, $1 \leq i \leq n$, $\sigma(\varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_n) \in \Gamma$; In particular, the interpretation for a constant symbol $\sigma \in \Sigma_{\lambda, s}$ is $\sigma_W = \{\Gamma \in W_s \mid \sigma \in \Gamma\}$.

The carrier set W is not empty, thanks to Lemma 71.

The canonical model has a nontrivial property stated as the next lemma. The proof of the lemma is difficult, so we leave it to the end of the subsection.

Theorem 73 (Existence Lemma). *Let $\Sigma = (S, \Sigma)$ be a signature and Γ be a witnessed MCS of sort $s \in S$. Given a symbol $\sigma \in \Sigma_{s_1 \ldots s_n, s}$ and patterns $\varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_n$ of appropriate sorts. If $\sigma(\varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_n) \in \Gamma$, then there exist n witnessed MCSs $\Gamma_1, \ldots, \Gamma_n$ of appropriate sorts such that $\varphi_i \in \Gamma_i$ for every $1 \leq i \leq n$, and $\Gamma \in \sigma_W(\Gamma_1, \ldots, \Gamma_n)$.*

Definition 74 (Generated Models). Let $\Sigma = (S, \Sigma)$ be a signature and $W = (\{W_s\}_{s \in S}, \_W)$ be the canonical model. Given a witnessed MCS $\Gamma = \{\Gamma_s\}_{s \in S}$. Define $Y = \{Y_s\}_{s \in S}$ be the smallest sets such that $Y_s \subseteq W_s$ for every sort s, and the following inductive properties are satisfied:
- $\Gamma_s \in Y_s$ for every sort s;
- If $\Delta \in Y_s$ and there exist a symbol $\sigma \in \Sigma_{s_1 \ldots s_n, s}$ and witnessed MCSs $\Delta_1, \ldots, \Delta_n$ of appropriate sorts such that $\Delta \in \sigma_W(\Delta_1, \ldots, \Delta_n)$, then $\Delta_1 \in Y_{s_1}, \ldots, \Delta_n \in Y_{s_n}$.

Let $Y = (Y, \_Y)$ be the model generated from Γ, where

$$\sigma_Y(\Delta_1, \ldots, \Delta_n) = Y_s \cap \sigma_W(\Delta_1, \ldots, \Delta_n) \quad \text{for every}$$
$$\sigma \in \Sigma_{s_1 \ldots s_n, s} \text{ and } \Delta_1 \in Y_{s_1}, \ldots, \Delta_n \in Y_{s_n}.$$

We give some intuition about the generated model $Y = (Y, \_Y)$. The interpretation σ_Y is just the restriction of the interpretation σ_M on Y. The carrier set Y is defined inductively. Firstly, Y contains Γ. Given a set $\Delta \in Y$. If sets $\Delta_1, \ldots, \Delta_n$ are "generated" from Δ by a symbol σ, meaning that $\Delta \in \sigma_W(\Delta_1, \ldots, \Delta_n)$, then they are also in Y. Of course, a set Δ is in Y maybe because it is generated from a set Δ' by a symbol σ', while Δ' is generated from a set Δ'' by a symbol σ'', and so on. This generating path keeps going and eventually ends at Γ in finite number of steps. By definition, every member of Y has at least one such generating path, which we formally define as follows.

Definition 75 (Generating Paths). Let $\Gamma = \{\Gamma_s\}_{s \in S}$ be a witnessed MCS and Y be the model generated from Γ. A *generating path* π is either the empty path ϵ, or a sequence of pairs $\langle(\sigma_1, p_1), \ldots, (\sigma_k, p_k)\rangle$ where $\sigma_1, \ldots, \sigma_k$ are symbols (not necessarily distinct) and $p_1, \ldots, p_k$ are natural numbers representing positions. The *generating path relation*, denoted as GP, is a binary relation between witnessed MCSs in Y and generating paths, defined as the smallest relation that satisfies the following conditions:
- $GP(\Gamma_s, \epsilon)$ holds for every sort s;
- If $GP(\Delta, \pi)$ holds for a set $\Delta \in Y_s$ and a generating path π, and there exist a symbol $\sigma \in \Sigma_{s_1 \ldots s_n, s}$ and witnessed MCSs $\Delta_1, \ldots, \Delta_n$ such that $\Delta \in \sigma_W(\Delta_1, \ldots, \Delta_n)$, then $GP(\Delta_i, \langle\pi, (\sigma, i)\rangle)$ holds for every $1 \leq i \leq n$.

We say that Δ has a generating path π in the generated model if $GP(\Delta, \pi)$ holds. It is easy to see that every witnessed MCS in Y has at least one generating path, and if a witnessed MCS of sort s has the empty path ϵ as its generating path, it must be Γ_s itself.

Definition 76 (Symbol Contexts for Generating Paths). Given a generating path π. Define the symbol context C_π inductively as follows. If $\pi = \epsilon$, then C_π is the identity context $\square$. If $\pi = \langle\pi_0, (\sigma, i)\rangle$ where $\sigma \in \Sigma_{s_1 \ldots s_n, s}$ and $1 \leq i \leq n$, then $C_\pi = C_{\pi_0}[\sigma(\top_{s_1}, \ldots, \top_{s_{i-1}}, \square, \top_{s_{i+1}}, \ldots, \top_{s_n})]$.

A good intuition about Definition 76 is given as the next lemma.

Lemma 77. *Let Γ be a witnessed MCS and Y be the model generated from Γ. Let $\Delta \in Y$. If Δ has a generating path π, then $C_\pi[\varphi] \in \Gamma$ for any pattern $\varphi \in \Delta$.*

Proof: The proof is by induction on the length of the generating path π. If π is the empty path ϵ, then Δ must be Γ and C_π is the identity context, and $C_\pi[\varphi] = \varphi \in \Gamma$ for any $\varphi \in \Delta$. Now assume Δ has a generating path $\pi = \langle\pi_0, (\sigma, i)\rangle$ with $\sigma \in \Sigma_{s_1 \ldots s_n, s}$. By Definition 75, there exist witnessed MCSs $\Delta_{s_1}, \ldots, \Delta_{s_n}, \Delta_s \in Y$ and $1 \leq i \leq n$ such that $\Delta = \Delta_{s_i}$, $\Delta_s \in \sigma_W(\Delta_{s_1}, \ldots, \Delta_{s_n})$, and Δ_s has π_0 as its generating path. For every $\varphi \in \Delta = \Delta_i$, since $\top_{s_j} \in \Delta_{s_j}$ for any $j \neq i$, by Definition 72, $\sigma(\top_{s_1}, \ldots, \top_{s_{i-1}}, \varphi, \top_{s_{i+1}}, \ldots, \top_{s_n}) \in \Delta_s$. By induction hypothesis, $C_{\pi_0}[\sigma(\top_{s_1}, \ldots, \top_{s_{i-1}}, \varphi, \top_{s_{i+1}}, \ldots, \top_{s_n})] \in \Gamma$, while the latter is exactly $C_\pi[\varphi]$. ∎

Lemma 78 (Singleton Variables). *Let Γ be a witnessed MCS and Y be the model generated from Γ. For every $\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \in Y$*

of the same sort and every variable x, if $x \in \Gamma_1 \cap \Gamma_2$ then $\Gamma_1 = \Gamma_2$.

Proof: Let π_i be a generating path of Γ_i for $i = 1, 2$. Assume $\Gamma_1 \neq \Gamma_2$. Then there exists a pattern φ such that $\varphi \in \Gamma_1$ and $\neg\varphi \in \Gamma_2$. Because $x \in \Gamma_1 \cap \Gamma_2$, we know $x \wedge \varphi \in \Gamma_1$ and $x \wedge \neg\varphi \in \Gamma_2$. By Lemma 77, $C_{\pi_1}[x \wedge \varphi], C_{\pi_2}[x \wedge \neg\varphi] \in \Gamma$, and thus $C_{\pi_1}[x \wedge \varphi] \wedge C_{\pi_2}[x \wedge \neg\varphi] \in \Gamma$. On the other hand, $\neg(C_{\pi_1}[x \wedge \varphi] \wedge C_{\pi_2}[x \wedge \neg\varphi])$ is an instance of (SINGLETON VARIABLE) and thus it is included in Γ. This contradicts the consistency of Γ. ∎

We will establish an important result about generated models in Lemma 81 (the Truth Lemma), which links the semantics and syntax and is essential to the completeness result. Roughly speaking, the lemma says that for any generated model Y and any witnessed MCS $\Delta \in Y$, a pattern φ is in Δ if and only if the interpretation of φ in Y contains Δ. To prove the lemma, it is important to show that every variable is interpreted to a singleton. Lemma 78 ensures that every variable belongs to *at most one* witnessed MCS. To make sure it is interpreted to *exactly one* MCS, we complete our model by adding a dummy element $\star$ to the carrier set, and interpreting all variables which are interpreted to none of the MCSs to the dummy element. This motivates the next definition.

Definition 79 (Completed Models and Completed Valuations). Let $\Gamma = \{\Gamma_s\}_{s \in S}$ be a witnessed MCS and Y be the Γ-generated model. Γ-*completed model*, denoted as $M = (\{M_s\}_{s \in S}, \_{M})$, is inductively defined as follows for all sorts $s \in S$:

- $M_s = Y_s$, if every $x{:}s$ belongs at least one MCS in Y_s;
- $M_s = Y_s \cup \{\star_s\}$, otherwise.

We assume $\star_s$ is an entity that is different from any MCSs, and $\star_{s_1} \neq \star_{s_2}$ if $s_1 \neq s_2$. For every $\sigma \in \Sigma_{s_1 \ldots s_n, s}$, define its interpretation

$$\sigma_M(\Delta_1, \ldots, \Delta_n) = \begin{cases} \emptyset & \text{if some } \Delta_i = \star_{s_i} \\ \sigma_Y(\Delta_1, \ldots, \Delta_n) \cup \{\star_s\} & \text{if all } \Delta_j \neq \star_{s_j} \\ & \text{and some } \Delta_i = \Gamma_{s_i} \\ \sigma_{Y_{\Gamma_0}}(\Delta_1, \ldots, \Delta_n) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

The completed valuation $\rho\colon \text{VAR} \to M$ is defined as

$$\rho(x{:}s) = \begin{cases} \Delta & \text{if } x{:}s \in \Delta \\ \star_s & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

The valuation ρ is a well-defined function, because by Lemma 78, if there are two witnessed MCSs Δ_1 and Δ_2 such that $x \in \Delta_1$ and $x \in \Delta_2$, then $\Delta_1 = \Delta_2$.

Now we come back to prove Lemma 73. We need the following technical lemma.

Lemma 80. *Let $\sigma \in \Sigma_{s_1 \ldots s_n, s}$ be a symbol, $\Phi_1, \ldots, \Phi_n, \phi$ be patterns of appropriate sorts, and $y_1, \ldots, y_n, x$ be variables*

of appropriate sorts such that $y_1, \ldots, y_n$ are distinct, and $y_1, \ldots, y_n \notin FV(\phi) \cup \bigcup_{1 \leq i \leq n} FV(\Phi_i)$. Then

$$\vdash \sigma(\Phi_1, \ldots, \Phi_n)$$
$$\to \exists y_1, \ldots, \exists y_n.$$
$$\sigma(\Phi_1 \wedge (\exists x.\phi \to \phi[y_1/x]), \ldots, \Phi_n \wedge (\exists x.\phi \to \phi[y_n/x]))$$

Proof: Notice that for every $1 \leq i \leq n$,

$$\vdash \exists x.\phi \to \exists y_i.(\phi[y_i/x]).$$

By easy matching logic reasoning,

$$\vdash \sigma(\Phi_1, \ldots, \Phi_n)$$
$$\to \sigma(\Phi_1 \wedge (\exists x.\phi \to \exists y_1.(\phi[y_1/x])),$$
$$\cdots,$$
$$\Phi_n \wedge (\exists x.\phi \to \exists y_n.(\phi[y_n/x])))$$

Then use Proposition 46 to move the quantifiers $\exists y_1, \ldots, \exists y_n$ to the top. ∎

Now we are ready to prove Lemma 80.

Proof of Lemma 80: Recall that $\Gamma \in \sigma_W(\Gamma_1, \ldots, \Gamma_n)$ means for every $\phi_i \in \Gamma_i$, $1 \leq i \leq n$, $\sigma(\phi_1, \ldots, \phi_n) \in \Gamma$. The main technique that we will be using here is similar to Lemma 71. We start with the singleton sets $\{\varphi_i\}$ for every $1 \leq i \leq n$ and extend them to witnessed MCSs Γ_i, while this time we also need to make sure the results $\Gamma_1, \ldots, \Gamma_n$ satisfy the desired property $\Gamma \in \sigma_W(\Gamma_1, \ldots, \Gamma_n)$. Another difference compared to Lemma 71 is that this time we do not extend our set of variables, because our starting point, $\{\varphi_i\}$, contains just one pattern and uses only finitely many variables. Readers will see how these conditions play a role in the upcoming proof.

Enumerate all patterns of sorts $s_1, \ldots, s_n$ as follows $\psi_0, \psi_1, \psi_2, \cdots \in \bigcup_{1 \leq i \leq n} \text{PATTERN}_{s_i}$. Notice that $s_1, \ldots, s_n$ do not need to be all distinct. To ease our notation, we define a "choice" operator, denoted as $[\varphi_s]_{s'}$, as follows

$$[\varphi_s]_{s'} = \begin{cases} \varphi_s & \text{if } s = s' \\ \text{nothing} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

For example, $\varphi_s \wedge [\psi]_s$ means $\varphi_s \wedge \psi$ if ψ also has sort s. Otherwise, it means φ_s. The choice operator propagates with all logic connectives in the natural way. For example, $[\neg\psi]_s = \neg[\psi]_s$.

In the following, we will define a non-decreasing sequence of pattern sets $\Gamma_i^{(0)} \subseteq \Gamma_i^{(1)} \subseteq \Gamma_i^{(2)} \subseteq \cdots \subseteq \text{PATTERN}_{s_i}$ for each $1 \leq i \leq n$, such that the following conditions are true for all $1 \leq i \leq n$ and $k \geq 0$:

1) If ψ_k has sort s_i, then either ψ_k or $\neg\psi_k$ belongs to $\Gamma_i^{(k+1)}$.
2) If ψ_k has the form $\exists x.\phi_k$ and it belongs to $\Gamma_i^{(k+1)}$, then there exists a variable z such that $(\exists x.\phi_k) \to \phi_k[z/x]$ also belongs to $\Gamma_i^{(k+1)}$.
3) $\Gamma_i^{(k)}$ is finite.
4) Let $\pi_i^{(k)} = \bigwedge \Gamma_i^{(k)}$ for every $1 \leq i \leq n$. Then $\sigma(\pi_1^{(k)}, \ldots, \pi_n^{(k)}) \in \Gamma$.
5) $\Gamma_i^{(k)}$ is consistent.

Among the above five conditions, condition (2)–(5) are like "safety" properties while condition (1) is like a "liveness" properties. We will eventually let $\Gamma_i = \bigcup_{k \geq 0} \Gamma_i^{(k)}$ and prove that Γ_i has the desired property. Before we present the actual construction, we give some hints on how to prove these conditions hold. Conditions (1)–(3) will be satisfied directly by construction, although we will put a notable effort in satisfying condition (2). Condition (4) will be proved hold by induction on k. Condition (5) is in fact a consequence of condition (4) as shown below. Assume condition (4) holds but condition (5) fails. This means that $\Gamma_i^{(k)}$ is not consistent for some $1 \leq i \leq n$, so $\vdash \pi_i^{(k)} \to \bot$. By (FRAMING)

$$\vdash \sigma(\pi_1^{(k)}, \ldots, \pi_i^{(k)}, \ldots, \pi_n^{(k)}) \to \sigma(\pi_1^{(k)}, \ldots, \bot, \ldots, \pi_n^{(k)})$$

Then by Proposition 46 and FOL reasoning,

$$\vdash \sigma(\pi_1^{(k)}, \ldots, \pi_i^{(k)}, \ldots, \pi_n^{(k)}) \to \bot$$

Since $\sigma(\pi_1^{(k)}, \ldots, \pi_i^{(k)}, \ldots, \pi_n^{(k)}) \in \Gamma$ by condition (4), we know $\bot \in \Gamma$ by Proposition 69. And this contradicts the fact that Γ is consistent.

Now we are ready to construct the sequence $\Gamma_i^{(0)} \subseteq \Gamma_i^{(1)} \subseteq \Gamma_i^{(2)} \subseteq \ldots$ for $1 \leq i \leq n$. Let $\Gamma_i^{(0)} = \{\varphi_i\}$ for $1 \leq i \leq n$. Obviously, $\Gamma_i^{(0)}$ satisfies conditions (3) and (4). Condition (5) follows as a consequence of condition (4). Conditions (1) and (2) are not applicable.

Suppose we have already constructed sets $\Gamma_i^{(k)}$ for every $1 \leq i \leq n$ and $k \geq 0$, which satisfy the conditions (1)–(5). We show how to construct $\Gamma_i^{(k+1)}$. In order to satisfy condition (1), we should add either ψ_k or $\neg \psi_k$ to $\Gamma_i^{(k)}$, if $\Gamma_i^{(k)}$ has the same sort as ψ_k. Otherwise, we simply let $\Gamma_i^{(k+1)}$ be the same as $\Gamma_i^{(k)}$. The question here is: if $\Gamma_i^{(k)}$ has the same sort as ψ_k, which pattern should we add to $\Gamma_i^{(k)}$, ψ_k or $\neg \psi_k$? Obviously, condition (3) will still hold no matter which one we choose to add, so we just need to make sure that we do not break conditions (2) and (4).

Let us start by satisfying condition (4). Consider pattern $\sigma(\pi_1^{(k)}, \ldots, \pi_n^{(k)})$, which, by condition (4), is in Γ. This tells us that the pattern

$$\sigma(\pi_1^{(k)} \wedge [\psi_k \vee \neg \psi_k]_{s_1}, \ldots, \pi_n^{(k)} \wedge [\psi_k \vee \neg \psi_k]_{s_n})$$

is also in Γ. Recall that $[\_]_s$ is the choice operator, so if ψ_k has sort s_i, then $\pi_i^{(k)} \wedge [\psi_k \vee \neg \psi_k]_{s_i}$ is $\pi_i^{(k)} \wedge (\psi_k \vee \neg \psi_k)$. Otherwise, it is $\pi_i^{(k)}$. Use Proposition 46 and FOL reasoning, and notice that the choice operator propagates with the disjunction $\vee$ and the negation $\neg$, we get

$$\sigma((\pi_1^{(k)} \wedge [\psi_k]_{s_1}) \vee (\pi_1^{(k)} \wedge \neg[\psi_k]_{s_1}),$$
$$\ldots, \qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad \in \Gamma$$
$$(\pi_n^{(k)} \wedge [\psi_k]_{s_n}) \vee (\pi_n^{(k)} \wedge \neg[\psi_k]_{s_n}))$$

Then we use Proposition 46 again and move all the disjunctions to the top, and we end up with a disjunction of 2^n patterns:

$$\bigvee \sigma(\pi_1^{(k)} \wedge [\neg]_1^{(k)}[\psi_k]_{s_1}, \ldots, \pi_n^{(k)} \wedge [\neg]_n^{(k)}[\psi_k]_{s_n}) \in \Gamma$$

where $[\neg]$ means either nothing or $\neg$. Notice that some $[\psi_k]_{s_i}$'s might be nothing, so some of these 2^n patterns may be the same.

Notice that Γ is an MCS. By proposition 69, among these 2^n patterns there must exists one pattern that is in Γ. We denote *that* pattern as

$$\sigma(\pi_1^{(k)} \wedge [\neg]_1^{(k)}[\psi_k]_{s_1}, \ldots, \pi_n^{(k)} \wedge [\neg]_n^{(k)}[\psi_k]_{s_n})$$

For any $1 \leq i \leq n$, if $[\neg]_i^{(k)}[\psi_k]_{s_i}$ does not have the form $\exists x.\phi$, we simply define $\Gamma_i^{(k+1)} = \Gamma_i^{(k)} \cup \{[\neg]_i^{(k)}[\psi_k]_{s_i}\}$. If $[\neg]_i^{(k)}[\psi_k]_{s_i}$ does have the form $\exists x.\phi$, we need special effort to satisfy condition (2). Without loss of generality and to ease our notation, let us assume that *for every* $1 \leq i \leq n$, the pattern $[\neg]_i^{(k)}[\psi_k]_{s_i}$ has the same form $\exists x.\phi$. We are going to find for each index i a variable z_i such that

$$\sigma(\pi_1^{(k)} \wedge \exists x.\phi \wedge (\exists x.\phi \to \phi[z_1/x]),$$
$$\ldots, \qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad \in \Gamma$$
$$\pi_n^{(k)} \wedge \exists x.\phi \wedge (\exists x.\phi \to \phi[z_n/x]))$$

This will allow us to define $\Gamma_i^{(k+1)} = \Gamma_i^{(k)} \cup \{\exists x.\phi\} \cup \{\exists x.\phi \to \phi[z_i/x]\}$ which satisfies conditions (2) and (4).

We find these variables z_i's by Lemma 80 and the fact that Γ is a witnessed set. Let $\Phi_i \equiv \pi_i^{(k)} \wedge \exists x.\phi$ for $1 \leq i \leq n$. By construction, $\sigma(\Phi_1, \ldots, \Phi_n) \in \Gamma$. Hence, by Lemma 80 and Proposition 69, for any distinct variables $y_1, \ldots, y_n \notin FV(\phi) \cup \bigcup_{1 \leq i \leq n} FV(\Phi_i)$,

$$\exists y_1 \ldots \exists y_n.$$
$$\sigma(\Phi_1 \wedge (\exists x.\phi \to \phi[y_1/x]), \ldots, \Phi_n \wedge (\exists n.\phi \to \phi[y_n/x])) \in \Gamma$$

The set Γ is a witnessed set, so there exist variables $z_1, \ldots, z_n$ such that

$$\sigma(\Phi_1 \wedge (\exists x.\phi \to \phi[z_1/x]), \ldots, \Phi_n \wedge (\exists x.\phi \to \phi[z_n/x])) \in \Gamma$$

This justifies our construction $\Gamma_i^{(k+1)} = \Gamma_i^{(k)} \cup \{\exists x.\phi\} \cup \{\exists x.\phi \to \phi[z_i/x]\}$.

So far we have proved our construction of the sequences $\Gamma_i^{(0)} \subseteq \Gamma_i^{(1)} \subseteq \Gamma_i^{(2)} \subseteq \ldots$ for $1 \leq i \leq n$ satisfy the conditions (1)–(5). Let $\Gamma_i = \bigcup_{k \geq 0} \Gamma_i^{(k)}$ for $1 \leq i \leq n$. By construction, Γ_i is a witnessed MCS. It remains to prove that $\Gamma \in \sigma_W(\Gamma_1, \ldots, \Gamma_n)$. To prove it, assume $\phi_i \in \Gamma_i$ for $1 \leq i \leq n$. By construction, there exists $K > 0$ such that $\phi_i \in \Gamma_i^{(K)}$ for all $1 \leq i \leq n$. Therefore, $\vdash \pi_i^{(K)} \to \phi_i$. By condition (4), $\sigma(\pi_1^{(K)}, \ldots, \pi_n^{(K)}) \in \Gamma$, and thus by (FRAMING) and Proposition 69, $\sigma(\phi_1, \ldots, \phi_n) \in \Gamma$. ∎

Lemma 81 (Truth Lemma). *Let Γ be a witnessed MCS, M be its completed model, and ρ be the completed valuation. For any witnessed MCS $\Delta \in M$ and any pattern φ such that Δ and φ have the same sort,*

$$\varphi \in \Delta \quad \text{if and only if} \quad \Delta \in \bar\rho(\varphi)$$

Proof: The proof is by induction on the structure of φ. If φ is a variable the conclusion follows by Definition 72. If φ has the form $\psi_1 \wedge \psi_2$ or $\neg \psi_1$, the conclusion follows from

Proposition 69. If φ has the form $\sigma(\varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_n)$, the conclusion from left to right is given by Lemma 73. The conclusion from right to left follows from Definition 72.

Now assume φ has the form $\exists x.\psi$. If $\exists x.\psi \in \Delta$, since Δ is a witnessed set, there is a variable y such that $\exists x.\psi \rightarrow \psi[y/x] \in \Delta$, and thus $\psi[y/x] \in \Delta$. By induction hypothesis, $\Delta \in \bar{\rho}(\psi[y/x])$, and thus by the semantics of the logic, $\Delta \in \bar{\rho}(\exists x.\psi)$.

Consider the other direction. Assume $\Delta \in \bar{\rho}(\exists x.\psi)$. By definition there exists a witnessed set $\Delta' \in M$ such that $\Delta \in \overline{\rho[\Delta'/x]}(\psi)$. By Definition 79, every element in M (no matter if it is an MCS or $\star$) has a variable that is assigned to it by the completed valuation ρ. Let us assume that variable y is assigned to Δ', i.e., $\rho(y) = \Delta'$. By Lemma 66, $\Delta \in \bar{\rho}'(\psi) = \bar{\rho}(\psi[y/x])$. By induction hypothesis, $\psi[y/x] \in \Delta$. Finally notice that $\vdash \psi[y/x] \rightarrow \exists y.\psi[y/x]$. By Proposition 69, $\exists y.\psi[y/x] \in \Delta$, i.e., $\exists x.\psi \in \Delta$. $\blacksquare$

Theorem 82. *For any consistent set Γ, there is a model M and a valuation ρ such that for all patterns $\varphi \in \Gamma$, $\bar{\rho}(\varphi) \neq \emptyset$.*

Proof: Use Lemma 71 and extend Γ to a witnessed MCS Γ^+. Let M and ρ be the completed model and valuation generated by Γ^+ respectively. By Lemma 81, for all patterns $\varphi \in \Gamma \subseteq \Gamma^+$, we have $\Gamma^+ \in \bar{\rho}(\varphi)$, so $\bar{\rho}(\varphi) \neq \emptyset$. $\blacksquare$

Now we are ready to prove Theorem 16.

Proof of Theorem 16: Assume the opposite. If $\emptyset \nvdash \varphi$, then $\{\neg\varphi\}$ is consistent by Definition 68. Then there is a model M and an valuation ρ such that $\bar{\rho}(\neg\varphi) \neq \emptyset$, i.e., $\bar{\rho}(\varphi) \neq M$. This contradicts the fact that $\emptyset \vDash \varphi$. $\blacksquare$

We point out that Lemma 81 in fact gives us the following stronger completeness result of $\mathcal{H}$. In literature, Theorem 16 is called *weak local completeness theorem* while Theorem 83 is called *strong local completeness theorem*.

Theorem 83. *For any set Γ and any pattern φ, $\Gamma \vDash^{loc} \varphi$ implies $\Gamma \Vdash \varphi$, where $\Gamma \vDash^{loc} \varphi$ means that for all models M, all valuations ρ, and all elements $a \in M$, if $a \in \bar{\rho}(\psi)$ for all $\psi \in \Gamma$ then $a \in \bar{\rho}(\varphi)$.*

Proof: Assume the opposite that $\Gamma \nVdash \varphi$, which implies that $\Gamma \cup \{\neg\varphi\}$ is consistent. Extend it to a witnessed MCS Γ^+ and let M, ρ be the completed model and completed valuation generated by Γ^+. By Lemma 81, $\Gamma^+ \in \bar{\rho}(\psi)$ for all $\psi \in \Gamma$, and $\Gamma^+ \in \bar{\rho}(\neg\varphi)$, i.e., $\Gamma^+ \notin \bar{\rho}(\varphi)$. This contradicts with $\Gamma \vDash^{loc} \varphi$. $\blacksquare$

APPENDIX E
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 20

Proof of Proposition 20: Trivial. Note that MmL coincides with ML on the fragment without μ. $\blacksquare$

APPENDIX F
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 22 AND 23

We prove that the theory $\Gamma_{\Sigma}^{\text{term}}$ captures precisely term algebras, up to isomorphism. The proof is mainly a feast of inductive reasoning.

Proof: Let us fix a Σ^+-model M such that $M \vDash \Gamma_{\Sigma}^{\text{term}}$. By axiom (FUNCTION), the interpretation $c_M : M \times \cdots \times M \rightarrow$

$\mathcal{P}(M)$ must be a function, where $c \in \Sigma_{Term...Term\,Term}$, meaning that for all $a_1, \ldots, a_n \in M$, $c_M(a_1, \ldots, a_n)$ contains exactly one element. By abuse of language, we denote *that* element as $c_M(a_1, \ldots, a_n)$ and regard $c_M : M \times \cdots \times M \rightarrow M$ as really a function.

To prove the proposition, it suffices to establish an isomorphism between the two algebras $(M, \{c_M\}_{c \in \Sigma})$ and $(T_{Term}^{\Sigma}, \{c_{T^{\Sigma}}\}_{c \in \Sigma})$.

Let us define a subset $M_0 \subseteq M$ *inductively* as follows (in which we separate the cases of constant constructs from non-constant constructors for clarity):

- $c_M \in M_0$, if $c \in \Sigma_{\lambda, Term}$;
- $c_M(a_1, \ldots, a_n)$, if $c \in \Sigma_{Term...Term, Term}$ and $a_1, \ldots, a_n \in M_0$.

We claim that for all valuation ρ,

$$\bar{\rho}(\mu D \, . \bigvee_{c \in \Sigma} c(D, \ldots, D)) = M_0.$$

We prove the equation by proving set containment for both directions. Notice that by definition,

$$\bar{\rho}(\mu D \, . \bigvee_{c \in \Sigma} c(D, \ldots, D)) = \bigcap \{A \subseteq M \mid \bigcup_{c \in \Sigma} c_M(A, \ldots, A) \subseteq A\}.$$

Denote the above set M_1 and we prove $M_0 = M_1$.

(Case $M_0 \subseteq M_1$). Notice that M_0 is defined inductively, so we carry out induction. The base case is $c \in \Sigma_{\lambda, Term}$ and $c_M \in M_0$. We aim to prove $c_M \in M_1$. For that purpose, assume a set $A \subseteq M$ such that $\bigcup_{c \in \Sigma} c_M(A, \ldots, A) \subseteq A$ and try to prove $c_M \in A$. This is trivial, because c_M is in the big-union set on the left. The induction case is $c \in \Sigma_{Term...Term, Term}$ and $a_1, \ldots, a_n \in M_0$ and $c_M(a_1, \ldots, a_n) \in M_0$. We aim to prove $c_M(a_1, \ldots, a_n) \in M_1$. Similarly, we assume a set $A \subseteq M$ such that $\bigcup_{c \in \Sigma} c_M(A, \ldots, A) \subseteq A$ and try to prove $c_M(a_1, \ldots, a_n) \in M_0$. By induction hypothesis, $a_1, \ldots, a_n \in M_1$, which implies that $c_M(a_1, \ldots, a_n)$ is in the big-union on the left, and thus in A. Done.

(Case $M_1 \subseteq M_0$). We just need to prove that M_1 satisfies the condition that $\bigcup_{c \in \Sigma} c_M(M_0, \ldots, M_0) \subseteq M_0$, which follows directly by the construction of M_0.

Hence we conclude that $M_0 = M_1$. By axiom (INDUCTIVE DOMAIN), $M_1 = M$ is the total set, and thus $M = M_0$. Note that (INDUCTIVE DOMAIN) forces the model M to be an inductive one (i.e., M_0), and thus admits inductive reasoning.

We now define the isomorphism:

$$(M, \{c_M\}_{c \in \Sigma}) \underset{j}{\overset{i}{\rightleftarrows}} (T^{\Sigma}, \{c_{T^{\Sigma}}\}_{c \in \Sigma})$$

inductively as follows:

- $i(c_M) = c$, for $c \in \Sigma_{\lambda, Term}$;
- $i(c_M(a_1, \ldots, a_n)) = c(i(a_1), \ldots, i(a_n))$, for $c \in \Sigma_{Term...Term, Term}$;
- $j(c) = c_M$, for $c \in \Sigma_{\lambda, Term}$;
- $j(c(t_1, \ldots, t_n)) = c_M(j(t_1), \ldots, j(t_n))$, for $c \in \Sigma_{Term...Term, Term}$.

It is then straightforward to verify that $i \circ j$ and $j \circ i$ are both identity function, by induction. In addition, they are isomorphic to each other. $\blacksquare$

Proposition 23 is a direct corollary of Theorem 22.

Proof of Theorem 23: Let us fix a model $M \vDash \Gamma^{\mathbb{N}}$. By Theorem 22, the reduct of M over the sub-signature $\{0 \in \Sigma_{\lambda,Nat}, succ \in \Sigma_{Nat,Nat}\}$ is isomorphic to natural numbers $\mathbb{N}$, under the isomorphism:

$$(M, \{0_M, succ_M\}) \underset{j}{\overset{i}{\rightleftharpoons}} (\mathbb{N}, \{0, s\})$$

where $s(n) = n + 1$ is the successor function on $\mathbb{N}$.

Our aim is to show that the four axioms about *plus* and *mult* force a *unique* interpretation in M. In particular, $+$ and $\times$ obviously give two valid interpretations under the above (i, j)-isomorphism, as they clearly satisfies the axioms. But the uniqueness of the interpretations of *plus* and *mult* is trivial, as the four axioms form a valid *inductive* definition in M. ∎

Appendix G
Properties about Proof System $\mathcal{H}_\mu$

We present and proof some important properties about $\mathcal{H}_\mu$. First of all, we can generalized Lemma 66 to the setting with set variables and μ-binder.

Lemma 84. $\bar{\rho}(\varphi[\psi/X]) = \overline{\rho[\rho(\psi)/X]}(\varphi)$ *for all* $X \in \mathrm{SVar}$.

Proof: Carry out induction on the structure of φ. The only interesting case is when $\varphi \equiv \mu Z . \varphi_1$. By α-renaming, we can safely assume $Z \notin FV(\psi)$. We have:

$$\bar{\rho}((\mu Z . \varphi_1)[\psi/X])$$
$$= \bar{\rho}(\mu Z . (\varphi_1[\psi/X]))$$
$$= \bigcap \{A \mid \overline{\rho[A/Z]}(\varphi_1[\psi/X]) \subseteq A\}$$
$$= \bigcap \{A \mid \overline{\rho[A/Z][\overline{\rho[A/Z]}(\psi)/X]}(\varphi_1) \subseteq A\}$$
$$= \bigcap \{A \mid \overline{\rho[A/Z][\bar{\rho}(\psi)/X]}(\varphi_1) \subseteq A\}$$
$$= \bigcap \{A \mid \overline{\rho[\bar{\rho}(\psi)/X][A/Z]}(\varphi_1) \subseteq A\}$$
$$= \overline{\rho[\bar{\rho}(\psi)/X]}(\mu Z . \varphi_1)$$
$$= \overline{\rho[\bar{\rho}(\psi)/X]}(\varphi).$$

Done. ∎

We prove the soundness theorem.

Proof of Theorem 24: The soundness of all proof rules in $\mathcal{H}$ are proved as in Theorem 13. We just need to prove the soundness of (Set Variable Substitution), (Pre-Fixpoint), and (Knaster-Tarski). Let M be a model.

(Set Variable Substitution). Assume $M \vDash \varphi$. By definition, $\bar{\rho}(\varphi) = M$ for all ρ. Our goal is to show $M \vDash \varphi[\psi/X]$. Let ρ be any valuation. We have $\bar{\rho}(\varphi[\psi/X]) = \overline{\rho[\bar{\rho}(\psi)/X]}(\varphi)$. Note that $\rho[\bar{\rho}(\psi)/X]$ is just another valuation, so $\overline{\rho[\bar{\rho}(\psi)/X]}(\varphi) = M$ by assumption.

(Pre-Fixpoint). Let ρ be any valuation. Our goal is to prove $\bar{\rho}(\varphi[\mu X . \varphi/X] \rightarrow \mu X . \varphi) = M$. By definition, $\bar{\rho}(\varphi[\mu X . \varphi/X]) = \overline{\rho[\bar{\rho}(\mu X . \varphi)/X]}(\varphi)$, and $\bar{\rho}(\mu X . \varphi) = \bigcap \{A \mid \overline{\rho[A/X]}(\varphi) \subseteq A\}$. By Knaster-Tarski theorem, $\bar{\rho}(\mu X . \varphi)$ itself is a fixpoint of $\overline{\rho[A/X]}(\varphi) = A$. Therefore, $\overline{\rho[\bar{\rho}(\mu X . \varphi)/X]}(\varphi) = \bar{\rho}(\mu X . \varphi)$. Done.

(Knaster-Tarski). Assume $M \vDash \varphi[\psi/X] \rightarrow \psi$. Our goal is to prove $M \vDash \mu X . \varphi \rightarrow \psi$. Let ρ be any valuation. We need to prove $\bar{\rho}(\mu X . \varphi) \subseteq \bar{\rho}(\psi)$. Note that $\bar{\rho}(\mu X . \varphi)$ is defined as the least fixpoint of $\overline{\rho[A/X]}(\varphi) = A$. By Knaster-Tarski theorem, it suffices to prove $\bar{\rho}(\psi)$ is a pre-fixpoint, i.e., $\overline{\rho[\bar{\rho}(\psi)/X]}(\varphi) \subseteq \bar{\rho}(\psi)$. This is given by our assumption, $M \vDash \varphi[\psi/X] \rightarrow \psi$. This implies that $\bar{\rho}(\varphi[\psi/X]) \subseteq \bar{\rho}(\psi)$, i.e., $\overline{\rho[\bar{\rho}(\psi)/X]}(\varphi) \subseteq \bar{\rho}(\psi)$. Done. ∎

Lemma 85. $\vdash \mu X . \varphi \leftrightarrow \varphi[\mu X . \varphi/X]$.

Proof: We prove both directions.
(Case "$\rightarrow$"). Apply (Knaster-Tarski), and we prove $\vdash \varphi[(\varphi[\mu X . \varphi/X])/X] \rightarrow \varphi[\mu X . \varphi/X]$. By Lemma 89, and the fact that φ is positive in X, we just need to prove $\vdash \varphi[\mu X . \varphi/X] \rightarrow \varphi$, which is proved by (Pre-Fixpoint).
(Case "$\leftarrow$") is exactly (Pre-Fixpoint). ∎

Lemma 86. *The following propositions hold:*
- *Pre-Fixpoint:* $\vdash \nu X . \varphi \rightarrow \varphi[\nu X . \varphi/X]$;
- *Knaster-Tarski:* $\vdash \psi \rightarrow \varphi[\psi/X]$ *implies* $\vdash \psi \rightarrow \nu X . \varphi$.

Proof: These are standard proofs as in modal μ-logic. ∎

Lemma 87. $\Gamma \vdash \varphi_1 \rightarrow \varphi_2$ *implies* $\Gamma \vdash \mu X . \varphi_1 \rightarrow \mu X . \varphi_2$.

Proof: Use (Knaster-Tarski), and then (Set Variable Substitution). ∎

Lemma 88. *For any context C, we have* $\Gamma \vdash \varphi_1 \leftrightarrow \varphi_2$ *if and onlyf if* $\Gamma \vdash C[\varphi_1] \leftrightarrow C[\varphi_2]$.

Proof: Carry out induction on the structure of C. Except the case $C \equiv \mu X . C_1$, all other cases have been proved in Proposition 47. While the μ-case is proved by Lemma 87. ∎

Note that Lemma 88 along with Lemma 85 allow us to "unfold" a least fixpoint pattern $\mu X . \varphi$ and replace it, in-place in any context, by $\varphi[\mu X . \varphi/X]$.

Lemma 89. *A context C is positive if it is positive in $\square$; otherwise, it is negative. Let $\Gamma \vdash \varphi_1 \rightarrow \varphi_2$. We have*

$$\Gamma \vdash C[\varphi_1] \rightarrow C[\varphi_2] \qquad \textit{if } C \textit{ is positive,}$$
$$\Gamma \vdash C[\varphi_2] \rightarrow C[\varphi_1] \qquad \textit{if } C \textit{ is negative.}$$

Proof: Carry out induction on the structure of C. The cases when C is a propositional/FOL context are trivial. The case when C is a symbol application is proved by (Framing). The case when C is a μ-binder is proved by Lemma 87. ∎

Lemma 90. *Let ψ be a predicate pattern and C be a context where $\square$ is not under any μ-binder. We have* $\vdash \psi \wedge C[\varphi] \leftrightarrow \psi \wedge C[\psi \wedge \varphi]$ *for all φ.*

Proof: Carry out induction on the structure of C. The cases when C is a propositional/FOL context are trivial. The case when C is a symbol application is proved using the fact that predicate patterns propagate through symbols. Since $\square$ does not occur under any μ-binder, that is all cases. ∎

Lemma 91. *Let ψ be a predicate pattern and φ be a pattern. Let X be a set variable that does not occur under any μ-binder in φ, and $X \notin FV(\psi)$. We have* $\vdash \psi \wedge \mu X . \varphi \leftrightarrow \mu X . (\psi \wedge \varphi)$.

Proof: Note that "←" is proved by Lemma 87. We only need to prove "→". By propositional reasoning, the goal becomes ⊢ $\mu X . \varphi \rightarrow \psi \rightarrow \mu X . (\psi \wedge \varphi)$ and we apply (KNASTER-TARSKI). We obtain ⊢ $\psi \wedge \varphi[\psi \rightarrow \mu X . (\psi \wedge \varphi)/X] \rightarrow \mu X . (\psi \wedge \varphi)$. By (PRE-FIXPOINT), we just need to prove ⊢ $\psi \wedge \varphi[\psi \rightarrow \mu X . (\psi \wedge \varphi)/X] \rightarrow \psi \wedge \varphi[\mu X . (\psi \wedge \varphi)/X]$. By Lemma 91, we just need to prove ⊢ $\psi \wedge \varphi[\psi \wedge (\psi \rightarrow \mu X . (\psi \wedge \varphi))/X] \rightarrow \psi \wedge \varphi[\mu X . (\psi \wedge \varphi)/X]$, which then by Lemma 89 becomes ⊢ $\psi \wedge \varphi[\psi \wedge (\mu X . (\psi \wedge \varphi))/X] \rightarrow \psi \wedge \varphi[\mu X . (\psi \wedge \varphi)/X]$, which then follows by Lemma 91. ∎

We now obtain a version of deduction theorem for $\mathcal{H}_\mu$, which we believe is not in its strongest form, but it is good enough to prove other theorems in this paper.

Theorem 92 (Deduction Theorem of $\mathcal{H}_\mu$). *Let Γ be an axiom set containing definedness axioms and φ, ψ be two patterns. If $\Gamma \cup \{\psi\} \vdash \varphi$ and the proof (1) does not use (UNIVERSAL GENERALIZATION) on free element variables in ψ; (2) does not use (KNASTER-TARSKI), unless set variable X does not occur under any μ-binder in φ and $X \notin FV(\psi)$; (3) does not use (SET VARIABLE SUBSTITUTION) on free set variables in ψ, then $\Gamma \vdash \lfloor \psi \rfloor \rightarrow \varphi$.*

Proof: Carry out induction on the length of the proof $\Gamma \cup \{\psi\} \vdash \varphi$. (Base Case) and (Induction Case) for (MODUS PONENS) and (UNIVERSAL GENERALIZATION) are proved as in Theorem 92. We only need to prove (Induction Case) for (KNASTER-TARSKI) and (SET VARIABLE SUBSTITUTION).

(Knaster-Tarski). Suppose $\varphi \equiv \mu X . \varphi_1 \rightarrow \varphi_2$. We should prove that $\Gamma \vdash \lfloor \psi \rfloor \rightarrow (\mu X . \varphi_1 \rightarrow \varphi_2)$, i.e., $\Gamma \vdash \lfloor \psi \rfloor \wedge \mu X . \varphi_1 \rightarrow \varphi_2$. Note that $\lfloor \psi \rfloor$ is a predicate pattern. By Lemma 91, our goal becomes $\Gamma \vdash \mu X . (\lfloor \psi \rfloor \wedge \varphi_1) \rightarrow \varphi_2$. By (KNASTER-TARSKI), we need to prove $\Gamma \vdash (\lfloor \psi \rfloor \wedge \varphi_1)[\varphi_2/X] \rightarrow \varphi_2$. Note that $X \notin FV(\lfloor \psi \rfloor)$, so the above becomes $\Gamma \vdash \lfloor \psi \rfloor \wedge \varphi_1[\varphi_2/X] \rightarrow \varphi_2$, i.e., $\Gamma \vdash \lfloor \psi \rfloor \rightarrow \varphi_1[\varphi_2/X] \rightarrow \varphi_2$, which is our induction hypothesis.

(SET VARIABLE SUBSTITUTION). Trivial. Note that $X \notin FV(\psi)$. ∎

Proof of Proposition 25: We refer readers to [1] for some of the proof techniques that we use. Notice that $\varphi(x)$ as well as other formulas are patterns of sort *Pred*. However, the (INDUCTIVE DOMAIN) axiom is about the sort *Nat*. Therefore, our first step is to lift φ from *Pred* to *Nat*, using the definedness symbols. In fact, we will use the membership and equality constructs that are defined from the definedness symbols. We define $N = \exists x . x \wedge \lceil \varphi(x) \rceil^{Nat}_{Pred}$, which captures the set of all numbers in which φ holds. One can prove that $x \in N = \lceil \varphi(x) \rceil^{Nat}_{Pred}$.

Since all patterns of sort *Pred* are predicate patterns, we may use the deduction theorem (Theorem 92) and assume $\varphi(0)$ and $\forall x . (\varphi(x) \rightarrow \varphi(succ(x)))$, and to prove $\forall x . \varphi(x)$. Using the equality $x \in N = \lceil \varphi(x) \rceil^{Nat}_{Pred}$, this means that we assume $0 \in N$ and $\forall x . (x \in N \rightarrow succ(x) \in N)$ and prove $\forall x . x \in N$, which implies N by (MEMBERSHIP ELIMINATION).

By (KNASTER-TARSKI), it suffices to prove only $0 \vee succ(N) \rightarrow N$, which requires to prove $0 \rightarrow N$ and $succ(N) \rightarrow N$. The first is proved by the assumption that $0 \in N$. The second is proved by considering $y \in succ(N) \rightarrow y \in N$, which then becomes $(\exists x . y \in succ(x) \wedge x \in N) \rightarrow y \in N$. By the fact that *succ* is a function, it becomes $x \in N \rightarrow succ(x) \in N$, which is then proved by our second assumption. Done. ∎

Even though we tactically blur the distinction between constant symbol $\sigma \in \Sigma_{\lambda, s_1 \otimes \cdots \otimes s_n \otimes s}$ and *n*-ary symbol $\sigma \in \Sigma_{s_1 \ldots s_n, s}$, doing so will cause us a lot of trouble in this section, when our aim is to prove such as blur of syntax actually works. Therefore, within this section, we introduce and use a more distinct syntax that distinguishes the two.

We use the following notations (and their meaning):

$$\sigma \in \Sigma_{s_1, \ldots, s_n, s}$$
$$\alpha_\sigma \in \Sigma_{\lambda, s_1 \otimes \cdots \otimes s_n \otimes s}$$

$\sigma(\varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_n)$	symbol application
$\alpha_\sigma[\varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_n]$	projections
$\sigma(x_1, \ldots, x_n) = \alpha_\sigma[x_1, \ldots, x_n]$	recursive symbol
$\alpha_\sigma = \mu \alpha . \exists \vec{x} \langle \vec{x}, \varphi[\alpha/\sigma] \rangle$	definition of α_σ

Before we prove Theorem 29, we introduce a useful lemma that allows us to prove properties about least fixpoint patterns. Recall that rule (KNASTER-TARSKI) allows us to prove theorems of the form $\Gamma \vdash \mu X . \varphi \rightarrow \psi$. However, in practice, the least fixpoint pattern $\mu X . \varphi$ is not always the only components on the left hand side, but rather stay *within some contexts*. The following lemma is particularly useful in practice, as it allows us to "plug out" the least fixpoint pattern from its context, so that we can apply (KNASTER-TARSKI). After that, we may "plug it back" into the context.

Lemma 93. *Let $C[\square]$ be a context such that $\square$ does not occur under any μ-binder, and*

- *$C[\varphi \wedge \psi] = C[\varphi] \wedge \psi$, for all patterns φ and all predicate patterns ψ;*
- *$C[\exists x . \varphi] = \exists x . C[\varphi]$, for all φ and $x \notin FV(C[\square])$.*

Then we have that $\Gamma \vdash C[\varphi] \rightarrow \psi$ if and only if $\Gamma \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \exists x . x \wedge \lfloor C[x] \rfloor \rightarrow \psi \rfloor$.

Proof: We prove both directions simultaneously. Note that it is easy to prove that $\Gamma \vdash \varphi = \exists x . (x \wedge (x \in \varphi))$ using rules (MEMBERSHIP) in the proof system $\mathcal{P}$ (see Fig. 3).

We start with $\Gamma \vdash C[\varphi] \rightarrow \psi$. By the mentioned equality, we get $\Gamma \vdash C[\exists x . (x \wedge (x \in \varphi))] \rightarrow \psi$. By the properties of C, it becomes $\Gamma \vdash (\exists x . C[x] \wedge x \in \varphi) \rightarrow \psi$, which, by FOL reasoning, becomes $\Gamma \vdash x \in \varphi \rightarrow (C[x] \rightarrow \psi)$. Note that $x \in \varphi$ is a predicate pattern, so the goal is equivalent to $\Gamma \vdash x \in \varphi \rightarrow \lfloor C[x] \rightarrow \psi \rfloor$.

Now we are almost done. To show the "if" part, we apply (MEMBERSHIP INTRODUCTION) on $\Gamma \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \exists x . x \wedge \lfloor C[x] \rightarrow \psi \rfloor$ and obtain $\Gamma \vdash y \in \varphi \rightarrow \exists x . (y \in x) \wedge \lfloor C[x] \rightarrow \psi \rfloor$.

Note that y is a fresh variable and $y \notin FV(C[x]) \cup FV(\psi)$, so $y \in \lfloor C[x] \to \psi \rfloor = \lfloor C[x] \to \psi \rfloor$. Notice that $y \in x = (y = x)$. And we obtain $\Gamma \vdash y \in \varphi \to \lfloor C[y] \to \psi \rfloor$. Done.

To show the "only if" part, we apply some simple FOL reasoning on $\Gamma \vdash x \in \varphi \to \lfloor C[x] \to \psi \rfloor$ and conclude that $\Gamma \vdash (\exists x . (x \wedge x \in \varphi)) \to \exists x . (x \wedge \lfloor C[x] \to \psi \rfloor)$. Then by the equality $\varphi = \exists x . (x \wedge x \in \varphi)$, we are done. ∎

Note the conditions about the context C in Lemma 93 are important. Many contexts that arise in practice satisfy the conditions. In particular, (nested) symbol contexts satisfy the conditions automatically.

Under the above new notation and the lemma, we are ready to prove Theorem 29.

Proof of Theorem 29: (Pre-Fixpoint). This is proved by simply unfolding α_σ following its definition.

(Knaster-Tarski). We give the following proof that goes backward from conclusion to their sufficient conditions.

$$\sigma(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \to \psi$$
$$\Longleftarrow \quad \alpha_\sigma[x_1, \ldots, x_n] \to \psi$$
$$\Longleftarrow \quad \alpha \to \exists \alpha . (\alpha \wedge \lfloor \alpha[x_1, \ldots, x_n] \to \psi \rfloor)$$
$$\Longleftarrow \quad \alpha_\sigma \to \forall \vec{x} . \underbrace{\exists \alpha . (\alpha \wedge \lfloor \alpha[x_1, \ldots, x_n] \to \psi \rfloor)}_{\alpha_0}$$
$$\Longleftarrow \quad \exists \vec{x} . \langle \vec{x}, \varphi[\forall \vec{x} . \alpha_0 / \sigma] \rangle \to \forall \vec{x} . \alpha_0$$
$$\Longleftarrow \quad \langle \vec{x}, \varphi[\forall \vec{x} . \alpha_0 / \sigma] \rangle \to \alpha_0[z_1 / x_1 \ldots z_n / x_n]$$
$$\Longleftarrow \quad \langle \vec{x}, \varphi[\forall \vec{x} . \alpha_0 / \sigma] \rangle$$
$$\qquad \to \exists \alpha . (\alpha \wedge \lfloor \alpha[z_1, \ldots, z_n] \to \psi[z_1 / x_1 \ldots z_n / x_n] \rfloor)$$
$$\Longleftarrow \quad \langle \vec{x}, \varphi[\forall \vec{x} . \alpha_0 / \sigma] \rangle[x_1, \ldots, x_n] \to \psi$$
$$\Longleftarrow \quad \varphi[\forall \vec{x} . \alpha_0 / \sigma] \to \psi$$
$$\Longleftarrow \quad \varphi[\forall \vec{x} . \alpha_0 / \sigma] \to \varphi[\psi / \sigma]$$

Notice that the last step is by $\Gamma \vdash \varphi[\psi / \sigma] \to \psi$.

By the positiveness of φ in σ (see Lemma 89), we just need to prove that for all $\varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_n$:

$$\Gamma \vdash (\forall \vec{x} . \alpha_0)[\varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_n] \to \psi[\varphi_1 / x_1 \ldots \varphi_n / x_n]$$

By (Key-Value) and definition of α_0, the above becomes

$$\Gamma \vdash z_1 \in \varphi_1 \wedge \cdots \wedge z_n \in \varphi_n \wedge \psi[z_1 / x_1 \ldots z_n / x_n]$$
$$\to \psi[\varphi_1 / x_1 \ldots \varphi_n / x_n],$$

which holds by assumption. Done. ∎

What is interesting in the above proof is that we used only (Key-Value) and did not use (Injectivity) and (Product Domain). The last two axioms are used in the proof of Theorem 30, where we need to establish an isomorphism between *models* of LFP and MmL. In there, the two axioms are needed to constrain MmL models.

Appendix J
Proof of Theorem 30

We first show that the theory of products (see Definition 27) capture precisely the product set $M_s \times M_t$. We denote the theory of products as Γ^{product}, consisting of the three axioms (Injectivity), (Key-Value), and (Product Domain).

Lemma 94. *For any signature Σ consisting two sorts s, t and their product sort $s \otimes t$, there exists an isomorphism*

$$M_{s \otimes t} \overset{i}{\underset{j}{\rightleftharpoons}} M_s \times M_t.$$

Under the above isomorphism, we adopt the following abbreviations for all $a \in M_s, b \in M_s, p \in M_s \times M_t$:

$$\langle a, b \rangle \equiv (\langle \_, \_ \rangle_{s,t})_M(a, b) \qquad p(v) \equiv (\_(\_)_{s,t})_M(p, v)$$

Then for all $f : M_s \to \mathcal{P}(M_t)$ and $\alpha \subseteq \mathcal{P}(M_s \times M_t)$, we have

$$f(a) = uncurry(f)(a) \qquad curry(\alpha)(a) = \alpha(a).$$

Proof: By (Product Domain), $M_{s \otimes t} = \bar{\rho}(\exists k \exists v . \langle k, v \rangle) = \cup_{a \in M_s, b \in M_t} \langle a, b \rangle$. Define the (i, j)-isomorphism such that $i(\langle a, b \rangle) = (a, b)$ and $j((a, b)) = \langle a, b \rangle$. Note that i is well-defined because of (Injectivity). Clearly, i, j form an isomorphism between $M_{s \times t}$ and $M_s \times M_t$.

Now we prove the two equations. They are straightforward. Note that $uncurry(f)(a) = \{(a, b) \mid b \in f(a)\}(a) = \{b \mid b \in f(a)\} = f(a)$. Similarly, $curry(\alpha)(a) = \{b \mid (a, b) \in \alpha\} = \alpha(a)$ by definition. Done. ∎

Corollary 95. *For any signature Σ containing sorts $s_1, \ldots, s_n, t$ and their product sorts $s_1 \otimes \cdots \otimes s_n \otimes t$, there exists an isomorphism between $M_{s_1 \otimes \cdots \otimes s_n \otimes t}$ and $M_{s_1} \times \cdots \times M_{s_n} \times M_t$. And for any function $f : M_{s_1} \times \cdots \times M_{s_n} \to \mathcal{P}(M_t)$ and sets $\alpha \subseteq M_{s_1} \times \cdots \times M_{s_n} \times M_t$, we have*

$$f(a_1, \ldots, a_n) = uncurry(f)(\alpha)$$
$$curry(\alpha)(a_1, \ldots, a_n) = \alpha(a_1, \ldots, a_n)$$

where we abbreviate $\alpha(a_1, \ldots, a_n) \equiv \alpha(a_1) \ldots (a_n)$ is a composition of projections.

We now review the syntax and semantics of LFP, slightly adapted to fit the best with our setting.

Definition 96. Let (S, Σ, Π) be a FOL signature. LFP extends FOL formulas by the following additional rule:

$$\varphi ::= \cdots \mid [\mathsf{lfp}_{R, \vec{x}} \varphi](t_1, \ldots, t_n)$$

where R is an n-ary predicate variable and φ is positive in R. LFP valuations also extend FOL that map every n-ary predicate variable R to and n-ary relation $\rho(R) \subseteq \mathcal{P}(M^n)$.[4] Given a FOL model M and a valuation ρ, LFP extends the

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[4]This is where we are different from the classic LFP. In classic LFP, formulas cannot contain predicate variables that occur free. And the semantics of predicate variables, which is needed when we define the semantics of $[\mathsf{lfp}_{R, x_1, \ldots, x_n}]$, are given by an extended model M' that takes R as an n-ary predicate symbol and interprets it as a relation $\alpha \subseteq M_{s_1} \times \cdots \times M_{s_n}$. Here, we allow predicate variables to occur free in a formula, and we extend valuations to give them semantics, instead of modifying the model. This slightly modified presentation is obviously the same as the classic one, but fits better in our setting and looks more similar and uniform to MmL.

semantics of FOL by adding the following valuation rule for least fixpoint formulas:

$$M, \rho \vDash_{\mathsf{LFP}} [\mathsf{lfp}_{R,\vec{x}} \varphi](t_1, \ldots, t_n),$$
$$\text{if } (\rho(t_1), \ldots, \rho(t_n)) \in$$
$$\bigcap \{\alpha \subseteq M_{s_1} \times \cdots \times M_{s_n} \mid \text{for all } a_i \in M_{s_i}, 1 \leq i \leq n,$$
$$M, \rho[\alpha/R, \vec{a}/\vec{x}] \vDash_{\mathsf{LFP}} \varphi \text{ implies } (a_1, \ldots, a_n) \in \alpha\}$$

LFP formula φ is valid, denoted $\vDash_{\mathsf{LFP}} \varphi$, if $M, \rho \vDash_{\mathsf{LFP}} \varphi$ for all M and ρ.

Proof of Theorem 30: The proof is mainly based on the isomorphism between LFP models and MmL Γ^{LFP}-models. Notice that the (FUNCTION) axioms forces symbols in all Γ^{LFP}-models are functions. In addition, the axiom $\forall x{:}Pred \forall y{:}Pred . x = y$ forces the carrier set of *Pred* must be a singleton set, say, $\{\star\}$.

(The "if" direction). We follow the same idea as we prove that ML captures faithfully FOL (see [1]), we construct from an LFP model $(\{M_s^{\mathsf{LFP}}\}_{s \in S}, \Sigma^{\mathsf{LFP}}, \Pi^{\mathsf{LFP}})$ a corresponding MmL Γ^{LFP} model, denoted $(\{M_s^{\mathsf{MmL}}\}_{s \in S} \cup \{M_{Pred}^{\mathsf{MmL}}\}, \Sigma^{\mathsf{MmL}})$ with $M_s^{\mathsf{MmL}} = M_s^{\mathsf{LFP}}$, $M_{Pred}^{\mathsf{MmL}} = \{\star\}$, and Σ^{MmL} defined as in Section II-D consisting of symbols that are all functions. An LFP valuation ρ^{LFP} derives a corresponding MmL valuation ρ^{MmL} such that $\rho^{\mathsf{MmL}}(x) = \rho^{\mathsf{LFP}}(x)$ for all LFP (element) variables x and $\rho^{\mathsf{MmL}}(R) = \rho^{\mathsf{LFP}}(R) \times \{\star\}$. Our goal is to prove that for all LFP formulas φ, we have $M^{\mathsf{LFP}}, \rho^{\mathsf{LFP}} \vDash_{\mathsf{LFP}} \varphi$ if and only if $\overline{\rho^{\mathsf{MmL}}}(\varphi) = \{\star\}$. Firstly, notice that as shown in [1], $\overline{\rho^{\mathsf{MmL}}}(t) = \{\rho^{\mathsf{LFP}}(t)\}$ for all terms t. Therefore, to simplify our notation we uniformly use $\rho(t)$ in both LFP and MmL settings. Carry out induction on the structure of φ. The only additional cases (compared with FOL) are $\varphi \equiv R(t_1, \ldots, t_n)$ and $\varphi \equiv [\mathsf{lfp}_{R,x_1,\ldots,x_n} \psi](t_1, \ldots, t_n)$. The first case is easy, as shown in the following reasoning: $M^{\mathsf{LFP}}, \rho^{\mathsf{LFP}} \vDash R(t_1, \ldots, t_n)$ iff $(\rho(t_1), \ldots, \rho(t_n)) \in \rho^{\mathsf{LFP}}(R)$ iff $(\rho(t_1), \ldots, \rho(t_n), \star) \in \overline{\rho^{\mathsf{MmL}}}(R)$ iff $\overline{\rho^{\mathsf{MmL}}}(R(t_1, \ldots, t_n)) = \{\star\}$. The second case when $\varphi \equiv [\mathsf{lfp}_{R,x_1,\ldots,x_n} \psi](t_1, \ldots, t_n)$ is shown as the following reasoning:

$$M^{\mathsf{LFP}}, \rho^{\mathsf{LFP}} \vDash_{\mathsf{LFP}} [\mathsf{lfp}_{R,x_1,\ldots,x_n} \psi](t_1, \ldots, t_n)$$
iff $(\rho(t_1), \ldots, \rho(t_n)) \in$
$$\bigcap \{\alpha \subseteq M_{s_1}^{\mathsf{LFP}} \times \cdots \times M_{s_n}^{\mathsf{LFP}} \mid \text{for all } a_i \in M_{s_i}^{\mathsf{LFP}}, 1 \leq i \leq n,$$
$$M^{\mathsf{LFP}}, \rho^{\mathsf{LFP}}[\alpha/R, \vec{a}/\vec{x}] \vDash_{\mathsf{LFP}} \psi \text{ implies } (a_1, \ldots, a_n) \in \alpha\}$$
iff (by induction hypothesis)
$$(\rho(t_1), \ldots, \rho(t_n)) \in$$
$$\bigcap \{\alpha \subseteq M_{s_1}^{\mathsf{MmL}} \times \cdots \times M_{s_n}^{\mathsf{MmL}} \mid \text{for all } a_i \in M_{s_i}^{\mathsf{MmL}}, 1 \leq i \leq n,$$
$$\overline{(\rho[\alpha/R, \vec{a}/\vec{x}])^{\mathsf{MmL}}}(\psi) = \{\star\} \text{ implies } (a_1, \ldots, a_n) \in \alpha\}$$
iff (by definition of $(\rho[\alpha/R, \vec{a}/\vec{x}])^{\mathsf{MmL}}$)
$$(\rho(t_1), \ldots, \rho(t_n)) \in$$
$$\bigcap \{\alpha^+ \subseteq M_{s_1}^{\mathsf{MmL}} \times \cdots \times M_{s_n}^{\mathsf{MmL}} \times \{\star\} \mid$$
$$\text{for all } a_i \in M_{s_i}^{\mathsf{MmL}}, 1 \leq i \leq n,$$
$$\overline{\rho^{\mathsf{MmL}}[\alpha^+/R, \vec{a}/\vec{x}]}(\psi) = \{\star\} \text{ implies } (a_1, \ldots, a_n, \star) \in \alpha^+\}$$

iff (by reasoning about sets)
$$(\rho(t_1), \ldots, \rho(t_n)) \in$$
$$\bigcap \{\alpha^+ \subseteq M_{s_1}^{\mathsf{MmL}} \times \cdots \times M_{s_n}^{\mathsf{MmL}} \times \{\star\} \mid$$
$$\bigcup_{a_i \in M_{s_i}^{\mathsf{MmL}}} (a_1, \ldots, a_n, \overline{\rho^{\mathsf{MmL}}[\alpha^+/R, \vec{a}/\vec{x}]}(\psi)) \subseteq \alpha^+\}$$
iff (by MmL semantics)
$$(\rho(t_1), \ldots, \rho(t_n)) \in$$
$$\overline{\rho^{\mathsf{MmL}}}((\mu R \colon s_1 \otimes \ldots \otimes s_n \otimes Pred . \exists x_1 \ldots \exists x_n . \langle x_1, \ldots, x_n, \psi \rangle)),$$

and the last statement, by MmL semantics, is equivalent to $\overline{\rho^{\mathsf{MmL}}}([\mathsf{lfp}_{R,x_1,\ldots,x_n} \psi](t_1, \ldots, t_n))$, Done. And now we conclude that $\Gamma^{\mathsf{LFP}} \vDash \varphi$ then $\vDash_{\mathsf{LFP}} \varphi$. Otherwise, there exists an LFP model M^{LFP} and valuation ρ^{LFP} such that $M^{\mathsf{LFP}}, \rho^{\mathsf{LFP}} \nvDash_{\mathsf{LFP}} \varphi$, and this implies that in the Γ^{LFP}-model M^{MmL}, we have $\overline{\rho^{\mathsf{MmL}}}(\varphi) \neq \{\star\}$, meaning that $\Gamma^{\mathsf{LFP}} \nvDash \varphi$.

(The "only if" part). Notice the axiom $\forall x{:}Pred \forall y{:}Pred . x = y$ forces that $M_{Pred} = \{\star\}$ must be a singleton set, which ensures that the above translation from an LFP model M^{LFP} to an MmL model M^{MmL} can go *backward*. Specifically, for every MmL (function) symbol $f \in \Sigma_{s_1 \ldots s_n, s}^{\mathsf{MmL}}$, we construct from its interpretation $f_{M^{\mathsf{MmL}}} \colon M_{s_1} \times \cdots \times M_{s_n} \to \mathcal{P}(M_s)$, the corresponding LFP function $f_{M^{\mathsf{LFP}}} \colon M_{s_1} \times \cdots \times M_{s_n} \to M_s$ such that $f_{M^{\mathsf{MmL}}}(a_1, \ldots, a_n) = \{f_{M^{\mathsf{LFP}}}(a_1, \ldots, a_n)\}$. Similarly, for every MmL (function) symbol $\pi \in \Sigma_{s_1 \ldots s_n, Pred}^{\mathsf{MmL}}$, we construct from its interpretation $\pi_{M^{\mathsf{MmL}}} \colon M_{s_1} \times \cdots \times M_{s_n} \to \{\emptyset, \{\star\}\}$, the corresponding LFP predicate $\pi_{M^{\mathsf{LFP}}} \subseteq M_{s_1} \times \cdots \times M_{s_n}$, such that $\pi_{M^{\mathsf{LFP}}} \subseteq M_{s_1} \times \cdots \times M_{s_n} = \{(a_1, \ldots, a_n) \mid \pi_{M^{\mathsf{MmL}}}(a_1, \ldots, a_n) = \{\star\}\}$. Then we carry out the same reasoning as in the "if" part, and we are done. ∎

APPENDIX K
PROOF OF THEOREM 31

Proof: We conduct structural induction on φ. The case when $\varphi \equiv p(\varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_n)$ where p is a recursive predicate is proved directly by the definition of the canonical model *Map*. The other cases have been proved in [1, Proposition 9.2]. ∎

APPENDIX L
PROOF OF THEOREM 32

Theorem 32 shows that our definition of modal μ-logic in MmL is faithful. We have shown a proof sketch in the main paper. We give the complete detailed proof in this subsection. The main purpose is to give an example, as the proofs of the corresponding theorems for LTL/CTL/DL have similar forms.

Lemma 97. $\vdash_\mu \varphi$ *implies* $\Gamma^\mu \vdash \varphi$.

Proof: We need to prove that all modal μ-logic proof rules are provable in matching μ-logic. Recall that modal μ-logic contains all propositional tautologies and (MODUS PONENS), plus the following four rules:

(K) $\quad \circ(\varphi_1 \to \varphi_2) \to (\circ\varphi_1 \to \circ\varphi_2)$

(N) $\quad \dfrac{\varphi}{\circ\varphi}$

(μ_1) $\quad \varphi[(\mu X.\varphi)/X] \to \mu X.\varphi$

(μ_2) $\quad \dfrac{\varphi[\psi/X] \to \psi}{\mu X.\varphi \to \psi}$

Notice that (K) and (N) are proved by Proposition 12, and (μ_1) and (μ_2) are exactly (Pre-Fixpoint) and (Knaster-Tarski). ∎

Lemma 98. *For all $\mathbb{S} = (S, R)$ and all valuations $V : \mathrm{PVar} \to \mathcal{P}(S)$, we have $s \in \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_V^{\mathbb{S}}$ if and only if $s \in \bar{V}(\varphi)$.*

Proof: Carry out structural induction on φ.

(Case $\varphi \equiv X$). We have $\llbracket X \rrbracket_V^{\mathbb{S}} = V(X) = \bar{V}(X)$. Proved.

(Case $\varphi \equiv \varphi_1 \wedge \varphi_2$). We have $\llbracket \varphi_1 \wedge \varphi_2 \rrbracket_V^{\mathbb{S}} = \llbracket \varphi_1 \rrbracket_V^{\mathbb{S}} \cap \llbracket \varphi_2 \rrbracket_V^{\mathbb{S}} = \bar{V}(\varphi_1) \wedge \bar{V}(\varphi_2) = \bar{V}(\varphi_1 \wedge \varphi_2)$. Proved.

(Case $\varphi \equiv \neg \varphi_1$). We have $\llbracket \neg \varphi_1 \rrbracket_V^{\mathbb{S}} = S \setminus \llbracket \varphi_1 \rrbracket_V^{\mathbb{S}} = S \setminus \bar{V}(\varphi_1) = S \setminus (S \setminus \bar{V}(\neg \varphi_1)) = \bar{V}(\neg \varphi_1)$. Proved.

(Case $\varphi \equiv \circ \varphi_1$). By Proposition 33, we have $\llbracket \circ \varphi_1 \rrbracket_V^{\mathbb{S}} = \{s \in S \mid s\,R\,t \text{ implies } t \in \llbracket \varphi_1 \rrbracket_V^{\mathbb{S}} \text{ for all } t \in S\} = \{s \in S \mid s \in \bar{V}(\circ \varphi_1)\} = \bar{V}(\circ \varphi_1)$. Proved.

(Case $\varphi \equiv \mu X . \varphi_1$). We have $\llbracket \mu X . \varphi_1 \rrbracket_V^{\mathbb{S}} = \bigcap \{A \subseteq S \mid \llbracket \varphi_1 \rrbracket_{V[A/X]}^{\mathbb{S}} \subseteq A\} = \bar{V}(\mu X . \varphi_1)$. Proved.

Induction is finished and lemma is proved. ∎

Corollary 99. $\Gamma^\mu \vDash \varphi$ *implies* $\vDash_\mu \varphi$.

Proof: Assume the opposite. Then there exist $\mathbb{S} = (S, R)$, $\rho : \mathrm{PVar} \to \mathcal{P}(S)$, and $s \in S$ such that $s \notin \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_V^{\mathbb{S}}$. By Lemma 98, $s \notin \bar{V}(\varphi)$. Since $\mathbb{S} \vDash \Gamma^\mu$, we have $\Gamma^\mu \nvDash \varphi$. Contradiction. ∎

Now we have completed the proof of Theorem 32, where (2) $\Longrightarrow$ (3) is given by Lemma 97, and (5) $\Longrightarrow$ (6) is given by Corollary 99.

Appendix M
Proof of Proposition 33

Proof of Proposition 33: We simply apply definition. Recall that $s \in \bullet_{\mathbb{S}}(t)$ iff $s\,R\,t$.

(Case "$\bullet$"). $s \in \bar{\rho}(\bullet \varphi)$ iff there exists $t \in \bar{\rho}(\varphi)$ such that $s \in \bullet_{\mathbb{S}}(t)$ iff there exists t such that $s\,R\,t$ and $t \in \bar{\rho}(\varphi)$.

(Case "$\circ$"). $s \in \bar{\rho}(\circ \varphi)$ iff $s \in \bar{\rho}(\neg \bullet \neg \varphi)$ iff $s \notin \bar{\rho}(\bullet \neg \varphi)$ iff (use (Case "$\bullet$")) for all t, $t \in \bar{\rho}(\neg \varphi)$ implies $s \notin \bullet_{\mathbb{S}}(t)$ iff for all t, $s \in \bullet_{\mathbb{S}}(t)$ implies $t \in \bar{\rho}(\varphi)$ iff for all t, $s\,R\,t$ implies $t \in \bar{\rho}(\varphi)$.

(Case "$\Diamond$"). Note that $\bar{\rho}(\Diamond \varphi) = \bigcap\{A \subseteq S \mid \rho[A/X](\varphi \vee \bullet X) \subseteq A\} = \bigcap\{A \subseteq S \mid \bar{\rho}(\varphi) \cup \bullet_{\mathbb{S}}(A) \subseteq A\}$. On the other hand, $\{s \in S \mid \exists t \in S \text{ such that } t \in \bar{\rho}(\varphi) \text{ and } s\,R^*\,t\} = \{s \in S \mid \exists t \in S, \exists n \geq 0 \text{ such that } t \in \bar{\rho}(\varphi) \text{ and } s\,R^n\,t\} = \{s \in S \mid \exists n \geq 0 \text{ such that } s \in \bullet_{\mathbb{S}}^n(\bar{\rho}(\varphi))\} = \bigcup_{n \geq 0} \bullet_{\mathbb{S}}^n(\bar{\rho}(\varphi))$. Therefore, we just need to prove the two sets:

$$(\eta) \equiv \bigcap\{A \subseteq S \mid \bar{\rho}(\varphi) \cup \bullet_{\mathbb{S}}(A) \subseteq A\}$$
$$(\xi) \equiv \bigcup_{n \geq 0} \bullet_{\mathbb{S}}^n(\bar{\rho}(\varphi))$$

are equal. This can be directly proved by Knaster-Tarski theorem.

(Case "$\Box$"). Similar to (Case "$\Diamond$").

(Case "$\varphi_1\,U\,\varphi_2$"). As in (Case "$\Diamond$"), we define two sets:

$$(\eta) \equiv \bar{\rho}(\varphi_1\,U\,\varphi_2) = \bigcap\{A \subseteq S \mid \bar{\rho}(\varphi_2) \cup (\bar{\rho}(\varphi_1 \cap \bullet_{\mathbb{S}}(A))) \subseteq A\}$$
$$(\xi) \equiv \{s \in S \mid \text{exist } n \geq 0 \text{ and } t_1, \ldots, t_n \in S \text{ such that }$$
$$s\,R\,t_1\,R \ldots R\,t_n, \text{ and } s, t_1, \ldots, t_{n-1} \in \bar{\rho}(\varphi_1), t_n \in \bar{\rho}(\varphi_2)\}$$

(Taut)	φ, if φ is a propositional tautology
(MP)	$\dfrac{\varphi_1 \quad \varphi_1 \to \varphi_2}{\varphi_2}$
(K$_\circ$)	$\circ(\varphi_1 \to \varphi_2) \to (\circ\varphi_1 \to \circ\varphi_2)$
(N$_\circ$)	$\dfrac{\varphi}{\circ\varphi}$
(K$_\Box$)	$\Box(\varphi_1 \to \varphi_2) \to (\Box\varphi_1 \to \Box\varphi_2)$
(N$_\Box$)	$\dfrac{\varphi}{\Box\varphi}$
(Fun)	$\circ\varphi \leftrightarrow \neg(\circ\neg\varphi)$
(U$_1$)	$(\varphi_1\,U\,\varphi_2) \to \Diamond\varphi_2$
(U$_2$)	$(\varphi_1\,U\,\varphi_2) \leftrightarrow (\varphi_2 \vee (\varphi_1 \wedge \circ(\varphi_1\,U\,\varphi_2)))$
(Ind)	$\Box(\varphi \to \circ\varphi) \to (\varphi \to \Box\varphi)$

Fig. 4. Infinite-trace LTL proof system

and then use Knaster-Tarski theorem to prove them equal.

(Case "WF"). Again, we define two sets:

$$(\eta) \equiv \bar{\rho}(\mu X . \circ X) = \bigcap\{A \subseteq S \mid (S \setminus A) \subseteq \bullet_{\mathbb{S}}(S \setminus A)\}$$
$$(\xi) \equiv \{s \in S \mid s \text{ has no infintie path}\}$$

and then use Knaster-Tarski theorem to prove them equal. ∎

Appendix N
Proof of Theorem 34

As a review, we formally define the semantics of infinite-trace LTL and present in Fig. 4 its sound and complete proof system. There are different notions of semantics of infinite-trace LTL. We here review the one that fits best in our setting.

Let us first formally define some characteristic subclasses of transition systems.

Definition 100. A transition system $\mathbb{S} = (S, R)$ is:
- *well-founded* if for all $s \in S$, there is no infinite path from s;
- *non-terminating*, if for all $s \in S$ there is $t \in S$ such that $s\,R\,t$.
- *linear*, if for all $s \in S$ and $t_1, t_2 \in S$ such that $s\,R\,t_1$ and $s\,R\,t_2$, then $t_1 = t_2$.

Definition 101. Infinite-trace LTL formulas φ is interpreted over a transition system $\mathbb{S} = (S, R)$ that is *non-terminating* and *linear*. We use s_k to denote the unique state such that $s R s_1 R s_2 R \ldots R s_k$, for $k \geq 0$. When $k = 0$, we let $s_0 = s$. Given a valuation $V : \mathrm{PVar} \to \mathcal{P}(S)$, semantics of infinite-trace LTL is inductively defined for all $s \in S$ and φ as follows:
- $s \vDash_{\mathsf{infLTL}} X$ if $s \in V(X)$;
- $s \vDash_{\mathsf{infLTL}} \varphi_1 \wedge \varphi_2$ if $s \vDash_{\mathsf{infLTL}} \varphi_1$ and $s \vDash_{\mathsf{infLTL}} \varphi_2$;
- $s \vDash_{\mathsf{infLTL}} \neg\varphi$ if $s \nvDash_{\mathsf{infLTL}} \varphi$;
- $s \vDash_{\mathsf{infLTL}} \circ\varphi$ if $s_1 \vDash_{\mathsf{infLTL}} \varphi$;
- $s \vDash_{\mathsf{infLTL}} \varphi_1\,U\,\varphi_2$ if exists $k \geq 0$ such that $s_k \vDash_{\mathsf{infLTL}} \varphi_2$ and for all $0 \leq i < k$, $s_i \vDash_{\mathsf{infLTL}} \varphi_1$.

Lemma 102. $\vDash_{\mathsf{infLTL}} \varphi$ *implies* $\Gamma^{\mathsf{infLTL}} \vdash \varphi$.

Proof: We just need to prove that all proof rules in Fig. 4 can be proved in Γ^{infLTL}.

(TAUT) and (MP). Trivial.

(K$_\circ$) and (N$_\circ$). By Proposition 12.

(K$_\square$) and (N$_\square$). Proved by applying (KNASTER-TARSKI) first, followed by simple propositional and modal logic reasoning.

(FUN, "$\rightarrow$"). Proved from axiom (INF) $\bullet\top$ and simple modal logic reasoning.

(FUN, "$\leftarrow$"). Exactly axiom (LIN).

(U$_1$). By (KNASTER-TARSKI) followed by propositional reasoning.

(U$_2$). By definition of $\varphi_1\, U\, \varphi_2$ as a least fixpoint and (FUN).

(IND). By (KNASTER-TARSKI). ∎

Lemma 103. $s \vDash_{\mathsf{infLTL}} \varphi$ *if and only if* $s \in \bar{V}(\varphi)$.

Proof: We make two interesting observations. Firstly, it suffices to prove merely the "only if" part. The "if" part follows by considering the "only if" part on $\neg\varphi$.

Secondly, the definition of "$s \vDash_{\mathsf{infLTL}} \varphi$" is an *inductive* one, meaning that "$\vDash_{\mathsf{infLTL}}$" is the least relation that satisfies the five conditions in Definition 101. To show that "$s \vDash_{\mathsf{infLTL}} \varphi$ implies $s \in \bar{V}(\varphi)$", it suffices to show that $s \in \bar{V}(\varphi)$ satisfies the same conditions. This is easily followed by Proposition 33.

Note how interesting that this lemma is proved by applying Knaster-Tarski theorem in the meta-level. ∎

Corollary 104. $\Gamma^{\mathsf{infLTL}} \vDash \varphi$ *implies* $\vDash_{\mathsf{infLTL}} \varphi$.

Proof: Assume the opposite and there exists a transition system $\mathbb{S} = (S, R)$ that is linear and non-terminating, a valuation V, and a state $s \in S$ such that $s \nvDash_{\mathsf{infLTL}} \varphi$. By Lemma 103, $s \notin \bar{V}(\varphi)$, meaning that $\mathbb{S} \nvDash \varphi$. Since $\mathbb{S}$ is non-terminating and linear, the axioms (INF) and (LIN) hold in $\mathbb{S}$, and thus $\Gamma^{\mathsf{infLTL}} \nvDash \varphi$. Contradiction. ∎

Now we are ready to prove Theorem 34.

Proof of Theorem 34: Use Lemma 102 and Corollary 104, as well as the soundness of MmL proof system and the completeness of infinite-trace LTL proof system. ∎

APPENDIX O
PROOF OF THEOREM 35

We review the semantics of finite-trace LTL as well as its sound and complete proof system presented in Fig. 5.

The following definition is adapted from [10] to fit best in our setting.

Definition 105. Finite-trace LTL formulas φ is interpreted over a transition system $\mathbb{S} = (S, R)$ that is *well-founded* and *linear*. One can show that $S = \{s_1, \ldots, s_n\}$ must be finite, and the transition relation of $\mathbb{S}$ must be of the linear structure $s_1 R \ldots R s_n$. Given a valuation $V: \mathrm{PVAR} \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(S)$, semantics of infinite-trace LTL is inductively defined for all $s_i \in S$ and φ as follows:

- $s_i \vDash_{\mathsf{finLTL}} X$ if $s_i \in V(X)$;
- $s_i \vDash_{\mathsf{finLTL}} \varphi_1 \wedge \varphi_2$ if $s_i \vDash_{\mathsf{finLTL}} \varphi_1$ and $s_i \vDash_{\mathsf{finLTL}} \varphi_2$;
- $s_i \vDash_{\mathsf{finLTL}} \neg\varphi$ if $s_i \nvDash_{\mathsf{finLTL}} \varphi$;
- $s_i \vDash_{\mathsf{finLTL}} \circ\varphi$ if $s_i = s_n$ or $s_{i+1} \vDash_{\mathsf{finLTL}} \varphi$;
- $s_i \vDash_{\mathsf{finLTL}} \varphi_1\, U_w\, \varphi_2$ if either $s_j \vDash_{\mathsf{finLTL}} \varphi_1$ for all $j \geq i$, or there exists $i \leq k \leq n$ such that $s_k \vDash_{\mathsf{finLTL}} \varphi_2$ and for all $i \leq j < k$, $s_j \vDash_{\mathsf{finLTL}} \varphi_1$.

(TAUT)	φ, if φ is a propositional tautology
(MP)	$\dfrac{\varphi_1 \quad \varphi_1 \rightarrow \varphi_2}{\varphi_2}$
(K$_\circ$)	$\circ(\varphi_1 \rightarrow \varphi_2) \rightarrow (\circ\varphi_1 \rightarrow \circ\varphi_2)$
(N$_\circ$)	$\dfrac{\varphi}{\circ\varphi}$
(K$_\square$)	$\square(\varphi_1 \rightarrow \varphi_2) \rightarrow (\square\varphi_1 \rightarrow \square\varphi_2)$
(N$_\square$)	$\dfrac{\varphi}{\square\varphi}$
($\neg\circ$)	$\neg\circ\varphi \rightarrow \circ\neg\varphi$
(coIND)	$\dfrac{\circ\varphi \rightarrow \varphi}{\varphi}$
(FIX)	$(\varphi_1\, U_w\, \varphi_2) \leftrightarrow (\varphi_2 \vee (\varphi_1 \wedge \circ(\varphi_1\, U_w\, \varphi_2)))$

Fig. 5. Finite-trace LTL proof system

Lemma 106. $\vdash_{\mathsf{finLTL}} \varphi$ *implies* $\Gamma^{\mathsf{finLTL}} \vdash \varphi$.

Proof: We just need to prove all proof rules in Fig. 5 can be proved by axioms (FIN) and (LIN) in MmL. We skip the ones that have shown in Lemma 102.

($\neg\circ$). Proved by axiom (LIN).

(coIND). Use axiom (FIN) $\mu X \,.\, \circ X$ and to prove $\Gamma^{\mathsf{finLTL}} \vdash \mu X \,.\, \circ X \rightarrow \varphi$ by (KNASTER-TARSKI).

(FIX). By definition of $\varphi_1\, U_w\, \varphi_2$ as a least fixpoint. ∎

Lemma 107. $s \vDash_{\mathsf{finLTL}} \varphi$ *if and only if* $s \in \bar{V}(\varphi)$.

Proof: As in Lemma 103, we just need to prove the "only if" part, by showing that $s \in \bar{V}(\varphi)$ satisfies the five conditions in Definition 105. This is easily followed by Proposition 33. The case $\varphi_1\, U_w\, \varphi_2$ shall be proved by directly applying MmL semantics. ∎

Corollary 108. $\Gamma^{\mathsf{finLTL}} \vDash \varphi$ *implies* $\vDash^{\mathsf{finLTL}} \varphi$.

Proof: Assume the opposite and use Lemma 107. ∎

Now we can prove Theorem 35.

Proof of Theorem 35: Use Lemma 106 and Corollary 108, as well as the soundness of MmL proof system and the completeness of finite-trace LTL proof system. ∎

APPENDIX P
PROOF OF THEOREM 36

We review the semantics of CTL as well as its sound and complete proof system presented in Fig. 6.

Definition 109. CTL formulas are interpreted on a transition system $\mathbb{S} = (S, R)$ that is non-terminating, and a valuation $V: \mathrm{PVAR} \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(S)$. We call an (infinite) sequence of states $s_0 s_1 \ldots$ a *path* if $s_i R s_{i+1}$ for all $i \geq 0$. CTL semantics is defined inductively for all $s_0 \in S$ and φ as follows:

- $s_0 \vDash_{\mathsf{CTL}} X$ if $s_0 \in V(X)$;
- $s_0 \vDash_{\mathsf{CTL}} \varphi_1 \wedge \varphi_2$ if $s_0 \vDash_{\mathsf{CTL}} \varphi_1$ and $s_0 \vDash_{\mathsf{CTL}} \varphi_2$;
- $s_0 \vDash_{\mathsf{CTL}} \neg\varphi$ if $s_0 \nvDash_{\mathsf{CTL}} \varphi$;
- $s_0 \vDash_{\mathsf{CTL}} \mathsf{EX}\varphi$ if there exists s_1 such that $s_0 R s_1$, $s_1 \vDash_{\mathsf{CTL}} \varphi$;
- $s_0 \vDash_{\mathsf{CTL}} \mathsf{AX}\varphi$ if for all s_1 such that $s_0 R s_1$, $s_1 \vDash_{\mathsf{CTL}} \varphi$;
- $s_0 \vDash_{\mathsf{CTL}} \varphi_1 \mathsf{EU} \varphi_2$ if there exists a path $s_0 s_1 \ldots$ and $k \geq 0$ such that $s_k \vDash_{\mathsf{CTL}} \varphi_2$, and $s_0, \ldots, s_{k-1} \vDash_{\mathsf{CTL}} \varphi_1$;

(TAUT)	φ, if φ is a propositional tautology
(MP)	$\dfrac{\varphi_1 \quad \varphi_1 \rightarrow \varphi_2}{\varphi_2}$
(CTL$_1$)	$\mathsf{EX}(\varphi_1 \vee \varphi_2) \leftrightarrow \mathsf{EX}\varphi_1 \vee \mathsf{EX}\varphi_2$
(CTL$_2$)	$\mathsf{AX}\varphi \leftrightarrow \neg(\mathsf{EX}\neg\varphi)$
(CTL$_3$)	$\varphi_1 \mathsf{EU} \varphi_2 \leftrightarrow \varphi_2 \vee (\varphi_1 \wedge \mathsf{EX}(\varphi_1 \mathsf{EU} \varphi_2))$
(CTL$_4$)	$\varphi_1 \mathsf{AU} \varphi_2 \leftrightarrow \varphi_2 \vee (\varphi_1 \wedge \mathsf{AX}(\varphi_1 \mathsf{AU} \varphi_2))$
(CTL$_5$)	$\mathsf{EX}true \wedge \mathsf{AX}true$
(CTL$_6$)	$\mathsf{AG}(\varphi_3 \rightarrow (\neg\varphi_2 \wedge \mathsf{EX}\varphi_3)) \rightarrow (\varphi_3 \rightarrow \neg(\varphi_1 \mathsf{AU} \varphi_2))$
(CTL$_7$)	$\mathsf{AG}(\varphi_3 \rightarrow (\neg\varphi_2 \wedge (\varphi_1 \rightarrow \mathsf{AX}\varphi_3)))$
	$\rightarrow (\varphi_3 \rightarrow \neg(\varphi_1 \mathsf{EU} \varphi_2))$
(CTL$_8$)	$\mathsf{AG}(\varphi_1 \rightarrow \varphi_2) \rightarrow (\mathsf{EX}\varphi_1 \rightarrow \mathsf{EX}\varphi_2)$

Fig. 6. CTL proof system

(TAUT)	φ, if φ is a propositional tautology
(MP)	$\dfrac{\varphi_1 \quad \varphi_1 \rightarrow \varphi_2}{\varphi_2}$
(DL$_1$)	$[\alpha](\varphi_1 \rightarrow \varphi_2) \rightarrow ([\alpha]\varphi_1 \rightarrow [\alpha]\varphi_2)$
(DL$_2$)	$[\alpha](\varphi_1 \wedge \varphi_2) \leftrightarrow ([\alpha]\varphi_1 \wedge [\alpha]\varphi_2)$
(DL$_3$)	$[\alpha \cup \beta]\varphi \leftrightarrow [\alpha]\varphi \wedge [\beta]\varphi$
(DL$_4$)	$[\alpha \,;\beta]\varphi \leftrightarrow [\alpha][\beta]\varphi$
(DL$_5$)	$[\psi?]\varphi \leftrightarrow (\psi \rightarrow \varphi)$
(DL$_6$)	$\varphi \wedge [\alpha][\alpha^*]\varphi \leftrightarrow [\alpha^*]\varphi$
(DL$_7$)	$\varphi \wedge [\alpha^*](\varphi \rightarrow [\alpha]\varphi) \rightarrow [\alpha^*]\varphi$
(GEN)	$\dfrac{\varphi}{[\alpha]\varphi}$

Fig. 7. Dynamic logic proof system

- $s_0 \vDash_{\mathsf{CTL}} \varphi_1 \mathsf{AU} \varphi_2$ if for all paths $s_0 s_1 \ldots$ there exists $k \geq 0$ such that $s_k \vDash_{\mathsf{CTL}} \varphi_2$, and $s_0, \ldots, s_{k-1} \vDash_{\mathsf{CTL}} \varphi_1$;.

We write $\vDash_{\mathsf{CTL}} \varphi$ if for all $\mathbb{S} = (S, R)$, all valuations ρ, and all $s \in S$, $s \vDash_{\mathsf{CTL}} \varphi$.

Lemma 110. $\vdash_{CTL} \varphi$ *implies* $\Gamma^{CTL} \vdash \varphi$.

Proof: We just need to prove all CTL rules from the axiom (INF) in MmL. We skip the first 7 rules as they are simple. The rest 3 rules can be proved by applying (KNASTER-TARSKI) and use properties in Properties 117. ∎

Lemma 111. $s \vDash_{CTL} \varphi$ *if and only if* $s \in \bar{V}(\varphi)$.

Proof: As in Lemma 103, we just need to prove the "only if" part by showing that $s \in \bar{V}(\varphi)$ satisfies all 7 conditions in Definition 109. The first 5 of them are simple. We show the last two ones about "EU" and "AU".

(Case EU). Assume there exists a path $s_0 s_1 \ldots$ and $k \geq 0$ such that $s_k \in \bar{V}(\varphi_2)$ and $s_0, \ldots, s_{k-1} \in \bar{V}(\varphi_1)$. Our goal is to show $s_0 \in \bar{V}(\varphi_1 \mathsf{EU} \varphi_2)$. By semantics of MmL, $\bar{V}(\varphi_1 \mathsf{EU} \varphi_2) = \bar{V}(\mu X . \varphi_2 \vee (\varphi_1 \wedge \bullet X)) = \bigcap\{A \subseteq S \mid \bar{V}(\varphi_2) \cup (\bar{V}(\varphi_1) \cap \bullet_{\mathbb{S}}(A)) \subseteq A\}$. Therefore, it suffices to prove that $s_0 \in A$ for all $A \subseteq S$ such that $\bar{V}(\varphi_2) \subseteq A$ and $\bar{V}(\varphi_1) \cap \bullet_{\mathbb{S}}(A) \subseteq A$. This is easy, $s_k \in \bar{V}(\varphi_2) \subseteq A$ implies $s_{k-1} \in \bullet_{\mathbb{S}}(s_k)$. Also, $s_{k-1} \in \bar{V}(\varphi_1)$ by assumption. Then $s_{k-1} \in \bar{V}(\varphi_1) \cap \bullet_{\mathbb{S}}(s_k) \subseteq A$. Repeat this procedure for k times and we obtain $s_0 \in A$. Done.

(Case AU). Let us denote $\circ_{\mathbb{S}}(A) = \{s \in S \mid$ for all $t \in S$ such that $s R t, t \in A\}$ to be the "interpretation" of "all-path next $\circ$" in $\mathbb{S}$. Prove by contradiction. Assume the opposite statement that $s_0 \notin \bar{V}(\varphi_1 \mathsf{AU} \varphi_2) = \bar{V}(\mu X . \varphi_2 \vee (\varphi_1 \wedge \circ X)) = \bigcap\{A \subseteq S \mid \bar{V}(\varphi_2) \cup (\bar{V}(\varphi_1) \cap \circ_{\mathbb{S}}(A)) \subseteq A\}$. This means that there exists $A \subseteq S$ such that $\bar{V}(\varphi_2) \subseteq A$ and $\bar{V}(\varphi_1) \cap \circ_{\mathbb{S}}(A) \subseteq A$, and $s_0 \notin A$. This is going to cause contradiction. Firstly by $\bar{V}(\varphi_2) \subseteq A$, $s_0 \notin \bar{V}(\varphi_2)$, which implies that $s_0 \in \bar{V}(\neg\varphi_2)$. Secondly by $\bar{V}(\varphi_1) \cap \circ_{\mathbb{S}}(A) \subseteq A$, we know that $(S \setminus A) \subseteq \bar{V}(\neg\varphi_1) \cup \bullet_{\mathbb{S}}(S \setminus A)$. Since $s_0 \notin A$, we know either $s_0 \in \bar{V}(\neg\varphi_1)$ or $s_0 \in \bullet_{\mathbb{S}}(S \setminus A)$. If it is the first case, then we have a contradiction as any path starting from s_0 contradicts with the condition. If it is the second case, then there exists a state, say s_1, such that $s_0 R s_1$ and $s_1 \notin A$, which also implies $s_1 \notin \bar{V}(\varphi_2)$. Repeat this process and obtain a sequence of state $s_0 s_1 \ldots$. If the sequence is finite, say $s_0 s_1 \ldots s_n$, then by construction $s_0, \ldots, s_n \notin \bar{V}(\varphi_2)$

and $s_n \in \bar{V}(\neg\varphi_1)$, which is a contradiction to the condition. If the sequence is infinite, then by construction $s_0 s_1 \ldots$ satisfies that $s_0, s_1, \notin \bar{V}(\varphi_2)$, which also contradicts to the condition. Done. ∎

Corollary 112. $\Gamma^{CTL} \vDash \varphi$ *implies* $\vDash_{CTL} \varphi$.

Proof: Use Lemma 111 and prove by contradiction. Note that it is easy to verify that $\mathbb{S} \vDash \Gamma^{CTL}$ if $\mathbb{S}$ is non-terminating. ∎

Now we are ready to prove Theorem 36.

Proof of Theorem 36: Use Lemma 110 and Corollary 112, as well as soundness of MmL and completeness of CTL. ∎

APPENDIX Q
PROOF OF THEOREM 37

We review the semantics of DL as well as its sound and complete proof system presented in Fig. 7.

Definition 113. Let $\mathbb{S} = (S, \{R_a\}_{a \in \mathrm{APGM}})$ be an APGM-labeled transition system where $R_a \in S \times S$ is the transition relation for atomic program a. Let $V: \mathrm{PVAR} \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(S)$ be a valuation. DL semantics is inductively defined as follows where state formulas are evaluated to subsets of S and program formulas are evaluated to relations of S:

- $[\![p]\!]_V^{\mathbb{S}} = V(p)$;
- $[\![\varphi_1 \wedge \varphi_2]\!]_V^{\mathbb{S}} = [\![\varphi_1]\!]_V^{\mathbb{S}} \cap [\![\varphi_2]\!]_V^{\mathbb{S}}$;
- $[\![\neg\varphi]\!]_V^{\mathbb{S}} = S \setminus [\![\varphi]\!]_V^{\mathbb{S}}$;
- $[\![[\alpha]\varphi]\!]_V^{\mathbb{S}} = \{s \in S \mid$ for all $t \in S$ such that $(s, t) \in [\![\alpha]\!]_V^{\mathbb{S}}$, we have $t \in [\![\varphi]\!]_V^{\mathbb{S}}\}$;
- $[\![a]\!] = R_a$ for $a \in \mathrm{APGM}$;
- $[\![\alpha_1 \,;\alpha_2]\!]_V^{\mathbb{S}} = [\![\alpha_1]\!]_V^{\mathbb{S}} \circ [\![\alpha_2]\!]_V^{\mathbb{S}}$;
- $[\![\alpha_1 \cup \alpha_2]\!]_V^{\mathbb{S}} = [\![\alpha_1]\!]_V^{\mathbb{S}} \cup [\![\alpha_2]\!]_V^{\mathbb{S}}$;
- $[\![\alpha^*]\!]_V^{\mathbb{S}} = ([\![\alpha]\!]_V^{\mathbb{S}})^*$;
- $[\![\varphi?]\!]_V^{\mathbb{S}} = \{(s, s) \mid s \in [\![\varphi]\!]_V^{\mathbb{S}}\}$.

where "$R_1 \circ R_2$" is the *composition* of two relations R_1, R_2 defined as $R_1 \circ R_2 = \{(s_1, s_3) \mid$ there exists s_2 such that $(s_1, s_2) \in R_1$ and $(s_2, s_3) \in R_2\}$. We write $\vDash_{\mathsf{DL}} \varphi$ if $[\![\varphi]\!]_V^{\mathbb{S}} = S$ for all $\mathbb{S}$ and V.

Lemma 114. $\vdash_{DL} \varphi$ *implies* $\Gamma^{DL} \vdash \varphi$.

Proof: We just need to prove that all proof rules in Fig. 7 can be proved in Γ^{DL}. First of all, rules (DL$_3$) to (DL$_6$) follow from (syntactic sugar) definitions. Rules (Taut) and (MP) are trivial, We only prove (DL$_1$), (DL$_2$), (DL$_7$), and (Gen).

Notice that $[\alpha]\varphi$ is defined a syntactic sugar based on the structure of α. Therefore, we carry out structure induction on α. We should be careful to prevent circular reasoning. Our proving strategy is to prove (Gen) first, and then prove (DL$_1$) and (DL$_2$) simultaneously, and finally prove (DL$_7$).

(Gen). Carry out induction on α. All cases are trivial. Notice the case when $\alpha \equiv \beta^*$ is proved by proving $\Gamma^{\mathsf{DL}} \vdash \varphi \to [\alpha^*]\varphi$ using (Knaster-Tarski). After simplification, the goal becomes $\Gamma^{\mathsf{DL}} \vdash \varphi \to [\beta]\varphi$. This is proved by applying induction hypothesis, which shows $\Gamma^{\mathsf{DL}} \vdash [\beta]\varphi$.

(DL$_1$) and (DL$_2$). We prove both rules simultaneously by induction on α. We discuss only interesting cases and skip the trivial ones. (DL$_1$, $\alpha \equiv \beta_1 ; \beta_2$) is proved from induction hypothesis, by applying (Gen) on $[\beta_1]$. (DL$_1, \alpha \equiv \beta^*$) is proved by applying (Knaster-Tarski), following by applying (DL$_2$, "$\to$") on $[\beta]$. (DL$_2$, $\alpha \equiv \beta^*$, "$\to$") is proved by (Knaster-Tarski). (DL$_2$, $\alpha \equiv \beta^*$, "$\leftarrow$") is proved by (Knaster-Tarski), followed by (DL$_2$) on $[\beta]$.

(DL$_7$) is proved directly by (Knaster-Tarski), followed by (DL$_2$, "$\leftarrow$") on $[\alpha]$. ∎

We now connect the semantics of DL with the semantics of MmL. First of all, we show that the transition system $\mathbb{S} = (S, \{R_a\}_{a \in \text{APGM}})$ can be regarded as a Σ^{LTS}-model, where S is the carrier set of *State* and APGM (the set of atomic programs) is the carrier set of *Pgm*. The "one-path next • $\in \Sigma_{Pgm\,State,State}$ is interpreted *according to DL semantics* for all $t \in S$ and $a \in$ APGM:

$$\bullet_{\mathbb{S}}(a,t) = \{s \in S \mid (s,t) \in R_a\}.$$

In addition, valuation $V: \text{PVAR} \to \mathcal{P}(S)$ can be regarded as a matching μ-logic valuation (where we safely ignore the valuations of element variables because they do not appear in DL syntax).

Lemma 115. *Under the above notations, $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_V^{\mathbb{S}} = \bar{V}(\varphi)$.*

Proof: As in Lemma 103, we just need to prove that $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_V^{\mathbb{S}} \subseteq \bar{V}(\varphi)$ by showing that $\bar{V}(\varphi)$ satisfies the conditions in Definition 113. The only interesting case is to show $\bar{V}([\alpha]\varphi) = \{s \in S \mid$ for all $t \in S, (s,t) \in \llbracket \alpha \rrbracket_V^{\mathbb{S}}$ implies $t \in \bar{V}(\varphi)\}$. We prove it by carrying out structural induction on the DL program formula α. The case when $\alpha \equiv a$ for $a \in$ APGM is easy. The cases when $\alpha \equiv \beta_1 ; \beta_2$, $\alpha \equiv \beta_1 \cup \beta_2$, and $\alpha \equiv \psi$? follows directly by basic analysis about sets and using definition of the semantics of DL program formulas. The interesting case is when $\alpha \equiv \beta^*$. In this case we should prove $\underline{\bar{V}([\beta^*]\varphi) = \bar{V}(\nu X . \varphi \wedge [\beta]X) = \bigcup\{A \mid A \subseteq \bar{V}(\varphi) \cap}$ $\overline{V[A/X]}([\beta]X)\} = \bigcup\{A \mid A \subseteq \bar{V}(\varphi) \cap \{s \mid$ for all $t,(s,t) \in \llbracket \beta \rrbracket_V^{\mathbb{S}}$ implies $t \in S\}\} \stackrel{?}{=} \{s \mid$ for all $t,(s,t) \in \llbracket \beta^* \rrbracket_V^{\mathbb{S}}$ implies $t \in \bar{V}(\varphi)\}$ We denote the left-hand side of "$\stackrel{?}{=}$" as (η) and the right-hand side as (ξ).

To prove $(\eta) = (\xi)$, we prove containment from both directions.

(Case $(\eta) \subseteq (\xi)$). This is proved by considering an $s \in (\eta)$ and show $s \in (\xi)$. By construction of (η), there exists $A \subseteq S$ such that $A \subseteq \bar{V}(\varphi) \cap \{s \mid$ for all $t,(s,t) \in \llbracket \beta \rrbracket_V^{\mathbb{S}}$ implies $t \in A\}$, and that $s \in A$. In order to prove $s \in (\xi)$, we assume $t \in S$ such that $(s,t) \in (\llbracket \beta \rrbracket_V^{\mathbb{S}})^*$ and try to prove $t \in \bar{V}(\varphi)$. By definition, there exists $k \geq 0$ and $s_0, \ldots, s_k$ such that $s = s_0$, $t = s_k$, and $(s_i, s_{i+1}) \in \llbracket \beta \rrbracket_V^{\mathbb{S}}$ for all $0 \leq i < k$. By induction and the property of A, and that $s_0 \in A$, we can prove that $s_0, s_1, \ldots, s_k \in \bar{V}(\varphi)$, and thus $t \in \bar{V}(\varphi)$. Done.

(Case $(\xi) \subseteq (\eta)$). Notice that the set η is defined as a greatest fixpoint, so it suffices to show that (ξ) satisfies the condition, i.e., to prove that $(\xi) \subseteq \bar{V}(\varphi) \cap \{s \mid$ for all $t,(s,t) \in \llbracket \beta \rrbracket_V^{\mathbb{S}}$ implies $t \in (\xi)\}$. This can be easily proved by the definition of (ξ). Done. ∎

Corollary 116. $\Gamma^{\mathsf{DL}} \vDash \varphi$ *implies* $\vDash_{\mathsf{DL}} \varphi$.

Proof: Use Lemma 115, and for the sake of contradiction, assume the opposite. Suppose there exists $\mathbb{S} = (S, \{R_a\}_{a \in \text{APGM}})$ and a valuation V and a state s such that $s \notin \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket_V^{\mathbb{S}}$. We then know $s \notin \bar{V}(\varphi)$, which implies that $\mathbb{S} \nvDash \varphi$. Obviously $\mathbb{S} \vDash \Gamma^{\mathsf{DL}}$ as the theory Γ^{DL} contains no addition axioms. This means that $\Gamma^{\mathsf{DL}} \nvDash \varphi$. ∎

We are ready to prove Theorem 37.

Proof of Theorem 37: Use Lemma 114 and Corollary 116, as well as soundness of MmL and completeness of DL. ∎

APPENDIX R
PROOF OF THEOREM 40

As a review, we use the following notations:

"one-path next"	$\bullet\varphi$, where $\bullet \in \Sigma_{Cfg,Cfg}$
"all-path next"	$\circ\varphi \equiv \neg\bullet\neg\varphi$
"eventually"	$\Diamond\varphi \equiv \mu X . \varphi \vee \bullet X$
"always"	$\Box\varphi \equiv \nu X . \varphi \wedge \circ X$
"well-founded"	$\mathsf{WF} \equiv \mu X . \circ X$
"weak eventually"	$\Diamond_w\varphi \equiv \nu X . \varphi \vee \bullet X$

Proposition 117. *The following propositions hold:*

1) $\vdash \bullet\bot \leftrightarrow \bot$
2) $\vdash \bullet(\varphi_1 \vee \varphi_2) \leftrightarrow \bullet\varphi_1 \vee \bullet\varphi_2$
3) $\vdash \bullet(\exists x . \varphi) \leftrightarrow \exists x . \bullet\varphi$
4) $\vdash \circ\top \leftrightarrow \top$
5) $\vdash \circ(\varphi_1 \wedge \varphi_2) \leftrightarrow \circ\varphi_1 \wedge \circ\varphi_2$
6) $\vdash \circ(\forall x . \varphi) \leftrightarrow \forall x . \circ\varphi$
7) $\vdash \varphi \to \Diamond\varphi$ *and* $\vdash \bullet\Diamond\varphi \to \Diamond\varphi$
8) $\vdash \Box\varphi \to \varphi$ *and* $\vdash \Box\varphi \to \circ\Box\varphi$
9) $\vdash \varphi \to \Diamond_w\varphi$ *and* $\vdash \bullet\Diamond_w\varphi \to \Diamond_w\varphi$
10) $\Gamma \vdash \varphi_1 \to \varphi_2$ *implies* $\Gamma \vdash \star\varphi_1 \to \star\varphi_2$ *where* $\star \in \{\bullet, \circ, \Diamond, \Box, \Diamond_w\}$
11) $\vdash \Diamond\bot \leftrightarrow \bot$
12) $\vdash \Diamond(\varphi_1 \vee \varphi_2) \leftrightarrow \Diamond\varphi_1 \vee \Diamond\varphi_2$
13) $\vdash \Diamond(\exists x . \varphi) \leftrightarrow \exists x . \Diamond\varphi$

14) $\vdash \Box\top \leftrightarrow \top$

15) $\vdash \Box(\varphi_1 \wedge \varphi_2) \leftrightarrow \Box\varphi_1 \wedge \Box\varphi_2$

16) $\vdash \Box(\forall x \,.\, \varphi) \leftrightarrow \forall x \,.\, \Box\varphi$

17) $\vdash \Box\varphi \leftrightarrow \neg\Diamond\neg\varphi$

18) $\vdash \circ\varphi_1 \wedge \bullet\varphi_2 \rightarrow \bullet(\varphi_1 \wedge \varphi_2)$

19) $\vdash \circ(\varphi_1 \rightarrow \varphi_2) \wedge \bullet\varphi_1 \rightarrow \bullet\varphi_2$

20) $\vdash \Diamond_w\varphi \leftrightarrow (\mathsf{WF} \rightarrow \Diamond\varphi)$

21) $\vdash \Diamond_w(\varphi_1 \vee \varphi_2) \leftrightarrow \Diamond_w\varphi_1 \vee \Diamond_w\varphi_2$

22) $\vdash \Diamond_w(\exists x \,.\, \varphi) \leftrightarrow \exists x \,.\, \Diamond_w\varphi$

23) $\vdash \star \star \varphi \leftrightarrow \star\varphi$ *where* $\star \in \{\Diamond, \Box, \Diamond_w\}$

24) $\vdash \mathsf{WF} \leftrightarrow \mu X \,.\, \circ^k X$ *when* $k \geq 1$

25) $\vdash \mathsf{WF} \leftrightarrow \mu X \,.\, \circ\Box X$

26) $\vdash \Box\varphi_1 \wedge \Diamond_w\varphi_2 \rightarrow \Diamond_w(\varphi_1 \wedge \varphi_2)$

27) $\vdash \Box(\varphi_1 \rightarrow \varphi_2) \wedge \varphi_1 \rightarrow \varphi_2$

Proof: We prove them in order.

(1–3) follows from (Propagation), and (Framing).

(4–6) are proved from (1–3) and that $\circ\varphi \equiv \neg\bullet\neg\varphi$.

(7) is proved by (Pre-Fixpoint) that $\vdash \varphi \vee \bullet\Diamond\varphi \rightarrow \Diamond\varphi$.

(8) is proved by (Pre-Fixpoint) that $\vdash \Box\varphi \rightarrow \varphi \wedge \bullet\Box\varphi$.

(9) is proved by (Knaster-Tarski) that $\vdash \varphi \vee \bullet\Diamond_w\varphi \rightarrow \Diamond_w\varphi$.

(10, when $\star$ is $\bullet$) is exactly (Framing).

(10, when $\star$ is $\circ$) is exactly Proposition 12.

(10, when $\star$ is $\Diamond$) requires us to prove $\Gamma \vdash \Diamond\varphi_1 \rightarrow \Diamond\varphi_2$. By (Knaster-Tarski), it suffices to prove $\Gamma \vdash \varphi_1 \vee \bullet\Diamond\varphi_2 \rightarrow \Diamond\varphi_2$, which is proved by (7).

(10, when $\star$ is $\Box$) requires us to prove $\Gamma \vdash \Box\varphi_1 \rightarrow \Box\varphi_2$. By (Knaster-Tarski), it suffices to prove $\Gamma \vdash \Box\varphi_1 \rightarrow \varphi_1 \wedge \bullet\Box\varphi_2$, which is proved by (8).

(10, when $\star$ is $\Diamond_w$) requires us to prove $\Gamma \vdash \Diamond_w\varphi_1 \rightarrow \Diamond_w\varphi_2$. By (Knaster-Tarski), it suffices to prove $\Gamma \vdash \Diamond_w\varphi_1 \rightarrow \varphi_1 \vee \bullet\Diamond_w\varphi_2$, which is proved by (Pre-Fixpoint).

(11, "$\rightarrow$") is proved by (Knaster-Tarski).

(11, "$\leftarrow$") is trivial.

(12, "$\rightarrow$") is proved by (Knaster-Tarski), followed by (2) to propagate "$\bullet$" through "$\vee$", and finished with (7).

(12, "$\leftarrow$") is prove by (10, when $\star$ is $\Diamond$).

(13, "$\rightarrow$") is proved by (Knaster-Tarski), followed by (3) to propagate "$\bullet$" through "$\exists$", and finished with (7).

(13, "$\leftarrow$") is proved by (10, when $\star$ is $\Diamond$).

(14–16) are proved similar to (11–13).

(17, both directions) are proved by (Knaster-Tarski) followed by (Pre-Fixpoint).

(18) is proved by $\circ\varphi \equiv \neg\bullet\neg\varphi$ and (Propagation).

(19) is proved by (18) followed by (10).

(20, "$\rightarrow$") is proved by proving $\vdash \mathsf{WF} \rightarrow (\Diamond_w\varphi \rightarrow \Diamond\varphi)$, which is proved by (Knaster-Tarski) followed by (19).

(20, "$\leftarrow$") is proved by (Knaster-Tarski), followed by (2) to propagate "$\bullet$" through "$\vee$". After some additional propositional reasoning, we obtain two proof goals: $\vdash \Diamond\varphi \rightarrow \varphi \vee \bullet\Diamond\varphi$ and $\vdash \circ\mathsf{WF} \rightarrow \mathsf{WF}$. The former is proved by (Knaster-Tarski) and the latter is exactly (Pre-Fixpoint).

(21, "$\rightarrow$") is proved by applying (20) everywhere followed by (12).

(21, "$\leftarrow$") is proved by (10, when $\star$ is $\Diamond_w$).

(22, "$\rightarrow$") is proved by applying (20) everywhere followed by (13).

(22, "$\leftarrow$") is proved by (10, when $\star$ is $\Diamond_w$).

(23, when $\star$ is $\Diamond$, "$\rightarrow$") is proved by (Knaster-Tarski) followed by (7).

(23, when $\star$ is $\Diamond$, "$\leftarrow$") is proved by (7) and (10).

(23, when $\star$ is $\Box$, "$\rightarrow$") is proved by (8) and (10).

(23, when $\star$ is $\Box$, "$\leftarrow$") is proved by (Knaster-Tarski) followed by (8).

(23, when $\star$ is $\Diamond_w$, "$\rightarrow$") is proved by applying (Knaster-Tarski) first. Then we need to prove $\vdash \Diamond_w\Diamond_w\varphi \rightarrow \varphi \vee \bullet\Diamond_w\Diamond_w\varphi$. By (Pre-Fixpoint), we know $\vdash \Diamond_w\Diamond_w\varphi \rightarrow \Diamond_w\varphi \vee \bullet\Diamond_w\Diamond_w\varphi$. Thus, it suffices to prove $\vdash \Diamond_w\varphi \vee \bullet\Diamond_w\Diamond_w\varphi \rightarrow \varphi \vee \bullet\Diamond_w\Diamond_w\varphi$. By propositional reasoning, we just need to prove $\vdash \Diamond_w\varphi \rightarrow \varphi \vee \bullet\Diamond_w\Diamond_w\varphi$. By (Knaster-Tarski), we know $\vdash \Diamond_w\varphi \rightarrow \varphi \vee \bullet\Diamond_w\varphi$, so it suffices to prove $\vdash \varphi \vee \bullet\Diamond_w\varphi \rightarrow \varphi \vee \bullet\Diamond_w\Diamond_w\varphi$. Again by propositional reasoning, it suffices to prove $\vdash \bullet\Diamond_w\varphi \rightarrow \varphi \vee \bullet\Diamond_w\Diamond_w\varphi$, which can be proved by proving $\vdash \bullet\Diamond_w\varphi \rightarrow \bullet\Diamond_w\Diamond_w\varphi$, which is finally proved by (9) and (10).

(23, when $\star$ is $\Diamond_w$, "$\leftarrow$") is proved by (9) and (10).

Note it is sufficient to prove (24) only for the case $k = 1$.

(24, "$\rightarrow$") is proved by applying (Knaster-Tarski) and (Pre-Fixpoint) first. Then we need to prove $\vdash \mu X \,.\, \circ\circ X \rightarrow \circ\mu X \,.\, \circ\circ X$. Apply (Knaster-Tarski) again, and finished by (Pre-Fixpoint).

(24, "$\leftarrow$") is proved by applying (Knaster-Tarski) followed by (Pre-Fixpoint).

(25, "$\rightarrow$") is proved by applying (Knaster-Tarski) followed by (Pre-Fixpoint). Then we obtain $\vdash \mu X \,.\, \circ\Box X \rightarrow \Box\mu X \,.\, \circ\Box X$. Apply (Knaster-Tarski) on $\Box$, and we obtain $\vdash \mu X \,.\, \circ\Box X \rightarrow \circ\Box\mu X \,.\, \circ\Box X$, finished by (Pre-Fixpoint).

(25, "$\leftarrow$") is proved by (8), (10), and then apply Lemma 87.

(26) is proved by applying (Knaster-Tarski) firstly. After propositional reasoning, we obtain two goals: $\vdash \Box\varphi_1 \wedge \Diamond_w\varphi_2 \rightarrow \varphi_1 \vee \bullet(\Box\varphi_1 \wedge \Diamond_w\varphi_2)$ and $\vdash \Box\varphi_1 \wedge \Diamond_w\varphi_2 \rightarrow \varphi_2 \vee \bullet(\Box\varphi_1 \wedge \Diamond_w\varphi_2)$. The first goal is easily proved by (8). The second goal is by unfolding "$\Diamond_w\varphi_2$" and "$\Box\varphi_1$", and then use (18).

(27) is proved by (8). ∎

Lemma 118. $A \vdash_C \varphi_1 \Rightarrow \varphi_2$ *implies* $\Gamma^{\mathsf{RL}} \vdash \mathrm{RL2MmL}(A \vdash_C \varphi_1 \Rightarrow \varphi_2)$.

Proof: We need to prove that all reachability logic proof rules in Fig. 8 are provable in matching μ-logic.

(Axiom). We prove for the case when $C \neq \emptyset$. The case when $C = \emptyset$ is the same. Our goal, after translation, is $\Gamma^{\mathsf{RL}} \vdash \forall\boxdot A \wedge \forall\boxdot C \rightarrow (\varphi_1 \rightarrow \bullet\Diamond_w\varphi_2)$. By assumption, $\varphi_1 \Rightarrow \varphi_2 \in A$, and thus we just need to prove $\Gamma^{\mathsf{RL}} \vdash \forall(\varphi_1 \rightarrow \bullet\Diamond_w\varphi_2) \rightarrow (\varphi_1 \rightarrow \bullet\Diamond_w\varphi_2)$, which is trivial by FOL reasoning.

(Reflexivity). Notice that $C = \emptyset$ in this rule. Our goal, after translation, is $\Gamma^{\mathsf{RL}} \vdash \forall\boxdot A \rightarrow (\varphi \rightarrow \Diamond_w\varphi)$, which is true by Proposition 117.

(Transitivity, $C = \emptyset$). Our goal, after translation, is $\Gamma^{\mathsf{RL}} \vdash \forall\boxdot A \rightarrow (\varphi_1 \rightarrow \Diamond_w\varphi_3)$. Our two assumptions are $\Gamma^{\mathsf{RL}} \vdash \forall\boxdot A \rightarrow (\varphi_1 \rightarrow \Diamond_w\varphi_2)$ and $\Gamma^{\mathsf{RL}} \vdash \forall\boxdot A \rightarrow (\varphi_2 \rightarrow \Diamond_w\varphi_3)$. From the latter assumption and Proposition 117, we have $\Gamma^{\mathsf{RL}} \vdash \forall\boxdot A \rightarrow (\Diamond_w\varphi_2 \rightarrow \Diamond_w\Diamond_w\varphi_3)$, and then by propositional reasoning and the former assumption we have $\Gamma^{\mathsf{RL}} \vdash \forall\boxdot A \rightarrow (\varphi_1 \rightarrow \Diamond_w\Diamond_w\varphi_3)$. Finally, by Proposition 117

Axiom:
$$\frac{\varphi \Rightarrow \varphi' \in A}{A \vdash_C \varphi \Rightarrow \varphi'}$$

Reflexivity:
$$\frac{}{A \vdash_\emptyset \varphi \Rightarrow \varphi}$$

Transitivity:
$$\frac{A \vdash_C \varphi_1 \Rightarrow \varphi_2 \quad A \cup C \vdash \varphi_2 \Rightarrow \varphi_3}{A \vdash_C \varphi_1 \Rightarrow \varphi_3}$$

Logic Framing:
$$\frac{A \vdash_C \varphi \Rightarrow \varphi' \quad \psi \text{ is a FOL formula}}{A \vdash_C \varphi \wedge \psi \Rightarrow \varphi' \wedge \psi}$$

Consequence:
$$\frac{M^{\mathsf{cfg}} \vDash \varphi_1 \to \varphi_1' \quad A \vdash_C \varphi_1' \Rightarrow \varphi_2' \quad M^{\mathsf{cfg}} \vDash \varphi_2' \to \varphi_2}{A \vdash_C \varphi_1 \Rightarrow \varphi_2}$$

Case Analysis:
$$\frac{A \vdash_C \varphi_1 \Rightarrow \varphi \quad A \vdash_C \varphi_2 \Rightarrow \varphi}{A \vdash_C \varphi_1 \vee \varphi_2 \Rightarrow \varphi}$$

Abstraction:
$$\frac{A \vdash_C \varphi \Rightarrow \varphi' \quad X \cap FV(\varphi') = \emptyset}{A \vdash_C \exists X . \varphi \Rightarrow \varphi'}$$

Circularity:
$$\frac{A \vdash_{C \cup \{\varphi \Rightarrow \varphi'\}} \varphi \Rightarrow \varphi'}{A \vdash_C \varphi \Rightarrow \varphi'}$$

Fig. 8. Reachability logic proof system

we have $\Gamma^{\mathsf{RL}} \vdash \forall \boxdot A \to (\varphi_1 \to \Diamond_w \varphi_3)$, which is what we want to prove.

(TRANSITIVITY, $C \neq \emptyset$). Our goal, after translation, is $\Gamma^{\mathsf{RL}} \vdash \forall \boxdot A \wedge \forall \circ \boxdot C \to (\varphi_1 \to \bullet \Diamond_w \varphi_3)$. Our two assumptions are $\Gamma^{\mathsf{RL}} \vdash \forall \boxdot A \wedge \forall \circ \boxdot C \to (\varphi_1 \to \bullet \Diamond_w \varphi_2)$ and $\Gamma^{\mathsf{RL}} \vdash \forall \boxdot A \wedge \forall \boxdot C \to (\varphi_2 \to \Diamond_w \varphi_3)$. From the first assumption, we have $\Gamma^{\mathsf{RL}} \vdash \forall \boxdot A \wedge \forall \circ \boxdot C \wedge \varphi_1 \to \forall \boxdot A \wedge \forall \circ \boxdot C \wedge \bullet \Diamond_w \varphi_2$, and thus by propositional reasoning, it suffices to prove that $\Gamma^{\mathsf{RL}} \vdash \forall \boxdot A \wedge \forall \circ \boxdot C \wedge \bullet \Diamond_w \varphi_2 \to \bullet \Diamond_w \varphi_3$. From the second assumption and Proposition 117(10), we know that $\Gamma^{\mathsf{RL}} \vdash \bullet \Diamond_w(\forall \boxdot A \wedge \forall \boxdot C \wedge \varphi_2) \to \bullet \Diamond_w \Diamond_w \varphi_3$, which by Proposition 117(23), implies $\Gamma^{\mathsf{RL}} \vdash \bullet \Diamond_w(\forall \boxdot A \wedge \forall \boxdot C \wedge \varphi_2) \to \bullet \Diamond_w \varphi_3$. Then, it suffices to prove $\Gamma^{\mathsf{RL}} \vdash \forall \boxdot A \wedge \forall \circ \boxdot C \wedge \bullet \Diamond_w \varphi_2 \to \bullet \Diamond_w(\forall \boxdot A \wedge \forall \boxdot C \wedge \varphi_2)$. The rest is easy, since by Proposition 117(8), we just need to prove $\Gamma^{\mathsf{RL}} \vdash \forall \circ \boxdot A \wedge \forall \circ \boxdot C \wedge \bullet \Diamond_w \varphi_2 \to \bullet \Diamond_w(\forall \boxdot A \wedge \forall \boxdot C \wedge \varphi_2)$, which then by Proposition 117(18) becomes $\Gamma^{\mathsf{RL}} \vdash \bullet(\forall \boxdot A \wedge \forall \boxdot C \wedge \Diamond_w \varphi_2) \to \bullet \Diamond_w(\forall \boxdot A \wedge \forall \boxdot C \wedge \varphi_2)$, and then by Proposition 117(10) becomes $\Gamma^{\mathsf{RL}} \vdash \forall \boxdot A \wedge \forall \boxdot C \wedge \Diamond_w \varphi_2 \to \Diamond_w(\forall \boxdot A \wedge \forall \boxdot C \wedge \varphi_2)$, which is proved by Proposition 117(26).

(LOGIC FRAMING). We prove for the case when $C \neq \emptyset$. The case when $C = \emptyset$ is the same. Our goal, after translation, is $\Gamma^{\mathsf{RL}} \vdash \forall \boxdot A \wedge \forall \circ \boxdot C \to (\varphi_1 \wedge \psi \to \bullet \Diamond_w(\varphi_2 \wedge \psi))$. Our assumption is $\Gamma^{\mathsf{RL}} \vdash \forall \boxdot A \wedge \forall \circ \boxdot C \to (\varphi_1 \to \bullet \Diamond_w \varphi_2)$. Notice that FOL formula ψ is a predicate pattern, so $\vdash \bullet \Diamond_w(\varphi_2 \wedge \psi) \leftrightarrow (\bullet \Diamond_w \varphi_2) \wedge \psi$, and the rest is by propositional reasoning. The condition that ψ is a FOL formula (and thus a predicate pattern) is crucial to propagate ψ throughout its context.

(CONSEQUENCE). This is the only rule where axioms in Γ^{RL}

is actually used. Again, we prove for the case $C \neq \emptyset$ as the case when $C = \emptyset$ is the same. Our goal, after translation, is $\Gamma^{\mathsf{RL}} \vdash \forall \boxdot A \wedge \forall \circ \boxdot C \to (\varphi_1 \to \bullet \Diamond_w \varphi_2)$. Our three assumptions include $M^{\mathsf{cfg}} \vDash \varphi_1 \to \varphi_1'$, $M^{\mathsf{cfg}} \vDash \varphi_2' \to \varphi_2$, and $\Gamma^{\mathsf{RL}} \vdash \forall \boxdot A \wedge \forall \circ \boxdot C \to (\varphi_1' \to \bullet \Diamond_w \varphi_2')$. Notice that by definition of Γ^{RL}, we know immediately that $\varphi_1 \to \varphi_1' \in \Gamma^{\mathsf{RL}}$ and $\varphi_2' \to \varphi_2 \in \Gamma^{\mathsf{RL}}$. The rest of the proof is simply by Proposition 117(10) and some propositional reasoning.

(CASE ANALYSIS). Simply by some propositional reasoning.

(ABSTRACTION). Simply by some FOL reasoning. Notice that $\forall \boxdot A$ and $\forall \boxdot C$ are closed patterns.

(CIRCULARITY). We prove for the case when $C \neq \emptyset$, as the case when $C = \emptyset$ is the same. Our goal, after translation, is $\Gamma^{\mathsf{RL}} \vdash \forall \boxdot A \wedge \forall \circ \boxdot C \to (\varphi_1 \to \bullet \Diamond_w \varphi_2)$. By FOL reasoning and Proposition 117(20,2,25), the goal becomes $\Gamma^{\mathsf{RL}} \vdash \mu X . \circ \boxdot X \to \forall \boxdot A \wedge \forall \circ \boxdot C \to \forall(\varphi_1 \to \bullet \Diamond_w \varphi_2)$. By (KNASTER-TARSKI) and some FOL reasoning, it suffices to prove $\Gamma^{\mathsf{RL}} \vdash \circ \boxdot(\forall \boxdot A \wedge \forall \circ \boxdot C \to \forall(\varphi_1 \to \bullet \Diamond_w \varphi_2)) \wedge \forall \boxdot A \wedge \forall \circ \boxdot C \to (\varphi_1 \to \bullet \Diamond_w \varphi_2)$. Our assumption, after translation, is $\Gamma^{\mathsf{RL}} \vdash \forall \boxdot A \wedge \forall \circ \boxdot C \wedge \forall \circ(\varphi_1 \to \bullet \Diamond_w \varphi_2) \to (\varphi_1 \to \bullet \Diamond_w \varphi_2)$, so it suffices to prove $\Gamma^{\mathsf{RL}} \circ \boxdot(\forall \boxdot A \wedge \forall \circ \boxdot C \to \forall(\varphi_1 \to \bullet \Diamond_w \varphi_2)) \wedge \forall \boxdot A \wedge \forall \circ \boxdot C \to \forall \boxdot A \wedge \forall \circ \boxdot C \wedge \forall \circ(\varphi_1 \to \bullet \Diamond_w \varphi_2)$, which by some propositional reasoning becomes $\Gamma^{\mathsf{RL}} \vdash \circ \boxdot(\forall \boxdot A \wedge \forall \circ \boxdot C \to \forall(\varphi_1 \to \bullet \Diamond_w \varphi_2)) \wedge \forall \boxdot A \wedge \forall \circ \boxdot C \to \forall \circ(\varphi_1 \to \bullet \Diamond_w \varphi_2)$. By Proposition 117(8), it becomes $\Gamma^{\mathsf{RL}} \vdash \circ \boxdot(\forall \boxdot A \wedge \forall \circ \boxdot C \to \forall(\varphi_1 \to \bullet \Diamond_w \varphi_2)) \wedge \circ \forall \boxdot A \wedge \circ \forall \circ \boxdot C \to \forall \circ(\varphi_1 \to \bullet \Diamond_w \varphi_2)$, and by Proposition 117(5,6,10), it becomes $\Gamma^{\mathsf{RL}} \vdash \boxdot(\forall \boxdot A \wedge \forall \circ \boxdot C \to \forall(\varphi_1 \to \bullet \Diamond_w \varphi_2)) \wedge \forall \boxdot A \wedge \forall \circ \boxdot C \to \forall(\varphi_1 \to \bullet \Diamond_w \varphi_2)$, which is proved by Proposition 117(27). ∎

Corollary 119. $S \vdash_\emptyset \varphi_1 \Rightarrow \varphi_2$ *implies* $\Gamma^{\mathsf{RL}} \vdash \mathrm{RL2MmL}(S \vdash_\emptyset \varphi_1 \Rightarrow \varphi_2)$.

Proof: Let $A = S$ and $C = \emptyset$ in Lemma 118. ∎

Lemma 120. $\Gamma^{\mathsf{RL}} \vDash \mathrm{RL2MmL}(S \vdash_\emptyset \varphi_1 \Rightarrow \varphi_2)$ *implies* $S \vDash_{\mathsf{RL}} \varphi_1 \Rightarrow \varphi_2$.

Proof: Let $\mathbb{S} = (M^{\mathsf{cfg}}_{Cfg}, R)$ be the transition system that is yielded by S. We tactically use the same letter $\mathbb{S}$ to mean the extended $\bar{\Sigma}^{\mathsf{RL}}$-model M^{cfg} with $\bullet \in \Sigma_{Cfg,Cfg}$ be interested as the transition relation R. Then $\mathbb{S} \vDash \Gamma^{\mathsf{RL}}$, because all axioms in Γ^{RL} are about only the configuration model M^{cfg} and says nothing about the transition relation R. Since $M^{\mathsf{cfg}} \vDash \Gamma^{\mathsf{cfg}}$ (by definition), then $\mathbb{S} \vDash \Gamma^{\mathsf{cfg}}$. By condition of the lemma, $\mathbb{S} \vDash \mathrm{RL2MmL}(S \vdash_\emptyset \varphi_1 \Rightarrow \varphi_2)$, i.e., $\mathbb{S} \vDash \forall \boxdot S \to \varphi_1 \to \Diamond_w \varphi_2$. By construction of $\mathbb{S}$, for all rules $\psi_1 \Rightarrow \psi_2 \in S$, we have $\mathbb{S} \vDash \psi_1 \to \bullet \psi_2$ (in MmL), which implies $\mathbb{S} \vDash \forall \boxdot(\psi_1 \to \Diamond_w \psi_2)$, meaning that $\mathbb{S} \vDash \forall \boxdot S$. Therefore, $\mathbb{S} \vDash \varphi_1 \to \Diamond_w \varphi_2$ (in MmL), which is exactly the same meaning as $\mathbb{S} \vDash_{\mathsf{RL}} \varphi_1 \Rightarrow \varphi_2$ (in RL). ∎

Finally, we are ready to prove Theorem 40.

Proof of Theorem 40: Following the same roadmap as in the proof of Theorem 32, where (2) $\Rightarrow$ (3) is given by Corollary 119 and (5) $\Rightarrow$ (6) is given by Lemma 120. The rest is by the sound and (relative) completeness of RL. Notice that technical assumptions of [2] are needed for the completeness result of RL. ∎